Qatar’s Reevaluation in Regional Mediation
Qatar’s Reevaluation in Regional Mediation
Following the events of October 7, 2023, and the escalation of conflicts in the Gaza Strip, Qatar’s mediating role in the region has undergone significant changes.
This note attempts to provide a clear picture of Qatar’s preemptive balancing against future regional developments by examining the background of Qatar-Hamas relations, recent changes in Doha’s diplomatic stance, and the reasons for Qatar’s cautious shift regarding the Gaza crisis.
Over the past two decades, Qatar has emerged as one of the most important regional mediators. By adopting a multifaceted approach that includes preventive diplomacy, third-party mediation, and support for multilateral solutions, Qatar has played a role in resolving complex regional conflicts.
A prominent example of these mediations is the Doha Agreement in 2020 between the Taliban and the United States, which was signed under Qatar’s hosting. Since 2013, Qatar has also facilitated peace talks by establishing the Taliban’s political office in Doha.
Qatar’s mediating efforts have not been limited to Afghanistan.
In the Libyan crisis of 2022, Doha played a significant role in preventing the escalation of civil war by hosting talks between the conflicting parties. Additionally, Qatar has tried to bring the positions of the parties closer in Iran’s nuclear negotiations by hosting talks on reviving the JCPOA.
The Background and Context of Qatar-Hamas Relations
Although Qatar’s relations with Hamas began in 2006 after Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian legislative elections, the turning point of these relations dates back to 2012. In that year, two significant events brought Doha-Hamas relations to a new stage: first, the historic visit of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the then Emir of Qatar, to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, which was the first visit by an Arab leader to the region since Hamas came to power in 2007; second, Doha’s hosting of Hamas’ political office, which became the main decision-making base for the movement outside Palestine.
The establishment of Hamas’ political office in Doha played a crucial role in enhancing Qatar’s regional standing. This office, which hosted senior Hamas leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the political office, and Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas abroad, enabled Qatar to act as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The presence of this office in Doha also allowed Qatar to play an effective role in Gaza’s reconstruction after the 2014 and 2021 wars through the Gaza Reconstruction Committee, established in 2012.
However, Qatar-Hamas relations have always faced challenges. On one hand, these relations have drawn criticism from Western countries and their regional allies, and on the other hand, Qatar has tried to maintain limited relations with Israel to preserve its mediating role. These relations have faced serious challenges, especially after the October 7, 2023 attacks, as U.S. and Israeli pressures on Qatar to exert more pressure on Hamas have increased.
U.S. and Israeli Pressures
In recent weeks, the U.S. has informed Qatar that Hamas’ presence in Doha is no longer acceptable. This pressure increased after Hamas rejected a ceasefire proposal in October. Previously, in April 2024, Qatar had reconsidered Hamas’ presence due to its efforts being undermined by U.S. and Israeli politicians, leading to the temporary relocation of Hamas leaders to Turkey. Interestingly, two weeks later, the Biden administration and Israel asked Qatar to invite Hamas back, as negotiations were ineffective during the leaders’ stay in Turkey.
The Failure of Recent Negotiations
The last round of negotiations ended without result in mid-October. Hamas rejected a short-term ceasefire proposal, while Israel had previously rejected some proposals for a longer ceasefire. Major disagreements centered on the long-term future of Hamas and Israel’s presence in Gaza. These failures showed that Qatar’s mediating role, despite its extensive efforts, faces serious obstacles.
Changing Balance of Power in the Region
Recent developments, especially the assassination of senior Hamas leaders, have altered the balance of power. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Iran in July and the elimination of Yahya Sinwar in Gaza last month have posed significant challenges to Hamas’ leadership structure. Although potential successors like Khalil al-Hayya, who leads ceasefire negotiations for Hamas, and Khaled Meshaal are present in Doha, these leadership changes have affected the group’s ability to make decisions and negotiate.
Additionally, Qatar’s announcement that Hamas’ political office has lost its purpose indicates that Doha is reassessing its role in regional equations, especially as it is recognized as a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. and hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East.
Preemptive Balancing Against Future Threats
Within the framework of Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, Qatar’s recent decision to halt mediation in Gaza and reconsider hosting Hamas’ political office can be seen as a preemptive response to changing regional power dynamics with Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election.
Trump, with his pragmatic approach and emphasis on deal-making in foreign policy, is likely to put more pressure on U.S. regional allies to align with Washington’s policies. Qatar, as a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. that hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East, is well aware of Trump’s deal-making approach from the previous term. Therefore, Doha, understanding that maintaining a balance between relations with the West and regional groups will be more challenging in the new Trump presidency, prefers to redefine its position before the new term begins.
From Walt’s theoretical perspective, Qatar is balancing against a threat arising from a combination of factors: first, Trump’s more aggressive approach toward Iran and its regional allies, which could lead to increased regional tensions; second, the potential increase in pressure on Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel within the framework of the Abraham Accords; and third, Trump’s harsh stance towards Islamist groups, which could increase the cost of hosting Hamas for Qatar.
In this context, by adopting a preemptive approach and announcing the halt of mediation in Gaza and reevaluating the presence of Hamas’ political office, Qatar is trying to prevent any potential tensions with the new U.S. administration. This decision shows that Doha, in its security calculations, considers the threat of potential tension with Trump’s administration more serious than the costs of reducing its mediating role in the region. In other words, understanding Trump’s pragmatism and deal-oriented approach, Qatar prefers to adapt its position to new conditions before new developments occur to reduce potential future pressures.
Scenarios and Alternative Options
Following Qatar’s decision to halt mediation in the Gaza crisis, the most likely scenario is a managed transition, in which Doha moves towards gradually reducing its role instead of completely severing ties with Hamas or maintaining the status quo.
This approach allows Qatar to reduce Western pressures while still maintaining some of its regional influence. In this scenario, we are likely to see the gradual relocation of Hamas’ political office to a third country like Turkey, while Qatar retains its indirect communication channels and defines a new role for itself within a multilateral coalition.
It seems that in the near future, the mediation model in the Gaza crisis will move towards a multilateral structure in which different countries will take on specialized roles. In this new structure, Turkey is likely to host Hamas’ political office, Egypt will handle security negotiations, Qatar will provide financial and logistical support, and Oman will undertake diplomatic mediation. This multilateral model can create more flexibility in negotiations while distributing risks among various actors and enjoying higher regional legitimacy.