Iraq at the Crossroads of Nationalism or the Axis of Resistance
Iraq at the Crossroads of Nationalism or the Axis of Resistance
According to IranGate News Agency, the 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 11, are considered a decisive test for the country’s political balance and future stability. In this election, 329 parliamentary seats will be divided among the main Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish factions, and the result will determine whether Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani succeeds in forming his second government or if power will fall into the hands of his political rivals.
This event will not only shape the political future of Baghdad but could also affect regional dynamics and the balance between Tehran and Washington.
The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: A Test for Political Balance and Regional Stability
The Iraqi people’s vote on November 11, 2025, will decide which political faction will gain the majority of the 329 parliamentary seats, and after the formation of parliament, whether Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani will form his second government or a new government will be established by his rivals.
These elections could be a step towards maintaining Iraq’s stability or disrupt the balance of power, leading the country into a phase of political fragmentation and increased competition among foreign powers.
The upcoming elections are influenced by a series of internal and regional developments. The Sudani government has achieved relative political, economic, and social stability and is on the path of growth. However, it still faces the legacy of deep political divisions, the demands of a disillusioned younger generation, regional instability, and threats from climate change. Regionally, these elections are affected by the realignment of the Axis of Resistance, a relative decrease in Iran’s regional influence, and the ongoing competition between Tehran and Washington in Iraq.
On the other hand, the boycott of the elections by the Sadrist movement is likely to negatively impact voter turnout and is considered a significant factor in reducing the votes for Shia parties.
According to official statistics, out of 29 million eligible voters, 21 million have registered to participate in the elections.
Thus, the upcoming elections are multi-layered and complex, and each of these layers could become a focal point of tension in the post-voting period.
The new election law, the Sadrist movement’s boycott, internal divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework, the dispersion of electoral lists in this bloc, the change in the number of electoral districts from 83 to 18, and claims regarding the role of foreign financial resources in vote-buying and parliamentary seat trading are among the issues that could lead to post-election protests. For example, the boycott by the Sadrist movement could become an opportunity for rival parties.
Overall, the upcoming elections are a test for Iraq’s political future.
The key questions are whether Baghdad can maintain its current approach to managing ethnic-religious diversity, and which party will benefit from the changes to the election law.
And what implications will the divisions among Shia parties have for regional actors?
The Main Players in the 2025 Iraqi Elections
Iraq’s party system is composed of three major political players: Shia parties, Sunni parties, and Kurdish parties. The important point in this period is that the main competition is not between the three ethnic-religious blocs but within the Shia bloc.
Sunni and Kurdish parties are primarily focused on maintaining or increasing their share in the coalition government, and their role is mainly determined in the post-election coalition phase.
The current government has been successful in reducing ethnic tensions but still faces economic challenges, including a liquidity crisis and dependency on oil, security challenges in controlling militia groups, and political challenges that could prolong the government formation process for several months.
Nevertheless, according to surveys, the Sudani government is most likely to win and form the next government.
The Shia Bloc: Intra-factional Competition and the Possibility of Post-election Alliances
Currently, about 70% of the parliamentary seats are held by Shia parties. This bloc is entering the new elections with at least three main lists, including the Sudani, Maliki, and Khazali coalitions, and has postponed decision-making on government formation to the post-election alliance phase.
The election boycott by part of the Sadrist movement has also raised concerns about voter turnout and the Shia vote base.
The current government coalition led by Sudani, with a technocratic and nationalist approach, seeks to form its second government. This coalition aims to encourage urban middle-class participation in the elections and emphasizes the government’s successes in reducing ethnic-religious tensions, keeping Iraq away from regional conflicts, and maintaining balance in relations with Tehran and Washington in its campaign.
In contrast, the State of Law Coalition led by Nouri Maliki is working with the goal of gaining a parliamentary majority and forming a government.
Alongside these two, the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq movement led by Qais Khazali is also active, and due to its relative closeness to Sudani, there is a possibility of an alliance with him in the next phase. Additionally, the movements of Ammar Hakim, Haider al-Abadi, and the Badr Organization led by Hadi al-Amiri are also participating in the elections.
Although the Sadrist movement has boycotted the elections, there are speculations about the limited presence of its supporters on election day.
Sunni Parties: From Vote Loss to Redefining Position
The vote base of Arab Sunni parties has decreased due to internal splits. The Taqaddum Party, which currently holds 37 seats in parliament, has limited chances of repeating past results due to legal accusations against its leader and internal disagreements. Part of its votes has shifted towards smaller Sunni parties, weakening its position in future coalitions.
Despite this, Taqaddum remains the main Sunni party in Iraq, and the splinter parties from it are participating in the November elections as independent lists.
Kurdish Parties: Regional Competition to Increase Power Share
The Kurds see the elections as an opportunity to increase their share in the national power structure, but the disagreement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has hindered the formation of a united bloc. Temporary efforts to achieve a joint list did not succeed, and the two main parties are competing with separate lists.
However, smaller Kurdish parties could play a decisive role in forming the government during the post-election coalition phase.
Baghdad’s Foreign Policy After the November 2025 Elections
Within Iraq’s consociational political system, no party is capable of forming a government alone. Therefore, after the elections, broad coalitions will be formed to establish a coalition government.
It is expected that the Shia Coordination Framework will win the most parliamentary seats and play a central role in forming the government. However, splits within the Shia bloc, the Sadrist movement’s boycott, and the competition of Sunni and Kurdish parties for a greater share of power will influence this process.
Two main scenarios are conceivable for Baghdad’s Middle Eastern policy: If the Sudani coalition holds the upper hand in the future government, there is a possibility of accelerating the disarmament of militias and a relative reduction of Iran’s influence in Iraq, while a more nationalist approach focusing on attracting Western investment will be pursued.
But if the Nouri Maliki coalition wins, it is predicted that Iran’s influence in Iraq’s political structure will be strengthened, and in response, Washington may impose new financial restrictions on Baghdad. If neither faction holds the upper hand, the likelihood of a balanced policy between Tehran and the West increases.
In this scenario, if Sudani turns to an alliance with the Taqaddum Party led by Mohammed al-Halbousi, which is likely to win about 20 seats in the next parliament, the government’s focus will be on implementing the disarmament law for armed groups and strengthening economic relations with the West.
The Final Outlook
The 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections can be seen as a stage of power recalibration within the consociational order, a two-stage process in which the people first shape a new balance of power with their vote, followed by the parties through post-election coalitions.
With an expected participation rate of less than 40%, continuing a downward trend from 62% during the Arab Spring to 41% in the last elections, no structural transformation in Iraq’s political system is anticipated, but rather a redistribution of power among ethnic and religious elites is expected.
The likelihood of the Shia bloc winning and forming Sudani’s second government is assessed as higher than other options. In this case, Baghdad’s relations with Tehran will be maintained, but Sudani will show a greater inclination to expand relations with the United States and attract foreign investment.
The Sunni coalition parties will also support this approach, and regional players are likely to welcome Sudani’s step-by-step policy.
As a result, post-2025 Iraq will be a country where Iran’s traditional influence has diminished but remains intact, and Baghdad is taking steps towards more balanced engagement with the West.
Sudani’s moderate nationalism and his Third Path movement will be an effort to stabilize and reduce regional tensions to attract foreign investment.