Iran’s Foreign Policy Between Emotions and Interests
Iran’s foreign policy stands between emotions and interests. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, in Tehran just hours after attending the inauguration ceremony of President Masoud Pezeshkian has sparked numerous discussions in political and media circles both domestically and internationally about the reasons, methods, and consequences of this significant event, which could be a turning point in the political history of Iran, West Asia, and even the world.
Regardless of the debates about the reasons, which include various speculations, especially Netanyahu’s attempt to create grounds for dragging Iran and the US into a full-scale war that benefits Israel, and the methods of this incident, whether through Israeli infiltrators in Iran or missile launches by aircraft or guided drones, the important discussion is about the shape, dimensions, and scope of Iran’s reaction to this major incident. An incident that reminds many of significant assassinations that changed the course of history, like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, which paved the way for World War I.
The fact that Israel planned the assassination of the Hamas leader in Tehran, both in terms of location and timing, just hours after attending the inauguration of Iran’s new president, has put Iran’s political leadership in a difficult decision-making position.
A decision that certainly must be accompanied by an effective response to not only restore the credibility of the country’s security structure in the eyes of domestic and international public opinion but also to possess the necessary deterrence to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.
However, the conditions and possibilities for a proportionate response to Israel, such as assassinating one of its influential officials, are limited for Iran. If Iran decides to react, it is forced to take a different action, namely, a missile and drone attack on security and military centers within Israel.
Meanwhile, Iranian statesmen are aware of the real goal of the Israeli regime in planning and executing this assassination and know that Netanyahu seeks to drag Iran and the US into a full-scale war and politically exploit this war to Israel’s advantage on one hand, and to pave the way for Trump’s victory in the upcoming US presidential elections on the other.
Israel’s action in assassinating Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and on the day of Iran’s presidential inauguration has, at the same time, shocked and worried many governments and political leaders worldwide, even Israel’s supporters, with some calling it a political suicide or madness.
With this action, Netanyahu intended not only to confront Iran but also to place many other governments in a fait accompli and limit their ability to choose an appropriate response.
In these circumstances, some world leaders, in addition to condemning this assassination, began extensive efforts to persuade Iran not to react effectively and not to play on Israel’s terms.
This reaction also paved the way for exchanges of opinions between the US and some European governments with Iran, and there were reports of the possibility of reviving the JCPOA by the US if Iran refrained from reacting.
The new Iranian government, which faced such a major challenge in the early hours of its tenure, correctly prioritized diplomacy, or more precisely, the utilization of international political capacities, before any military response to Israel.
The request for an immediate UN Security Council meeting and the convening of an extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of the member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and the repeated contacts of the president with some country leaders, including two phone conversations with the French president, and intensive negotiations by Ali Bagheri, acting foreign minister, with Islamic and Western regional countries are evidence of this matter.
This approach is naturally analyzed with the aim of garnering international support in the event of any military reaction against Israel and also increasing international pressure against Israel.
On the other hand, public opinion in Iran was also shocked by this incident, while the public was preparing for the start of a new government different from the thirteenth government in terms of domestic, foreign, and economic policies and was expecting a period of political stability and social calm. The occurrence of this incident disrupted all their perceptions and expectations.
The new Iranian government came to power with the slogan of interaction and cooperation with the world, but the Israeli regime practically made the implementation of this policy difficult and costly right from the start.
But the question that can be raised despite all these interpretations and issues is: Could such a difficult situation, especially for a new government with different policies and programs, have been prevented? And another question is how can the recurrence and emergence of such difficult situations in the country be prevented in the future?
The reality is that Iran’s policy and approach in the foreign arena, considering the conditions the country has faced over the past two decades and the heavy costs imposed on the country, require a review and redefinition in terms of strategy and tactics in international, regional, and bilateral relations. This review in the regional area, given the multiplicity and diversity of issues and areas of conflict, is of greater importance and priority.
Iran has incurred heavy costs in the area of regional relations, and to some extent, its international relations are also significantly influenced by its regional behaviors and policies.
Iran’s regional policy, considering the variable of Israel and the resistance front, has taken on an ideological, supportive, emotional, and sentimental nature, and perhaps this form and content have paved the way for Iran’s regional policies to become costly and, at the same time, less effective.
The experience of various countries, including the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and even Russia in recent decades, shows that whenever emotional and sentimental issues have dominated policies and behaviors, the effectiveness of policies has decreased and costs have increased.
The Vietnam War, Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe, and the Ukraine war are examples of such behaviors.
Naturally, political behaviors accompanied by emotional and sentimental issues, in addition to low effectiveness and high costs, will also not be sustainable because in the world of politics, emotions and sentiments, even with ideological content, have no place. Based on this, redefining Iran’s regional relations can maintain the ideological and supportive basis while taking on a strategic nature and form.
In this form, the national interests of the country are also considered, and in fact, the effectiveness and efficiency of regional policies increase, political, security, and economic costs decrease, and more stable and stronger relations are formed.
A successful example of this type of regional policy is pursued by countries like Qatar and Turkey.
Qatar and Turkey have extensive and effective relations with the Islamic movement Hamas.
The main Hamas organization outside Palestine is in Doha, Qatar. In addition, a significant portion of Hamas’s political activities outside Palestine takes place in Istanbul, Turkey.
However, Israel chose Tehran rather than Doha or Istanbul for its terrorist action against Ismail Haniyeh because it is aware of imposing heavy costs on Iran. This is while Iran could have adopted a strategic support approach to prevent Israel’s extensive movements in the country and its terror and violence, thus avoiding heavy costs.
The rise of the new government in Iran is a suitable opportunity to redefine Iran’s regional relations and strengthen strategic approaches.