How Iran’s deterrence is revived
Reviving Iran’s deterrence would lead to retaliatory attacks by Iran, causing the United States and the European Union to intensify their support for Israel.
However, it does not seem that such attacks will happen in the short term. Iranian leaders have clearly stated that Lebanon’s resistance is capable of reacting to Israel on its own without needing Iran’s assistance.
To understand the nature of Iran’s possible reaction and its impact on diplomatic relations with the West, it is necessary to first understand the role of Hezbollah in Iran’s defense strategy. Iranian leaders realized very late that Israel’s assessment of threats has changed significantly since October 7, and previous red lines no longer have meaning.
While some may assess the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah as a desperate act by Netanyahu to divert attention from his failures in Gaza and strengthen his political position, there is no evidence to suggest that Netanyahu’s provocative methods have faced any resistance from opposition military leaders or the Israeli public overall. Given that the Biden administration has shown no inclination or ability to restrain Israeli actions, it means that Iran must once again establish some form of deterrence.
The option of arming Iran’s nuclear program was becoming more attractive even before Israel’s attack on Lebanon, and now many people support it. However, this option also poses significant risks.
Although Iran has the technical knowledge and nuclear materials to build a bomb, the decision to do so would likely prompt Israel or the US to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.
This decision will also activate the snapback mechanism and the return of the 6 suspended UN Security Council resolutions based on Resolution 2231. The US is no longer a member of the JCPOA, but Britain and France are, and each can trigger the snapback mechanism. There is still time until October 2025, the expiration date of this mechanism, to revive the Security Council sanctions against Iran. This undermines all government efforts to engage with the West in lifting sanctions and improving Iran’s economic situation, leading to increased public dissatisfaction in Iran.
Another option for Iran could be to quickly enhance its air defense, a step that must be taken regardless.
However, in the current situation, this implies relying on Russia and hoping that Russia is willing to respond to Iran’s steps in sending drones and, according to some reports, missiles to Russia.
But Russia also has its own calculations, including Moscow’s concerns about alienating its other partners in the Middle East, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, if it gets too close to Iran.
Even if Iran can overcome these considerations, Moscow may demand much more from Iran, including establishing a military base on Iranian soil, which is a highly controversial issue politically in Iran.
But if Iran faces an existential threat, the Islamic Republic will become closer to Russia, leading to a decrease in the likelihood of resuming talks with the West, especially Europe.
If the Biden administration were to use its leverage against Israel and handle the issues of nuclear programs and regional security with goodwill, it could avoid all these possibilities, considering that America is in the midst of election campaigns, the chance of such actions by Washington is zero.
