Iran’s Foreign Policy Between Emotions and Interests
Iran’s foreign policy between emotions and interests: The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, in Tehran just a few hours after attending the inauguration ceremony of President Masoud Pezeshkian has sparked extensive discussions in political and media circles both domestically and internationally regarding the reasons, the manner, and the consequences of this significant event, which could be a turning point in the political history of Iran, the West Asia region, and even the world.
Regardless of the discussions about the reasons, which involve various speculations, particularly the idea that Netanyahu is creating a pretext to engage Iran and the US in a full-scale war to benefit Israel, and the manner in which this incident occurred, including actions by Israeli infiltrators in Iran or missile launches by aircraft or guided drones, the important discussion is about the shape, dimensions, and scope of Iran’s reaction to this major incident. This incident reminds many of major assassinations that changed the course of history, such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, which paved the way for World War I.
The fact that Israel planned the assassination of the Hamas leader in Tehran in terms of location and just hours after attending the inauguration of Iran’s new president in terms of timing has placed the political leadership in Iran in a difficult decision-making position.
A decision that must certainly be accompanied by an effective reaction to not only restore the credibility of the country’s security structure in the eyes of domestic and foreign public opinion but also to possess the necessary deterrent capability to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.
However, the conditions and possibilities for a proportionate reaction to Israel, such as assassinating one of its influential officials, are limited for Iran. If Iran decides to react, it is compelled to take a different approach, namely missile and drone attacks on security and military centers within Israel.
At the same time, Iranian statesmen are aware of the real goal of the Israeli regime in planning and executing this assassination and know that Netanyahu seeks to drag Iran and the US into a full-scale war and politically exploit this war to benefit Israel on one hand and to pave the way for Trump’s victory in the upcoming US presidential elections on the other.
Israel’s action in assassinating Ismail Haniyeh, especially in Tehran and on the day of Iran’s presidential inauguration, has shocked and worried many governments and political leaders worldwide, even Israel’s supporters, and some have referred to it as political suicide or madness.
With this action, Netanyahu intended to place not only Iran but many other governments before a fait accompli and limit their ability to choose an appropriate response.
It was in these circumstances that some world leaders, besides condemning this assassination, made extensive efforts to persuade Iran not to react effectively and not to play into Israel’s hands.
This reaction also paved the way for dialogue between the US and some European governments with Iran, and news emerged about the possibility of reviving the JCPOA by the US if Iran refrained from reacting.
The new Iranian government, faced with such a major challenge in the early hours of its work, rightly prioritized diplomacy and, more precisely, the utilization of international political capacities over any military response to Israel.
Requests for an urgent Security Council meeting, as well as an extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation member countries in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and repeated contacts by the President with some heads of state, including two phone conversations with the French President and intense negotiations by Ali Bagheri, the acting foreign minister, with Islamic and Western countries, are evidence of this approach.
This approach is naturally analyzed with the aim of garnering international support in the event of any military reaction against Israel and also increasing international pressure on Israel.
On the other hand, public opinion in Iran was also shocked by this incident, while it was preparing for the start of a new government different from the thirteenth government in terms of domestic, foreign, and economic policies and was expecting a period of political stability and social calm. This incident disrupted all their perceptions and expectations.
The new Iranian government came to power with the slogan of interaction and cooperation with the world, but the Israeli regime practically made the implementation of this policy difficult and costly from the very beginning.
But the question that can be raised despite all these interpretations and issues is: Could such a difficult situation, especially for a newly established government with different policies and programs, have been prevented? And another question is: How can the recurrence and emergence of such difficult situations for the country be prevented in the future?
The reality is that Iran’s policy and approach in the foreign arena, in general, given the conditions that have prevailed over the country in the past two decades and have imposed heavy costs on the country, need a review and redefinition in terms of strategy and tactics in regional, international, and bilateral relations. This review in the regional domain, considering the multiplicity and diversity of issues and areas of conflict, is of greater importance and priority.
Iran has incurred heavy costs in the realm of regional relations, and to a large extent, its international relations are also influenced by its regional behaviors and policies.
Iran’s regional policy, considering the variable of Israel and the resistance front, has taken on an ideological, supportive, emotional, and sentimental nature, and perhaps this form and content have paved the way for the costly and at the same time low-yield nature of Iran’s regional policies.
The experience of various countries, including the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and even Russia in recent decades, shows that whenever emotional and sentimental issues have dominated policies and behaviors, the effectiveness of policies has decreased, and costs have increased.
The Vietnam War, Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe, and the Ukraine war are examples of such behaviors.
Naturally, political behaviors accompanied by emotional and sentimental issues, besides having low effectiveness and high costs, will not be sustainable because in the world of politics, emotions and feelings, even with ideological content, have no place. Therefore, redefining Iran’s regional relations can find a strategic nature and form while maintaining the ideological and supportive basis.
In this form, the country’s national interests are also considered, and in fact, the effectiveness and yield of regional policies increase, political, security, and economic costs decrease, and more stable and stronger relations are formed.
Successful examples of this type of regional policy are being pursued by countries like Qatar and Turkey.
Qatar and Turkey have extensive and effective relations with the Islamic movement Hamas.
The main organization of Hamas outside of Palestine is in Doha, Qatar. Additionally, the majority of Hamas’s political activities outside of Palestine occur in Istanbul, Turkey.
Yet, Israel chose Tehran instead of Doha and Istanbul for its terrorist action against Ismail Haniyeh because it is aware of the heavy costs it can impose on Iran. This is while Iran could have prevented Israel’s extensive activity in the country and its terrorism and violence by adopting strategic support and not exposing itself to heavy costs.
The rise of the new government in Iran is a suitable opportunity for redefining Iran’s regional relations and strengthening strategic approaches.