Gaza one year after the incident
One year after the Gaza war, this conflict has left deep political, security, and social wounds that have afflicted the entire Middle East and North Africa region.
Gaza Strip, governed by Hamas since 2007 and under Israeli blockade for nearly two decades, has suffered extensive destruction and its infrastructure has been severely damaged.
One year has passed and the Gaza war remains unresolved, increasing the likelihood of conflict across the region.
What is the humanitarian situation like? Will there be normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel? What does the future of the Abraham Accords hold? Will a regional war break out? Experts at the Atlantic Council have addressed these questions.
Israel’s relations with the United States
Israel has entered a new phase known as a schizophrenic rhythm in its relations with the United States.
Because important issues for both sides are heavily intertwined with domestic political considerations.
On one hand, both sides remain committed to ensuring Israel’s security. The Biden administration has uniquely supported Israel militarily, intelligence-wise, and diplomatically, making Israel’s defense forces stronger.
On the other hand, this collaboration has faced intense public scrutiny in the United States and Israel, with some believing that Washington has either not supported its ally enough or has supported it too much.
These conflicting realities complicate the landscape of relations today, with tensions revolving around the approach that the Benjamin Netanyahu government has pursued based on it.
US efforts to promote hostage freedom and a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, halt hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border, institutionalize the architecture of regional defense led by US Central Command, and possibly deepen Israel’s integration in the region have not materialized because Israel prioritizes its own maneuvers on the ground, resists efforts to hand over control to other external organizations. The challenge for Israel will become even more acute with the incoming US administration in January 2025.
The humanitarian situation in Gaza
The streets of Gaza are filled with rubble, and tents can be seen everywhere.
Sewage has been left on the streets of Gaza. Gaza’s streets, which are the passage for both humans and donkeys, are getting worse every day. Since the closure of the Rafah border crossing due to Israel’s invasion of the southern part of the Gaza Strip, humanitarian aid has drastically decreased. Even basic needs such as soap are scarce. What is available in the market is very expensive, and relief organizations have not been able to provide hygiene kits since June. The spread of diseases ranging from Hepatitis A to meningitis and cutaneous leishmaniasis, a flesh-eating bacterial skin disease, endangers the lives of children who are weak in fighting infections and suffering from malnutrition.
Humanitarian efforts are facing strange challenges in the war. In summary, Gaza is practically divided into two parts by Israeli forces. Crossing from north to south and moving to any point to receive humanitarian aid requires Israel’s permission. Israel no longer needs to massacre in Gaza. If humanitarian organizations continue to be deliberately obstructed and unable to provide what people need, the people of Gaza will suffer in more painful ways and in greater numbers.
Confrontation between Israel and Iran
US envoy Amos Hochstein and other diplomats have been trying for months to reach a resolution on the ceasefire in southern Lebanon. Israel’s severe attack on Hezbollah may strengthen the diplomats’ leverage, even if a political solution is not found. Israel can use a temporary period without war to prepare for potential conflicts that may arise. A broader confrontation with Iran, including its nuclear program and constant threats from the Resistance Axis, is not something Israel can handle alone.
Ending the Gaza war by implementing a reconstruction plan can facilitate the emergence of moderate leadership in Palestine and ultimately the formation of a Palestinian state. This can help Israel attract regional and international support to deal with these challenges. Such a plan opens the way for Arab governments to engage with Israel and can potentially isolate Iran and its allies. Iran pursues a long-term strategy to keep pressure on Israel and instigate actions that provoke regional and international reactions, weakening the will of the Israeli people. However, Israel needs a long-term plan to ensure regional cooperation and maintain its international reputation and US support.
Israel has lost its patience.
One important factor that has helped maintain the battle below the threshold of all-out war is that Hezbollah has not yet deployed its more advanced weapon systems, namely precision-guided missile arsenals. On September 25, Hezbollah fired a Fateh-1 missile towards the headquarters of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad near Tel Aviv.
As expected, Hezbollah’s missile was tracked by Israeli air defense systems. The launch of this missile was a warning to Israel that Hezbollah has used only old unguided rockets to target Israeli locations. It is believed that Hezbollah possesses arsenals of 150,000 rockets and missiles of various calibers and ranges, including precision-guided systems capable of carrying 500 kg warheads and accurately hitting targets within a 50-meter radius.
The reason Hezbollah has not resorted to more sophisticated systems is Iran. Tehran does not want Hezbollah, as a key component of the deterrence architecture of the Resistance Axis, to engage in a major and debilitating war with Israel due to Hamas in Gaza. Hezbollah holds significant value for Iran. If Hezbollah were to start launching Fateh-110 missiles at Tel Aviv and other areas in Israel, it would undoubtedly trigger a full-scale war. Iran’s caution has led to disillusionment among Hezbollah’s ranks.
They prefer to use more advanced systems to inflict real damage and pain on Israel despite the intensity of Israeli airstrikes and targeted assassinations of Hezbollah commanders. Surrendering to the onslaught and requesting a ceasefire goes against the ideology of this organization. Currently, the extent of the damage Hezbollah has suffered is uncertain. Israeli authorities have claimed that half of Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles have been destroyed in these airstrikes, leaving the organization in disarray. So far, there is little evidence to support such a claim. Hezbollah has been increasing its rocket attacks on Israel at an accelerating pace and has placed Israeli military targets deeper into Israel than before.
Arab countries are wary of escalating tensions with Iran.
When policymakers and commentators talk about the outlook for a regional war in the Middle East stemming from the escalation of border clashes between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah, what they truly predict or fear is a war launched by Israel against Iran. There is some alignment with Iran in the Gulf Arab countries, but these countries have no interest in joining a war against Iran under any circumstances.
In fact, Gulf countries have normalized their relations with Iran in recent years. Any involvement of Gulf countries in conflicts with Iran will likely be limited to certain permissions for information sharing and air flights. There is doubt whether countries like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will allow actions against Iran from US bases on their soil. The main supporter of a major war against Iran will be Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, who has long advocated for the removal of the Islamic Republic as the only real way to counter threats against Israel.
The hints of regime change are hardly welcomed in the Gulf countries, who closely witnessed the results of US efforts in Iraq. Meanwhile, conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon will somewhat continue next year. Neither Hamas nor Hezbollah are likely to end their attacks. The continuation of conflicts, even at a low level, prevents any significant reconstruction in Gaza and makes it very difficult for people to return to their homes in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.
Tensions in Israel and Egypt relations
A year has passed since the deadly attacks on October 7, 2023 by Hamas on southern Israel. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas has affected the relations between Egypt and Israel, reversing years of progress and destabilizing the relationship between the two neighbors. The relationship between Egypt and Israel had significantly improved in the years leading up to the war, especially after Israel agreed to Cairo’s request for assistance in dealing with ISIS-affiliated insurgencies in northern Sinai Desert.
In 2013, Cairo called for an amendment to the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to allow for the deployment of additional forces and military equipment in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel agreed and allowed around 66,000 Egyptian soldiers to be stationed in the Sinai Desert. Israel also strengthened its security cooperation with Egypt and provided strategic assistance, including intelligence and aerial support, which ultimately helped Cairo contain this threat.
However, the Israel-Hamas conflict has escalated tensions between Egypt and Israel over the past year. Accusations and warnings have been exchanged between the two sides on several disputed issues. In the early weeks of the war, provocative statements by some nationalist ministers in Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet regarding Egypt’s request to accept Palestinian refugees and resettle them in the Sinai Desert sparked a furious reaction from Cairo. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi emphasized that the Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be resolved at the expense of harming other parties and warned that such actions could jeopardize the peace treaty.
Egypt and Israel have also blamed each other for the closure of the Rafah border, which led to the blocking of trucks carrying humanitarian aid in Rafah. While the peace treaty is likely to remain intact, significant Israeli diplomacy is needed to repair the damage in relations with Egypt. If Cairo succeeds in mediating a ceasefire and a hostage exchange between Israel and Hamas, this issue could be a game-changer in restoring relations to pre-war status.
Uprooting Hamas and the possibility of an uprising in Gaza.
With 40% of its fighters still remaining on the battlefield, Hamas still has the capability to launch a large-scale attack in the future. Therefore, there is doubt whether Israel would agree to end the war until Hamas further weakens. Israel has largely concluded its major military operation by clearing the cities of Gaza, Khan Younis, and Rafah.
This means that nearly half of Hamas fighters are either mixed with civilian population or are still hiding among scattered buildings and tunnels in Gaza. Israel will likely have to continue clearance operations throughout the Gaza Strip for a long time, even if a short-term deal is reached for the remaining hostages. It is unlikely that Netanyahu would allow this number of Hamas fighters to remain.
Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, but quickly Yahya Sinwar, the military commander of this group and the architect of the October 7 attack, replaced him. Meanwhile, Israel is forced to start nation-building in Gaza because its stated goal is to replace Hamas with another group in Gaza. Hamas has been governing Gaza since the last elections in 2006. Recent media reports indicate that a multinational peacekeeping force composed of police officers will be formed to ensure security in Gaza. If the people of Gaza reject the presence of this security force, they will likely revolt.
Gaza after the war
Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, outlined Israel’s goal for Gaza after the war in his July 25 speech to the US Congress. Gaza should have a non-militant government run by Palestinians who are not seeking the destruction of Israel. Joe Biden on May 31 defined the United States’ goal as ending the enduring war, returning all hostages home, ensuring Israel’s security, and shaping a better post-war Gaza without Hamas the next day. It is obvious that military power alone will not achieve these goals.
History teaches us lessons that planners after the war should pay attention to issues such as the post-World War II stories of Germany and Japan, and Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan after the war. Who governs Gaza is very important. Foreign experts, political leaders of Israel and the United Arab Emirates all advocate for Gaza to be managed in a transitional period by a multinational official under the supervision of an international contact group with a strong international police force that can prevent Hamas from returning to power.
Some political issues need to be resolved, and only the United States can find a solution. All these plans acknowledge that achieving Biden’s goal requires more direct US intervention than the US has been willing to do, but there is no alternative to prevent Hamas from returning to power. The expression ‘winter is coming’ is on the way, remember the series of thrones and games.
The future of the Abraham Accords
Achieving a sustainable and just solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict without a comprehensive and fair agreement is not possible. Although these agreements have faced criticism for sidelining the Palestinian issue, they still have the potential to serve as a framework for reinvigorating dialogues. Additionally, the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia in these agreements could be a transformative development.
Riyadh has shown interest, but any official action will likely depend on significant progress towards resolving the Palestinian situation. Riyadh’s involvement can not only strengthen the agreements but also pave the way for broader acceptance of Israel in the region, potentially reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics and opening up new avenues to address Palestinian concerns comprehensively. Looking towards the future, the sustainability and success of the Abraham Accords rely on the continuous commitment of all parties to maintain the path of open dialogue, strengthen economic relations, and enhance people-to-people connections beyond political tensions.
Normalization of Saudi Arabia and Israel relations
The cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia has not stopped or decreased one year after Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Saudi Arabia insisted on initiating discussions about normalizing relations only if the formalization of general relations with Israel is done in parallel with establishing a path for the formation of Palestine. This path seemed more like an ambiguous concept just before October 7. If the United States were to take action by providing a defense guarantee to support Riyadh’s non-nuclear energy program, Saudi Arabia was ready to normalize.
However, it was Israel that did not accept the condition that Saudi Arabia imposed, refusing to integrate Israel into the Arab world until Tel Aviv commits to establishing a Palestinian state in the future. Countries like Qatar and Kuwait are forced to defend their relations with Israel less every day than yesterday. Even the United Arab Emirates has stuck its relations with Israel on a dual-track path. Saudi Arabia and Israel, despite differences in models, have similar assessments of threats to their government models. Do not mistake their secrecy with inaction.
Israel’s shift to the right
After a year has passed, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, has still not been able to recover from the defeat of October 7th. However, he has shown cunning in maintaining his coalition as always, and the hopes of many Israelis for early elections have faded. The Israeli economy, which was already hit by controversial judicial reforms before October 7th, has suffered further damage from the conflict. Despite all the turmoil, Netanyahu continues to try to pull himself out of the pit and has increased his popularity.
Recent polls indicate that although Netanyahu may not necessarily be able to form a coalition, he would still garner the most votes if elections were held. The left-wing in Israel has diminished. National polls show that 66% of Jewish Israelis and 61% of Palestinians believe that the opposing side wants to commit genocide against them. Right-wing views in Israel have increasingly solidified and become mainstream.
