Putin’s Footprint on Gaza’s Wound
Putin’s footprint on Gaza’s wound, according to Iran Gate, indicates how dangerous the Middle East situation is and what connection it has to the war in Ukraine. Let’s start with the facts. The first fact is of an official nature. It is necessary to define the operational environment we are discussing. While the conflict in Ukraine has a symmetrical, conventional, and high-intensity nature between two equal actors, even if one has a nuclear arsenal and the other does not, it has the characteristics of a full-scale war.
The conflict in the Middle East has a very asymmetrical and insurgent nature, with high but temporary intensity between two completely different actors—one with state characteristics and the other with a terrorist nature but with popular support, and in fact, a war with the characteristics of a local conflict.
Moreover, there is a significant difference between the first and second cases due to the infinitely larger population and territorial masses of the first case compared to the second. Also, the Russia-Ukraine war consumes infinitely more economic, material resources, and more importantly, human resources, regardless of the level of media coverage. For better understanding, let’s use a football comparison.
It’s like wanting to compare the Germany-Brazil match with the Belgium-Cameroon match in the World Cup. Maybe the latter is even more exciting and they play better, but the former will have a much greater impact on the final championship result.
Returning to the facts and the issue of Hamas’s attack, Hamas attacked with complete composure and caught Israel off guard with a strategic surprise. This attack was carried out based on precise intelligence preparation and flawless planning and achieved many of its intended objectives to a large extent and certainly reached its desired goal, which is provoking Israel for extensive retaliation.
The facts bring self-assessments and questions with them. Why was Israel, known for its excellent military and security intelligence, surprised? We assume a special investigation commission should study and review this matter, but from the outside, it can be said that it relates to the priorities set by the current government for its security forces.
We do not intend to delve into Israel’s internal political problems. It is no secret that the current government, fully legitimate, has deeply divided the entire Israeli society, and this may have helped create communication problems between different levels and their affiliated organizations.
The basic professional assessments are that Hamas’s planning and intelligence preparation proved so good that it raised the suspicion of whether this outcome is solely the product of their own planning. Essentially, it had never happened before that a military action penetrated so deeply into Israeli territory and caused extensive damage across this land.
This happened while armed elements roamed the streets of Israel. There is much talk about Iran’s involvement. Apart from the fact that taking a similar action by Iran at this critical juncture would not be a smart move, there is also doubt about the Iranian side’s ability to provide such professional and organized support.
But the question that preoccupies the mind the most is why Hezbollah did not attack simultaneously with Hamas or at least immediately after to maximize the surprise. This was a unique opportunity and is unlikely to be repeated. The opportunity to bring the war inside Israeli territory, even just for a few hours, indeed, when Israel mobilized, the possibility of conducting offensive operations other than simple missile launches or terrorist actions for Hezbollah drops to zero.
The chance for asymmetric organizations to attack enemy territory continues as long as the conventional enemy is affected by surprise and has not gathered its forces, and this chance has now largely dropped to zero.
After discussing the points, we now try to analyze the situation to some extent. Hamas’s attack, regardless of local motives such as preventing Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, coincided with Russia’s unexpected attack on Avdiivka, a city in the Donetsk province of Ukraine.
As stated, Hamas’s precise planning raised suspicions that this group must have benefited from very professional support from much more capable state institutions than Iran, and that this support included satellite image support. This led to the suspicion that Hamas’s action was both supported and coordinated by Russia, aligning with Moscow’s strategy to increase international tension to divert Western attention and reduce support for Ukraine.
We must always remember that Putin’s reasoning method is completely different from others, and many of his initiatives seem not only wrong but also illogical to us. Therefore, saying that it is not in Russia’s interest is not an appropriate answer to dismiss this suspicion, which, if proven, will clarify many issues. Russia closely cooperates with Iran, and for this reason, Tehran is likely to have been involved in preparing this action.
Preparation likely took a long time, but if Iran participated in this planning and Tehran largely controls Hezbollah, why did it not use this opportunity to participate in the attack? We must consider that both Hamas and Hezbollah are fundamentalist organizations, of course not jihadist, who devote themselves to martyrdom and sacrifice, and in their ideology, the opportunity for a glorious martyrdom is never overlooked.
However, there are many differences between Hamas and Hezbollah. Both are fundamentalist organizations, but one is Sunni, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and openly and publicly supported by Qatar and somewhat subtly by Erdogan.
While Hezbollah is Shia and affiliated with Iran and also Syria. In Syria, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood are irreconcilable enemies who have fought for years for and against the Assad regime, which is supported by Russia. This can somewhat explain the apparent lack of coordination between the two fundamentalist organizations, which are united by hatred of Israel and support from Moscow, but separated by mutual sectarian hatred.
Asymmetric aggression like Hamas’s attack has a specific goal: to provoke the enemy with such violence that it leads to a disproportionate reaction, which in turn causes massive collateral damage, including deadly political and diplomatic harm. In this particular case, damage that has blocked the Arab-Israeli negotiations process and caused division in Western public opinion.
The cost of such an operation, in addition to the collateral damage previously mentioned, can include the destruction of infrastructure and the killing of civilians, and can also include the destruction of the organization’s own military apparatus. All these costs seem completely unreasonable to us, but for a fundamentalist terrorist organization that sees value in its own and others’ martyrdom, it is entirely appropriate. This price, which seemingly has value for Hamas, does not have value for the country of Iran.
Especially at this critical time, the destruction of Hezbollah would deprive Tehran of a valuable and long-standing pressure tool and would risk destroying the influence it still has over the Bashar Assad regime and in Iraq, isolating Iran in the Middle East.
But if so, why would Iran participate in designing this operation? Planning, as mentioned, must have been a long process and perhaps even started before the conflict in Ukraine. The exact date for the start of the operation was probably not predicted, and as they say, the planning was potential to be executed at the right time, a moment that had clearly arrived for Hamas and Russia but not for Iran.
Recently, what has changed in the script that has caused Moscow’s and Tehran’s interests to diverge? The renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh with Russia’s forced but humiliating departure from Armenia and the emergence of Azerbaijan as an ally of Turkey and above all an ally of Israel. Azerbaijan, which in the event of a direct conflict between Iran and Israel, is in a strategically dangerous position as the only access route for the West to Central Asia, has suddenly been released from Russian tutelage and is very interested in cooperating with the West and wants to stay away from Chinese intervention.
Iran, due to many internal problems, does not consider itself fully prepared for a direct confrontation with Israel, especially now that Russia has clearly shown its inability to support its allies. If the proposed scenario is correct, we will face a rift in the Russia-Iran alliance, while Iran, due to its constant anti-Israeli rhetoric, has been accused of being involved in this attack, but in fact, at this moment, was absolutely not ready to confront it. We will see whether the practical approach of the Iranian government in the coming days, with less aggressive behavior than expected, confirms this scenario or not.