Israel’s Objective in Attacking the Consulate of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Israel’s objective in attacking the consulate of the Islamic Republic of Iran: By attacking Iran’s diplomatic complex, Israel crossed another red line. This attack, from Iran’s perspective and that of many other governments, is akin to an assault on Iranian territory. This attack likely indicates that the Israeli government believes the time has come to act against Iran’s military targets, whatever they may be, and that it can remain relatively immune from the consequences.
From the Israeli government’s perspective, Iran is currently so constrained that it is unlikely to respond in a way that would ignite a regional war. This means that from Israel’s viewpoint, the Gaza war has not limited its maneuvering space against Iran and its allies but has even expanded it. If this is the case, Israelis may have underestimated the unpredictability of the current regional atmosphere. This attack may confirm a miscalculation that could lead to dangerous consequences not only for Israel but for the entire region.
Over the years, the scope and nature of Israel’s attacks have shifted from focusing on hitting Iranian weapon shipments to a more targeted campaign aimed at killing operational and intelligence leaders of Iran’s network, including a growing number of senior Iranian military personnel. In fact, the recent attack continues the same pattern of Israeli attacks on highly valuable Iranian targets in Syria and beyond in recent months.
After the October 7th Hamas attack, Israel could have limited its broader regional campaign against Iran and focused on immediate threats originating from Gaza, especially since Hezbollah in Lebanon apparently showed no inclination to join the Hamas war. Israel could have aligned its regional campaign with the increasing fragility of the region, particularly given the strong U.S. desire to keep the war contained and avoid direct confrontation with Iran, which is also a priority for Israel’s Arab neighbors.
However, it seems that Netanyahu and his emergency military cabinet have chosen a different path. Six months after the start of the Gaza war, Israel is intensifying its regional campaign. This is the logical consequence of what Naftali Bennett called the ‘Octopus Head Doctrine’ in 2018. Israel believes it is necessary to confront Iran directly and not just target its proxies.
Following this strategy, Israel must hold Iran accountable for the actions of its regional militias, even if Iran has varying degrees of control over this decentralized network. Israeli public opinion strongly supports this approach, as do its various political factions.
Some observers believe that Israel is trying to provoke Iran into entering a war, but perhaps the opposite logic is true. Israel is betting that Iran is constrained and cornered because it fears retaliatory actions that could trigger direct Israeli attacks on its territory. Israel now sees Iran in a politically and economically vulnerable position, even if some analysts believe that with the Gaza war and increased military alignment with Russia, Iran’s hand has strengthened.
Since the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020, policymakers and analysts have raised questions about Iran’s ability to respond to attacks. A common discourse in Israel is that the assassination of General Soleimani showed that Iran is a paper tiger. Despite vowing to avenge Soleimani, Iran did little. The counter-interpretation is that Soleimani’s killing actually increased militancy and threats against Israel and the U.S. The expanded capabilities of Iran-backed armed groups in recent years show that Soleimani’s assassination did not fundamentally deter or eliminate these actors’ ability to inflict significant damage across the region.
Nonetheless, Israel is not mistaken in its assessment that following the start of Israeli attacks in Syria and Lebanon over the past six months, Iran and Hezbollah have done little to retaliate. Israelis likely see this moment as an opportunity to further weaken Iran and its regional allies, especially since they have full support from Washington and know that the world is against them.
Israel may be confident that it can push boundaries without Hezbollah or Iran entering a direct war. In other words, the Israeli goal in escalating its military attacks may not be to provoke Iran into direct conflict, but rather they believe Iran will stay out of it. A similar logic could guide Israel’s calculations regarding Washington.
Israel may believe it can shift the limits of military escalation because it expects the U.S. to stay out of its way or even provide tactical support for actions against groups that also threaten Washington’s interests. Israel, with the belief that it faces few constraints in its efforts to weaken Iran and its proxies, is taking a significant risk. At some point, the Iranian government might feel it must necessarily respond directly, and it appears to be facing increasing pressure domestically for such a response.
Israel might consider these risks manageable, but the growing sense of immunity involves not just a risk for Israel. It is a dangerous approach that could directly endanger American interests and lives. It seems that the Gaza war has further strengthened Israel’s already strong motivations for more, not less, military escalation with Iran. Israeli leaders acted within this framework both before and after the Gaza war, believing that the conflict with Iran can remain limited and that Israel can pursue its goals of weakening the Iran axis.
At the same time, it seeks to improve its relations with Arab countries that fear Iran. This assumption proved incorrect even before the Gaza war, but amid the ongoing assault on Gaza and the unimaginable scale of Palestinian civilian casualties, Israel is playing with fire. There is a risk that Israel might end up paying a heavier price than it anticipated for these attacks, and in such a scenario, it is likely that the U.S. would pay a similar price.