Red Alert in the Red Sea
Crisis in the Red Sea Confirms the Deep Fragmentation of the World
The red alert in the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks has put the freedom of navigation in crisis and further exposed the significant rifts that characterize the international scene. Freedom of navigation is one of the most important rights recognized for all countries worldwide. However, the current crisis in the Red Sea highlights the substantial fragmentation and division of the global order.
Three months after the Houthi attacks from Yemen, which sit between piracy and maritime terrorism against commercial ships linked to Israel and other countries transiting between the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, there is no joint multilateral initiative or even a common political stance to rely on as a starting point for decision-making on what to do. Meanwhile, the missiles and drones of the Yemeni armed movement will significantly impact international trade and economy.
Between the West and the East, the G7, and the Global South, the only country currently uninterested in the Red Sea is Iran, which in fact arms and trains the Houthis, Ansar Allah. While the consequences of the U.S. and U.K. attacks on Houthi military infrastructure on January 11, 2024, have yet to be assessed, focusing on the roots of the crisis and the reactions of regional and international players may prove fruitful.
Yemen: A National Crisis with Global Impact
The civil war in Yemen has been ongoing for nearly 9 years. In January 2015, the Houthi coup by the Zaidi Shias in the north in Sana’a prompted Saudi Arabia to intervene with an Arab coalition to counter this coup. The Saudis anticipated a swift victory. The Houthis, who have received regular military support from Iran since then, invested in a war of attrition to prevent Riyadh’s plans from being realized. Since 2016, they have launched repeated attacks on the Saudi kingdom, targeting economic and energy objectives as well as coastal targets with missiles, drones, unmanned boats, and floating mines.
Therefore, since 2022, Saudi Arabia decided to change its strategy and began direct negotiations with the Houthis for a ceasefire. This is a brief overview of the conditions under which this militia group has grown, transforming them from rebels dedicated to local guerrilla warfare into regional actors aligned with Iran to the extent that they are capable of conducting complex attacks even against the United Arab Emirates.
Reasons for the Houthis’ Reluctance to Withdraw
For the Gulf monarchies, the Houthis have been a security threat for years. For a long time, Europeans and Americans viewed them merely as local actors and considered Yemen a distant and marginal point. Additionally, describing and reducing the Yemen war, as many Western analysts and politicians have done, through misleading simplifications as a proxy war and the Houthis as Tehran’s proxy actors, largely misled the West. The Houthis are indeed part of the so-called Iran-aligned resistance axis but operate quite autonomously and primarily fight for their own objectives.
Opening the Red Sea front meets Tehran’s regional calculations, allowing them to strengthen internal support and recruitment, divert attention from their government’s social and economic failures, affirm their stance as an anti-Israel and anti-U.S. nation and the ideal leader of the Palestinian people, and ultimately negotiate with Saudi Arabia from a position of greater power, enhancing their standing in the Tehran-aligned regional constellation.
For this reason, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. and U.K. attack will force the Houthis to stop at this stage. Having presented themselves as those who resisted Saudi Arabia, they now intend to do the same with the United States. They are currently operating within the framework of war, and in the event of escalating tensions, this group essentially has little to lose compared to Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.
International Divisions
Even in the face of the global trade crisis in the Red Sea, the United Nations Security Council has not shown much unity. On January 10, 2024, a day before the U.K.-U.S. attack on Yemen, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2722, thanks to abstentions from Russia and China.
This text was presented by the United States and called on the Houthis to immediately stop their attacks and release the Galaxy Leader, a cargo ship detained with its crew since November 19. China also asked the Houthis to stop attacking shipping but then accused the resolution of ambiguities, emphasizing that the text could escalate tensions. Regionally, India is strengthening its forces in the Arabian Sea to combat piracy but has not joined the Guardians of Prosperity group.
European Doubts
Soon, disagreements over what to do emerged within the European Union. France, Italy, and Spain immediately distanced themselves from the Guardians of Prosperity, preferring to continue operations under the national command of Paris with the EU naval forces in Operation Atalanta, or like Madrid, to not participate in any activities.
There are three main reasons: the desire to move parallel with the United States, fear of potential retaliation against commercial ships, military resources, and economic costs of participation. As Brussels discusses with the Guardians of Prosperity the geographic scope and potential new mission, it is important to note that piracy is only one aspect of the maritime crises initiated by the Houthis.
Therefore, the new mission, in addition to Operation Atalanta, could resemble the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz program, organized by some European countries after Iran’s attacks on tankers in 2019 in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, and based in Abu Dhabi. Meanwhile, the use of private security companies by many maritime transport companies is on the rise.
Understanding Gulf Partners
For Washington, Europeans without a specific order are certainly not a new phenomenon, but it is believed that what worries Americans more is the distinction among Gulf partners. The monarchies, except for Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet, do not officially participate in the Guardians of Prosperity to reduce the risk of retaliation. Most importantly, they reacted to the U.K.-U.S. attack with very different tones.
Saudi Arabia expressed concern, including about the U.S., while the United Arab Emirates emphasized the unacceptable threat of the Houthis. Qatar warned Washington about the use of force, while Oman, which mediates in Yemen, openly condemned the targeted British-American bombing. These positions reflect different foreign policies in the region, despite the shared concern for maritime safety, which is especially crucial today for the Vision project and post-oil era.
The Red Sea: Militarized Conflict and Fragmentation
In the face of the Houthi threat, the lack of a multilateral initiative in the Red Sea is precisely due to the centrality this route has regained. In a few years, the Red Sea, the natural hinge between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, has become contested. The spiral of polarizing the international system with Russia’s aggression and systematic competition between the United States and China has accelerated the erosion of Western influence, initially by the United Kingdom and then by the United States, which has always been dominant in the Red Sea.
Therefore, Middle Eastern and international powers are fiercely competing to establish military bases, for example, in Djibouti, acquire port concessions, and create maritime and air infrastructures in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, and control Yemen’s islands and coastal cities. It is noteworthy that the institutional collapse of some countries like Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan also aids them in maximizing benefits.
In fact, it can be said that competition has now turned into militarization, and the multiplication of military interests has not only failed to create security but has also increased conflicts and tensions. There is no quarter in the world where security is as beneficial to all as in the Red Sea; everything from energy and grains to metals and manufactured goods passes through here. Its strategic position connecting the Indian Ocean with various Asian and African countries, as well as providing access to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal, has made it politically and economically significant in the region and the world.
However, precisely at this junction, the great global fragmentation makes finding common solutions impossible, and meanwhile, the Houthis are increasingly applying pressure from Yemen’s coastal periphery.