A Lose-Lose Game
The escalating conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon is essentially a contest of wills between Iran and Israel.
Tehran aims to impose a new strategic reality on Israel by establishing military connections and potential interdependencies between battlefields in Gaza, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. In response, Israel is attempting to counter this Iranian plan with the most intense military attacks. So far, the outcome of this confrontation has been strategic inefficiency, the death of thousands of civilians, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, and physical destruction.
Currently, despite the attacks by resistance groups from Iraq and Yemen on Israel, the main battlefields remain Gaza and southern Lebanon. One day after Hamas’s attack on October 7, Hezbollah in Lebanon launched attacks on Israel in line with Iran’s asymmetric defense doctrine.
At that time, Hezbollah announced that it would continue these attacks in support of Gaza until a ceasefire was established. So far, there is no real winner in this conflict, and it likely will not have any winners. Hamas’s military capability has been severely weakened, and Hezbollah has suffered heavy blows in recent days, while Israel has been in a difficult situation for a year and has also suffered heavy blows.
Although Israel has achieved tactical victories, it is by no means close to achieving strategic gains.
Northern Israel has become almost deserted. Israel’s international reputation and credibility have been severely damaged due to the killing of Palestinian civilians. Israel’s economy is in a very bad state, and domestically, it is facing political turmoil.
In the absence of a diplomatic strategy, Israel continues to attack Hamas and Hezbollah. Although these attacks politically benefit Benjamin Netanyahu, they will not resolve the aforementioned challenges for Israel.
On the contrary, Israel’s reliance on purely military means will not make it safer. Dozens of confrontations with resistance forces testify to the validity of this claim.
It is reasonable to suggest that Israel is trying to weaken Hamas and Hezbollah as much as possible to force them to accept a diplomatic solution. On paper, this approach might seem like a logical and classic strategy. In reality, Israel wants to tell the world that negotiation requires weakening the other party first.
However, in this particular case, Israel may have gone overboard. By refusing to accept a ceasefire in Gaza, which is a prerequisite for reducing tensions with Hezbollah, Israel is pushing the region towards a full-scale war.
The reason why Netanyahu refuses to accept a ceasefire is clear: his political survival depends on maintaining the war conditions, even if these conditions lead to disaster. Netanyahu knows this well and manipulates reality. He knows that the Israeli society does not remove a prime minister who is in charge during wartime.
Even the United States, Israel’s closest ally, has publicly expressed anger over Netanyahu’s reduced cooperation. However, if the U.S. had taken effective actions whenever Israel’s actions in Gaza caused more death and destruction, it wouldn’t need to express fatigue and anger now. It’s not very difficult; Israel’s war machine cannot continue without American military aid. Therefore, the U.S. could have used this leverage against the Israeli government and forced it to turn to diplomacy instead of military actions. But it is unlikely that the American leadership will take such actions or make a serious diplomatic move before the presidential elections.
In recent months, Iran’s new plan to encircle Israel with armed regional allies has not been fully successful. Hamas, Iran’s Palestinian ally, has suffered heavy blows and will take years to rebuild itself. Hezbollah, Iran’s trump card in the resistance network, has suffered heavy blows in recent days, and its military commanders and political leaders have been assassinated by Israel. Hezbollah’s communications network has also been severely disrupted, and Israeli surveillance and intelligence gathering technology makes effective communication among Hezbollah’s remaining commanders very difficult. Until now, Hezbollah has never suffered such a severe blow. The loss of Hassan Nasrallah is undoubtedly a major blow to Hezbollah. He was the central figure and the beating heart of the group.
He was a man with great influence and charisma in Lebanon and beyond its borders. How and when Hezbollah can recover from this blow is a big question that only time will answer. But it is a mistake to think that Hezbollah is left without help and helpless in the current situation. Hezbollah’s raison d’être contradicts this notion. Even Israel, after its recent attacks, has announced that Hezbollah still possesses significant military capabilities. Hezbollah still has the ability to inflict serious damage on Israel. Hezbollah’s precision missiles can harm Israel’s strategic facilities and urban centers.
As a result, Israel is currently at a crossroads. If Israel continues to escalate tensions and attack Hezbollah, and Hezbollah sees its existence in danger, it will likely respond to Israel in a way we have not seen before. In any case, if Hezbollah is not to exist and cannot stand up to Israel, what significance does Hezbollah’s deterrence have? Therefore, in the event of an existential threat to Hezbollah, Iran’s interests also dictate that Hezbollah responds to Israel with great intensity.
Israel is currently intoxicated by some of its tactical successes and thinks it can do to Hezbollah what it did to Hamas. But Hezbollah is a big fish that won’t be easily caught. Israel would have to be very foolish to launch a ground attack on southern Lebanon. Some Israeli political leaders have also warned about this. A ground attack by Israel on the south would give Hezbollah the upper hand. Hezbollah knows southern Lebanon well and is trained for effective combat in this area. The mountains and valleys of southern Lebanon are not comparable to the urban areas of Gaza. Of course, it is true that the Israeli army has learned many lessons from the 2006 33-day war, but Hezbollah has also gained experience from this battle. The question is whether Israel has learned anything from its 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon.
Now is a suitable time to pursue diplomacy, and this diplomacy only begins with establishing a ceasefire in Gaza. A ceasefire in Gaza could lead to a diplomatic agreement between Israel and Hezbollah based on Resolution 1701, with Hezbollah retreating behind the Litani River. However, reaching this point requires two things to happen: first, Netanyahu’s cooperation, and second, whether Washington will take the right action regarding Israel and prevent a disaster. Currently, there are few signs to be optimistic.