The Kremlin as a Mediator of Unity
What Russia Wants from the Gaza War
The Kremlin, as a mediator of unity, invited 14 group organizations for an intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow from February 29 to March 1 or 2. Among the participants will be representatives from Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, alongside various Palestinian political forces active in Middle Eastern countries including Syria and Lebanon. As Mikhail Bogdanov, Russia’s representative for Middle East and Africa affairs, explains, Moscow’s motivation for hosting such a meeting is to help Palestinian forces reach a political agreement for unity.
The logic behind this effort is that such unity is essential to overcoming the current crisis and exploring governance options for Palestine in the post-war stage. In fact, the Palestinian issue has long been a central pillar of Russia’s policy in the Middle East, and this is not the first time Kremlin officials have brought together key Palestinian forces for dialogue. Similar meetings have been regularly held in Moscow since 2011, and subsequently in 2017, 2018, and 2019.
However, the meeting on Thursday, February 29, is significant from several perspectives. It takes place not only at a time when the Palestinian people are experiencing the worst conflict and war in decades, and Palestinian leaders seem increasingly confused and disorganized, but also when international conditions and Moscow’s internal situation are very different from before.
Internationally, Russia has been completely marginalized by the West and its allies, including Israel. In response to this isolation, Moscow seems to be seeking a constructive role and building trust among Middle Eastern countries and those not aligned with the Western perspective. Domestically, what matters to Putin is staging and executing a positive narrative for his domestic audience to bolster his re-election bid in the upcoming elections.
Considering all this, despite the good potential of this meeting to inspire and provoke internal Palestinian thoughts and ideas, it seems unlikely that the key to Palestinian unity or a solution to the Israel-Palestine war will be found in Moscow. Although the Palestinian issue ranks high in Russia’s Middle East policy, the Kremlin cannot make positive changes happen.
The Palestinian struggle for independence has been one of the main elements of Russia’s Middle East policy since the establishment of the Jewish state. Looking back at that era and delving into Moscow’s political thinking, we find that Russia has practically aligned itself with anti-colonial movements that favored freedom, particularly independence and self-determination. Thus, every anti-imperialist movement deserved full support from the Russians, and Moscow stood with the oppressed people of the world in their anti-colonial struggle.
Given its historical connection and the level of commitment that Russian leadership still adheres to today, there is no doubt that Moscow continues to support this struggle. However, like the latter half of the past century, Moscow is undoubtedly aware of its limited tools and capabilities. February 29 is not the first Russia-backed meeting among Palestinian factions intended to help them agree on the necessary unity.
All previous efforts have yielded very little results. However, this does not mean that Russian officials have been discredited. On the contrary, Moscow’s efforts, although not decisive, have been greatly appreciated by Palestinian leadership and groups. Given the unprecedented conditions of the war in Israel and Palestine, today’s meeting on February 29 might be a fortunate event, but it is unlikely that a solution to Palestinian disagreements will be found this week in Moscow, and everyone, including the Russians themselves, knows this well.
Moscow’s Goals and Ambitions
By hosting intra-Palestinian talks, Russia pursues several goals simultaneously. First, this meeting serves Moscow’s propaganda needs. The Kremlin shows that even during the war with Ukraine and with the maximum focus of Moscow’s attention and resources on confronting the West, it can pursue an active foreign policy in different directions. For the domestic Russian audience, this meeting can demonstrate that Moscow is far from international isolation and, at its request, representatives of various international forces, including those Russia itself considers terrorists, visit it.
This meeting also sends a message to Middle Eastern partners, implying that while the U.S. and Europe have chosen the path of supporting Israel, Russia stands with the Arab world by trying to unite the Palestinians and strengthen their position on the international stage.
Finally, this meeting signals to Israel and the West that they have openly excluded Russia from the conflict resolution process they initiated. If you don’t want to talk to us, we will play our own games, which might create problems for you. However, Moscow’s chances of creating an effective united Palestinian bloc are not high.
Moreover, the question remains whether Russia has the resources or leverage to help the Palestinians implement the negotiated decisions. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the future of intra-Palestinian relations in the post-war period is currently being actively discussed by various international and regional actors.
Russia clearly wants to propose and draft the structure and relations of Palestine after the end of the Gaza conflict as it sees fit, thereby securing Moscow’s future position in Palestine.
The Key to Palestinian Unity is Not in Moscow
Moscow’s path over the past decade, as far as intra-Palestinian political reconciliation is concerned, has achieved very little. The key to Palestinian unity is not in Moscow. However, since the current political time is different, if the announced meeting succeeds in bringing together influential high-level representatives of Fatah and Hamas to engage in serious dialogue about the Palestinian political system, the national program of the Palestine Liberation Organization, unified leadership, and a roadmap and vision for the day after the war in Gaza, it will be a critical milestone.
However, the fact that both factions have not participated in any serious dialogue since October, despite numerous opportunities, suggests that this meeting in Moscow cannot promise a fruitful encounter that addresses the root causes of disagreements among the various groups in Palestine.
From Israel’s perspective, the problem is not the intra-Palestinian meeting, but Moscow’s broader policy regarding the Gaza war. International mediation efforts related to the Gaza war have mostly been undertaken by Western and Arab countries, while Russia has always been on the sidelines. As in the past, Russia seeks to compensate for this situation by bringing various Palestinian groups together on its soil. While Israel opposes this move, it is unlikely to react harshly because intra-Palestinian agreements, if reached, will likely be mediated by Arab countries, not Russia.
Israel is more concerned about Russia’s overall stance on the Gaza war and its attitude towards Hamas, and it has recently expressed this clearly through its new ambassador to Russia, Simona Halperin. Moscow uses its relations with the Palestinians as a political leverage in its complex relations with Israel. This meeting and past encounters with the Palestinians aim to present an impactful image of Moscow as a country that can engage with all stakeholders in the Middle East.
Unlike the U.S., which disproportionately sides with Israel and is somewhat responsible for the current situation in Gaza, and unlike Turkey with Erdogan, who has explicitly sided with the Palestinians, Russia wants to be seen as a genuine and fair mediator, although its chances of success are relatively low, and its relationship with Tel Aviv has been damaged since October 7.
However, this meeting can help Russia in its goal to maintain Israel, and the Kremlin will use its relations with the Palestinians as a political leverage in its complex relations with Tel Aviv. This is a similar strategy that Moscow has employed in the past concerning Turkey, using its relations with Armenia or the Kurds to increase its weight in bilateral relations with Ankara.
The Domestic Aspect of an International Meeting
The importance of this meeting from a domestic perspective is to enhance Putin’s image before the elections. Most experts argued 24 years ago that as a KGB agent, reliability for the West was not a job requirement for Vladimir Putin. As evidence, they cited the ruthless management of the Chechen uprising and the aftermath of the Kursk submarine sinking. However, most Western leaders ignored expert advice and desperately tried to believe the illusion that a normal relationship with Russia was possible until the second invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
But the non-Western world tells a different story. In these countries, there is a conducive environment for Russia’s growth due to the deep distrust of the West. Especially the Gaza war, due to the West and the United States’ support for Israel, has provided a unique and special opportunity for Russia. Simply put, in the Middle East, Russia acts boldly but more skillfully.
