Kremlin, the Mediator of Unity
What Does Russia Want from the Gaza War?
From February 29 to March 1 or 2, the Kremlin, as a mediator of unity, invited 14 group organizations to an intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow. Among the participants will be representatives from Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, alongside various Palestinian political forces active in different Middle Eastern countries, including Syria and Lebanon. As Mikhail Bogdanov, Russia’s representative for Middle East and Africa affairs, explains, Moscow’s motivation for hosting such a meeting is to help Palestinian forces achieve a political agreement for unity.
The logic behind this effort is that such unity is essential to overcome the current crisis and to explore governance options for Palestine in the post-war stage. In fact, the Palestinian issue has long been a central focus of Russia’s Middle East policy, and this is not the first time Kremlin officials have brought together the main Palestinian forces for dialogue. Similar meetings have been regularly held in Moscow since 2011 and subsequently in 2017, 2018, and 2019.
However, the meeting on Thursday, February 29, is significant for several reasons. It is not only being held at a time when the Palestinian people are experiencing the worst conflict and war in decades, and Palestinian leaders seem increasingly disoriented and disorganized, but also because the international conditions and Moscow’s internal position are very different from before.
Internationally, Russia has been completely marginalized by the West and its allies, including Israel. In response to this isolation, Moscow seems to be seeking to play a constructive role and build trust among Middle Eastern countries and those not aligned with the Western perspective. Domestically, what matters to Putin is staging and presenting a positive narrative for his domestic audience to bolster his re-election prospects in the upcoming elections.
Considering all this, despite the good potential of this meeting to inspire and provoke thoughts and ideas within Palestine, it seems unlikely that the key to Palestinian unity or a solution to the Israel-Palestine war will be found in Moscow. Although the Palestinian issue ranks high in Russia’s Middle East policy, the Kremlin cannot effect positive changes.
The Palestinian struggle for independence has been a core element of Russia’s Middle East policy since the creation of the Jewish state. Looking back at that era and delving into Moscow’s political thinking, we find that Russia practically aligned itself with anti-colonial movements advocating for freedom and particularly independence and autonomy. Thus, any anti-imperialist movement deserved full support from the Russians, and Moscow stood alongside the oppressed people of the world in their anti-colonial struggle.
Given its historical connection and the level of commitment that Russian leadership still adheres to today, there is no doubt that Moscow continues to support this struggle. However, like the latter half of the last century, Moscow is undoubtedly aware of the limitations of its tools and capabilities. February 29 is not the first Russia-backed meeting among Palestinian factions aimed at helping them reach the necessary unity agreement.
All previous efforts have yielded very few results. However, this does not mean that Russian officials have been discredited. On the contrary, Moscow’s efforts, though not decisive, have been greatly appreciated by Palestinian leadership and groups. Given the unprecedented conditions of the war in Israel and Palestine, today’s meeting on February 29 may be a fortunate event, but it is unlikely that a solution to Palestinian disagreements will be found in Moscow this week, and everyone, including the Russians themselves, knows this well.
Moscow’s Goals and Ambitions
By hosting intra-Palestinian negotiations, Russia is pursuing several goals simultaneously. Firstly, this meeting serves Moscow’s propaganda needs. The Kremlin demonstrates that even during the war with Ukraine and with Moscow’s maximum focus and resources on confronting the West, it can pursue an active foreign policy in various directions. For the domestic Russian audience, this meeting can indicate that Moscow is far from international isolation, and representatives of various international forces, including those Russia considers terrorists, visit at its request.
This meeting also sends a message to Middle Eastern partners, conveying that while the US and Europe have taken the path of supporting Israel, Russia stands alongside the Arab world by trying to unite the Palestinians and strengthen their position on the international stage.
Ultimately, this meeting signals to Israel and the West, who have blatantly excluded Russia from the conflict resolution process they initiated, that if you do not want to talk to us, we will play our own games, which could create problems for you. However, Moscow’s chances of creating an effective united Palestinian bloc are not high.
Moreover, the question remains whether Russia has the resources or leverage to help the Palestinians implement the negotiated decisions. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the future of intra-Palestinian relations in the post-war period is currently being actively discussed by various international and regional actors.
Russia clearly wants to propose and formulate the structure and relations of Palestine after the end of the Gaza conflict as it sees fit, thereby ensuring Moscow’s future position in Palestine.
The Key to Palestinian Unity is Not in Moscow
Moscow’s path over the past decade, as far as intra-Palestinian political reconciliation is concerned, has shown very little performance. The key to Palestinian unity is not in Moscow. However, given the different current political climate, if the announced meeting succeeds in bringing together influential high-level representatives of Fatah and Hamas for a serious dialogue about the Palestinian political system, the national program of the Palestine Liberation Organization, unified leadership, and a roadmap and vision for the day after the Gaza war, it will be a crucial milestone.
However, the fact that both factions have not participated in any serious dialogue since October, despite multiple opportunities, suggests that this meeting in Moscow cannot promise a fruitful encounter addressing the root causes of disagreements among the various groups in Palestine.
From Israel’s perspective, the problem is not the intra-Palestinian meeting itself but Moscow’s broader policy regarding the Gaza war. International mediation efforts related to the Gaza war have mostly been carried out by Western and Arab countries, while Russia has always been on the sidelines. As in the past, Russia seeks to compensate for such a situation by gathering various Palestinian groups on its soil. While Israel opposes this move, it is unlikely to react harshly, as any intra-Palestinian agreements, if reached, will likely be mediated by Arab countries, not Russia.
Israel is more concerned about Russia’s overall stance on the Gaza war and its attitude towards Hamas, and this has recently been explicitly stated by its new ambassador to Russia, Simona Halperin. Moscow uses its relations with the Palestinians as a political leverage in its complex relations with Israel. This meeting and past meetings with the Palestinians aim to present Moscow as a country capable of engaging with all stakeholders in the Middle East.
Unlike the US, which disproportionately aligns with Israel and is somewhat responsible for the current situation in Gaza, and unlike Turkey with Erdogan, who has explicitly sided with the Palestinians, Russia wants to be seen as a genuine and fair mediator, although its chances of success are relatively low, and its relationship with Tel Aviv has been damaged since October 7.
However, this meeting can help Russia towards its goal of maintaining Israel, and the Kremlin will use its relations with the Palestinians as a political tool in its complex relations with Tel Aviv. A similar strategy that Moscow employed in the past regarding Turkey, using its relations with Armenia or the Kurds to increase its leverage in its bilateral relationship with Ankara.
The Domestic Aspect of an International Meeting
The importance of this meeting from a domestic perspective is to enhance Putin’s image before the elections. Most experts argued 24 years ago that as a KGB agent, reliability for the West was not a job requirement for Vladimir Putin. As evidence, one could cite the ruthless handling of the Chechen uprising and the aftermath of the Kursk submarine sinking. However, most Western leaders ignored the experts’ advice and desperately tried to believe the illusion that a normal relationship with Russia was possible until the second attack on Ukraine in 2022.
However, the non-Western world tells a different story. In these countries, due to deep distrust of the West, there is a fertile ground for Russia’s growth, especially the Gaza war, due to Western and US support for Israel, provides a unique and special opportunity for Russia. Simply put, in the Middle East, Russia acts boldly but more skillfully.