The Persian Gulf after the Israel-Iran war: Three lessons learned
The Iran-Israel war: Fire in the Middle East, smoke in the Persian Gulf
The Israel-Iran war forced the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to strengthen their diplomacy with Iran, reject Israel’s military-oriented model due to its incompatibility with their economic focus, and prioritize Gulf unity through a coordinated missile defense system.
The Israel-Iran war has opened a new political chapter in the region for the GCC countries.
The risks stemming from this war have severely threatened the economies of these countries.
Although the ceasefire between Tel Aviv and Tehran was the de-escalation result that GCC countries desired to restore stability to the Persian Gulf region, they have now directly experienced their national vulnerabilities in the event of a Gulf-engaging war.
The diplomatic and defense strategies they have pursued so far, while effective in containing the Iranian threat, are still insufficient for its complete prevention.
In this context, the GCC countries have entered a new era of risks, with three key lessons from the twelve-day crisis: First, diplomatic efforts with Iran must be intensified, and the Arab Gulf capitals are ready to pursue this path alone, as evidenced by the July 7 meeting in Jeddah between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
Second, the military power-based order pursued by Israel in the Middle East differs from the economy-based order sought by Saudi Arabia, and these two orders are incompatible. Third, the GCC countries must invest more in regional unity.
The only way to enhance the security of each of these countries is to set aside doubts and move towards creating a coordinated early warning system against ballistic missiles and drones, at least in this area.
Iran is an active threat that Gulf diplomacy can only contain but not eliminate.
During the Israel-Iran war, the GCC countries continued direct dialogue with Iran to clarify their stance of active neutrality in this conflict. They did not want to side with or assist any party, including the United States, but focused solely on diplomacy to reduce tensions.
However, Iran’s missile attack on the American military base Al Udeid in Qatar had a direct impact on Gulf security. Although the Islamic Republic’s target was retaliation against the United States, the attack ultimately took place on Qatari soil.
This attack is a sign of a rupture in the sensitive trust-building process between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a process that began in 2022 and ultimately led to the 2023 agreement that revived diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Although Iran’s target was not Qatar but the American military base on its soil, this retaliatory action put Doha’s security at risk.
The attack on Al Udeid base taught GCC countries that Tehran, if necessary, prioritizes the security of its regime and national pride over good neighborliness.
This means that the security of the region’s countries will be unguaranteed if the Islamic Republic sees its future threatened.
The GCC countries are also well aware that they must engage directly with Iran without the mediation of extraregional actors, as not all potential mediators are suitable for this role.
Qatar has previously played a significant role in mediating the ceasefire between Israel and Iran along with the United States.
Globally, the United States even directly engaged in the conflict and attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The GCC countries opposed this decision because it not only failed to reduce security risks but increased them.
Their concern became a reality when the Al Udeid base was targeted.
Although China played a mediating role in the 2023 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it became clear that this country has limited political leverage over Iran.
This reality is partly why Beijing preferred to remain on the sidelines during the recent crisis.
Russia also adopted a low-key approach to the Israel-Iran war, maintaining its defense cooperation with Tehran but providing no military support during the war. This decision was also aimed at preserving its relations with the GCC countries.
Israel’s approach to the region cannot complement Saudi Arabia’s approach.
The Gulf monarchies learned another lesson for the future during the war.
In the Middle East, Israel’s military-oriented model is an alternative to the economy-based approach adopted by the GCC countries, but these two approaches cannot complement each other.
Currently, the GCC countries aim to resolve or at least manage security issues through diplomacy and economic cooperation.
In contrast, the Israeli government sees the use of military force as the best way to address national security threats and potentially eliminate them.
Although the GCC countries have benefited from the weakening of Iran and its allied non-state actors after October 7, their views on this matter are contradictory.
For the Saudis, regional stability is the top priority because economic prosperity is impossible in unstable conditions.
But for Israel, national security is the highest priority, regardless of the regional instability that pursuing it may entail.
Many Gulf analysts clearly expressed this view after the Israel-Iran war. They were concerned about Israel’s unilateral interventions in the region and the potential long-term destabilizing effects of these actions.
The leadership of all monarchies understands this gap in how the GCC countries and Israel think about the Middle East, whether they have signed the Abraham Accords or not. Two issues complicate the overall picture.
Firstly, the establishment of a Palestinian state has become a highly contentious issue between Saudi Arabia and Israel, exacerbated by how Tel Aviv manages regional policy.
Secondly, the behavior of the United States government during the twelve-day war raised questions among GCC leaders, as President Trump, who had previously supported the Gulf economic model, then decided to actively support Israel’s military-oriented model, thus jeopardizing the investments he had backed.
The unity of the GCC is a strategy for defense coordination.
During the Israel-Iran war, the GCC countries showed very high political cohesion, which increased further after Iran’s attack on Qatar.
Emphasizing that the unity of the GCC is unbreakable, the six foreign ministers of the council gathered the day after the attack on the Al Udeid base in Doha to express their solidarity with Qatar and also to send a message of unity. Political cohesion aimed at strengthening defense cooperation is the best response that the Arab Gulf capitals can offer in this new era of risks.
In 2019, Iran’s attack on Saudi Aramco facilities forced Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to reset their foreign policies from polarized competition to stabilizing cooperation.
Now, Iran’s 2025 attack on the Al Udeid base in Qatar has provided an opportunity for the GCC countries to improve their defense cooperation with a view to possible integration.
Bilateral issues that have led to a lack of trust and sometimes complete distrust have so far hindered real defense integration among the Arab Gulf capitals.
But the Israel-Iran war provided tangible evidence of the level of threats facing the GCC countries and that the Gulf’s connectivity is also its first point of vulnerability. This is particularly urgent and vital for Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, which cannot rely on any alternative maritime routes for access to the Gulf, whether for trade or water desalination.
Iran’s attack undoubtedly provided an opportunity for Qatar’s air force to showcase its capabilities in coordination with American forces.
However, this attack also highlighted the absence of a shared shield against missiles and drones and the lack of coordination among early warning systems, despite previous commitments to invest in a multilateral approach.
Regional threats have not yet ended, as some analysts have rightly pointed out, Iran still possesses a stockpile of short-range missiles and drones, as well as asymmetric naval capabilities that keep the GCC countries highly vulnerable.
Additionally, the Houthis have resumed their attacks on ships in the Red Sea, this time using drone boats or waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs).
Also, Iraqi military bases have to deal with repeated drone attacks, albeit without any claims of responsibility, adding new high-risk variables to the equation.
The Arab Gulf capitals continue to rely on the United States for air defense, a point emphasized with the inauguration of the first unit of the THAAD missile system in Saudi Arabia in early July. The regional environment is so perilous that it necessitates the urgent operationalization of the GCC’s regional security vision, first approved in 2023, and this should at least begin with creating a dedicated coordination system to counter missiles and drones.
The fact that this requires sharing data, surveillance, reconnaissance, and capabilities has so far prevented Gulf leaders from considering defense integration, even with repeated invitations from the United States.
Notably, in the GCC’s vision, missiles and drones are only mentioned in the context of condemning the supply of weapons to militias, not in the context of collective defense efforts.
However, the current uncertainties and some recent promising steps, including in defense industry cooperation, have made this challenge seem less out of reach today than in the past.
Although weakened, Iran remains an active threat to its neighbors, and despite diplomatic efforts, Israel’s military approach is also perceived as a destabilizing factor at the regional level.
Gulf leaders are now more aware than ever that to maintain their security, they must rely solely on their capabilities through a combination of diplomacy and defensive strength.