How to Revive Iran’s Deterrence
How to Revive Iran’s Deterrence: Iran’s retaliatory attack would lead the United States and the European Union to intensify their support for Israel.
However, it does not seem that such an attack will happen in the short term. Iranian leaders have clearly stated that the Lebanese resistance is capable enough to respond to Israel on its own without needing Iran’s help.
To understand the nature of Iran’s potential reaction and its effect on diplomatic preparations with the West, we first need to know the role of Hezbollah in Iran’s defensive strategy. Iranian leaders realized too late that Israel’s risk assessment has dramatically changed since October 7, and the previous red lines no longer hold meaning.
Although some might evaluate the assassination of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah as a reckless move by Netanyahu to distract from his failures in Gaza and bolster his political position, there is no evidence that Netanyahu’s emotional methods have faced resistance from Israeli military leaders, opposition, or the general Israeli public opinion. Given that the Biden administration has shown no willingness or ability to limit Israel’s actions, it means Iran must once again establish something similar to a deterrence.
The option of weaponizing Iran’s nuclear program was becoming more attractive even before Israel’s attack on Lebanon, and now many people support it. However, this option also carries many risks.
Although Iran has enough technical knowledge and nuclear materials to build a bomb, merely deciding to do so would lead Israel or the United States to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
This decision would also trigger the snapback mechanism and the return of six suspended UN Security Council resolutions based on Resolution 2231. The US is no longer a member of the JCPOA, but Britain and France are, and each can pull the snapback trigger. There is still time for such action until October 2025, when this mechanism expires. The revival of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran would destroy all the plans of the government for dialogue with the West, lifting sanctions, and improving Iran’s economic situation, which would intensify public dissatisfaction in Iran.
Another option for Iran could be to quickly upgrade its air defenses, something it should have done anyway.
But in the current situation, this means relying on Russia and hoping that Russia is willing to reciprocate Iran’s steps to send drones and, according to some reports, missiles to Russia.
However, Russia also has its own calculations, including Moscow’s concerns about alienating its other partners in the Middle East, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, if it gets too close to Iran.
Even if Iran can overcome these considerations, Moscow might demand much more from Iran, including establishing a military base on Iranian soil, which is politically a very controversial issue in Iran.
But if Iran faces an existential threat, then the Islamic Republic would move closer to Russia, thus reducing the chances of resuming talks with the West, especially Europe.
If the Biden administration used its leverage against Israel and approached the nuclear program and regional security issues with goodwill, all these possibilities could have been avoided. Given that the US is in the midst of election campaigns, the chance of such actions from Washington is zero.