Reforming the Reforms
After the elections and in a climate where the fourteenth government cabinet has been fully formed based on the slogan of national unity and ministers are introducing their deputies, Abbas Abdi wrote a letter to Seyyed Mohammad Khatami on the fifth of Shahrivar from a critical perspective, presenting two major suggestions and four criticisms. This letter, upon its publication, elicited reactions that led to a detailed response from Abdi a few days later, defending his viewpoint.
Abdi and the Letter to Khatami
In this letter, titled ‘A Word with Mr. Khatami,’ Abbas Abdi initially explains why he decided to publish the letter publicly in an official newspaper. He states that he chose to publish it publicly because its subject is a public matter, and he hopes that public dialogue on the issue can be more effective. He then presents his first suggestion, saying, ‘I see this text as an opening for dialogue and hope that similar discussions will be raised with other forces and political tendencies, benefiting the country.’
I find this dialogue necessary in the current situation because my analysis is that we have entered a new phase, and past methods and approaches are not responsive to the new conditions, making the need for change quite evident.
After presenting his suggestion, Abbas Abdi writes a preface to the criticisms he raises, stating, ‘I write my criticism of the overall trend of the reform movement, which is centered on the reform front.’
Although the reform front is not organizationally attributed to you, in public perception and in reality, it is associated with you. He then enters the realm of criticism and presents his first critique, stating, ‘The first criticism I have of the official reformist movement is the dominant political language among them, something I have mentioned directly and indirectly in my writings several times.’
It is clear to me that there is a stark contrast between your political language and that of some reformist political forces, but ultimately, the voices recognized as the main voice of reformism, which are evident in some members of the reform front, are those with a radical and combative language. A language that, according to my analysis, is not compatible with a reformist approach and strategy.
I do not intend to dismiss or reject the approach of struggle, but whether the language is right or wrong, it is not suited to reformism. This approach is more about defeating the opponent and replacing them, caught in the binary of good and evil, and as a result, it is unable to create empathy and mutual understanding.
In his second critique, he targets the reform front and writes, ‘Their second problem, which is somewhat influenced by the first problem, is the lack of an effective and guiding analytical approach. I will only mention that the analytical framework of these individuals is more trapped in past frameworks than focused on the future. Analyses that focus on the personality and psychology of individuals are often incorrect and do not pay attention to structures and social factors. These analyses serve the politics of struggle rather than understanding reality, seeing the courage to make decisions in going to prison and standing firm on a position rather than flexibility and advancing affairs and the public good.’
In part of the third section of the critique addressed to Khatami, Abbas Abdi writes, ‘The third problem is that this movement is becoming a closed group with few new members and many departures.’
One reason is that their positions, along with official restrictions, have prevented the next and younger generation from replacing them, and on the other hand, their circle of relationships has become closed and limited to a network of friendships and family ties.
However, in this section, he also presents his second suggestion, writing, ‘In my opinion, the traditional reformist-principalist alignment has become irrelevant.’
They have become more of a name than a practice.
We need to collaborate and cooperate with new forces from within the principalists in power and beyond them, with forces that are in the social arena and beyond both traditional factions, to help and act to get the country out of this situation.
And finally, he presents his fourth critique, writing, ‘The fourth problem, arising from previous issues, is the demise of this front with the continuation of the current situation. The lack of adaptability, along with looking to the past and lacking sociological analysis, and the dominance of friendship and attributed ties instead of political and professional ties, has led to a situation where, on one hand, due to politeness, they overlook each other’s mistakes, and on the other hand, they are unable to renew and expand themselves and to effectively attract and repel forces and ideas. The main concern is that they may not be able to create a positive impact during the period of unity and may not consolidate and deepen this historical opportunity.’
I believe it is our duty to more explicitly criticize the wrong behaviors and statements attributed to this front.
Abdi and the Criticisms
After Abbas Abdi’s letter to Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the leader of the reform movement, was published, some members of the reform front began responding to him.
For example, Hassan Rasouli, a member of the reform front, in an interview reacting to this letter, initially says it would have been better if Abdi had written this letter to the presidium of the reform front. He further emphasizes, ‘I suggested to the presidium that he should come to the official sessions of the reform general assembly and open this dialogue. Not only Mr. Engineer Abdi, who is a well-known and thoughtful reformist whose dedication and effectiveness are undisputed within the reform movement, but this approach should also apply to others.’
Essentially, a dynamic reform movement cannot maintain its dynamism and stability if it is not critiqued and evaluated. During the 2022 elections, when several reformist friends proposed an idea called ‘Opening,’ I also suggested as a real member of the reform front that we should have a completely positive and benevolent interaction with the proponents of this idea as part of the diverse capacities of the reform movement. By inviting these dear ones in the past and today, from a brother like Engineer Abdi, we should strive to add to the diverse capacities of the reform movement.
Another response given to Abbas Abdi came from the spokesperson of the reform front, who in an interview with Khabar Fori said, ‘Abdi can make any decision and critique any individual or organization, and we welcome it. However, he must accept that the positions of parties and a political movement are the result of organizational decisions and views, not those of one person or even one party. Khatami and others in the reform front have not reacted to the letter, and in fact, before Abdi’s remarks, the subject of rebuilding the reform discourse suitable for today’s societal conditions and the necessity of strengthening civil society and activating parties and NGOs were on the reform front’s agenda.’
Abbas Akhundi, one of the reform front’s candidates for the presidential election, also reacted to this letter on his Telegram channel, writing in part, ‘Mr. Engineer Abdi, in a note titled ‘A Word with Mr. Khatami,’ believes that elections are not a factor of change.’
A relative opening in the 2023 elections is the result of change, and Iran has entered a new phase.
Based on Mr. Engineer Abdi’s hypothesis, the question is, if it is accepted that a transformation in the approach to governance within power has occurred, we must have a correct understanding of this transformation. The question is, what is the nature of this transformation, the reasons for its occurrence, its dimensions and depth, and the possibility of its permanence and irreversibility to the previous state?
Farhad Darvishi, the political office secretary of the Islamic Association of University Professors, also responds in a detailed note to the criticisms made by Abbas Abdi. For example, he writes, ‘The claim that the dominant voice among reformists is a radical and combative voice is unclear whether it specifically targets an individual, a specific political party, or the entire reform movement in the country.’
From Mr. Abdi’s perspective, which of Mr. Khatami’s words or actions as the spiritual leader of the reforms or the reform front as the only legal and recognized organization of the reform movement in the country has confirmed a combative and radical approach in the country’s political arena, at least in the past two decades? Or, in another part, he writes, ‘The victory of Mr. Rouhani in the 2013 and 2017 elections and the victory of the Hope List in the 2015 elections and recently the victory of Mr. Pezeshkian in the 2023 election are clear signs of a peaceful approach and the maximum use of minimal goals by reformists.’
The series of criticisms directed at Abbas Abdi led him to respond in another note, addressing his critics in seventeen sections. For example, in part of his response, he states, ‘I do not condemn such language. Friends can choose however they like.’
My issue is with Mr. Khatami, who cannot simultaneously have this language attributed to him while using his own language.
This is something he definitely needs to address, and I am sure that if not to the extent that I do, he somewhat agrees with this statement. Therefore, we are not in the position of describing the causes of Iran’s situation and the prevailing political language. We are now in the position of choosing an appropriate and effective political language for reforms. Let me add that part of this radical language is a product of the inefficiency of reforms, which these forces have moved beyond.
From Abdi to Tajzadeh
After Abbas Abdi’s letter to Khatami and his response to his critics were published, Mostafa Tajzadeh, who is currently in prison, wrote a lengthy note analyzing what has happened in the country and what could and, in other words, should happen.
Examining this letter and the conditions and stipulations that Mostafa Tajzadeh presents is a subject for another report and case, but the interesting point is that at one point, Abbas Abdi and Mostafa Tajzadeh share a common ground in their analysis of what has occurred.
Where Tajzadeh writes in his note that, according to some, Ayatollah Khamenei, unlike the elections of 1997 and 2013, has deliberately and knowingly paved the way for the victory of the reformist candidate this time to start a new era. And, of course, he continues, ‘In the current situation, I do not consider the strategic question to be why the leader made such a change or accepted it and what were the reasons and factors for approving Pezeshkian’s qualifications and relatively making the election competitive. I do not even find it important to ask whether changes have occurred compared to a few months ago or not. My answer is, of course, positive.’
However, the common point between Abdi and Tajzadeh in analyzing the current conditions can be found in a note that Abdi published on the seventeenth of Shahrivar in response to criticisms directed at him, where he states in part of the letter, ‘Since 2018, I told Mr. Khatami that in these conditions and until further notice, reformist politics with an approach to entering the power structure is irrelevant. This is in clear contrast to the analytical approach of friends in the winter 2022 statement. But why did we go from Esfand 2022 to Khordad 2023? It was due to the change in the government’s policy, which I was completely expecting, and I had noted several times that 2023 was the year of the necessity for change, and it happened. Naturally, we should have responded positively to the new approach.’ He then writes a sentence similar to Tajzadeh’s: ‘If the official policy had not changed, we would still be in our place. The content of this letter was nothing new to me.’
Final Words
What was mentioned in this report is a brief look at the suggestions and criticisms made by Abbas Abdi, which, of course, could raise two important questions.
1. One of the statements made by the opposition to the Islamic Republic and those advocating for moving beyond the Islamic Republic is that reformists are system pawns and safety valves that activate when conditions are on the verge of crisis, preventing the crisis from escalating.
Based on this view, it might be said that the presence and selection of Masoud Pezeshkian are also based on this. Can Abbas Abdi’s statement that ‘if the official policy had not changed, we would still be in our place. The content of this letter was nothing new to me’ be seen as a confirmation of the same theory held by proponents of overthrow?
2. One of the points mentioned in Abbas Abdi’s letter to Khatami is that the decisions of the reform front are inevitably attributed to Khatami. The question that arises here is whether, in recent times, over the three years and a few months since the reform front’s existence, Khatami has acted contrary to the reform front. In the twelfth parliamentary elections, was it not that Khatami, like the reform front, did not go to the polls? After that, with the early presidential elections, Khatami officially said he would support the reform front’s decision. Perhaps the outcome of these decisions allowed for the accompaniment of reformists who are present under the banner of the reform front, preventing their exclusion from these elections.