Response to Trump’s Letter and the Stalemate
Response to Trump’s Letter and the Stalemate
In recent weeks, the political and media landscape has been heavily engaged in speculation about the content of Donald Trump’s letter to Tehran and the implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s response to this message.
However, if we carefully examine the official and unofficial positions and statements of both Tehran and Washington, we can largely understand what proposals were put forward in this letter and what approach Tehran will take in response.
According to Iran Gate, historically, Iran’s handling of diplomatic messages from U.S. governments, especially during Trump’s era, has always been based on specific principles.
For instance, in 2019, Tehran refused to receive a letter from Trump that was conveyed by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
This decision sparked various reactions, with some believing that this approach missed a diplomatic opportunity.
However, supporters of this policy emphasized that the negotiation conditions were unequal and unfair, and did not align with Iran’s national interests.
Now, with the experience of this event, Tehran has chosen a different path in dealing with Trump’s new letter, and this time, while accepting the letter, it will offer a response similar to the past but in a diplomatic and formal manner.
What will Iran’s response be?
Iran’s response, as derived from previous approaches, will be based on several key principles.
1. Negotiation under pressure is not possible. Tehran has repeatedly stated that the policy of sanctions and maximum pressure blocks the path to any fruitful dialogue.
This stance will be even stronger given that Trump intensified sanctions during his second term.
Iran will emphasize that negotiations must be based on mutual respect and conducted in an atmosphere free of pressure and threats.
2. Rejection of comprehensive negotiations on all topics. One of the strategies of the Trump administration was to draw Iran into comprehensive negotiations that included issues like the nuclear program, regional activities, and missile capabilities.
Meanwhile, Iran has consistently emphasized that defense and national security issues will not be subjects of negotiation.
Therefore, it is expected that Tehran, while expressing willingness for diplomacy, will reject any comprehensive and extensive negotiations.
3. Dismantling Iran’s nuclear program is a red line. Trump’s maximum pressure policy has always aimed to force Iran to accept stricter limitations than the JCPOA.
However, the experience of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA showed that such a policy was not only ineffective but also pushed Iran towards reducing its nuclear commitments.
From this perspective, the Islamic Republic will clearly state that any negotiation ultimately leading to the complete shutdown of the nuclear program will be unacceptable.
Tehran holds this analytical line that when it has secured the right to 3.67% enrichment in the JCPOA, it will not engage in negotiations to lose this right.
4. Negotiation space must be based on goodwill. One of the main challenges in Iran-U.S. relations is the deep mistrust between the two sides.
The experience of Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the intensification of sanctions showed that even if an agreement is reached, there is no guarantee of U.S. adherence to it.
Therefore, Iran will emphasize that any negotiation requires practical guarantees from Washington to prevent the repetition of past bitter experiences.
Uncertainty in the Outlook for Tehran-Washington Negotiations for 1404
Given these principles, it can already be concluded that Iran’s response to Trump’s letter, despite changes in tone and language, will not differ significantly in substance from previous positions. This makes the outlook for negotiations between Tehran and Washington remain uncertain.
Especially considering that Trump has adopted tougher policies against Iran in his second term, making the diplomatic space more complex than ever.
Ultimately, considering these developments, it can be said that the new solar year is also likely to witness the continuation of tensions between Iran and the U.S.
Although some diplomatic movements may occur at unofficial levels, as long as the policy of maximum pressure is in effect, the prospect of agreement and tension reduction does not seem very bright.
A Strategy That No Longer Works
In the current situation, the repetition and, to some extent, continuation of the strategy of neither war nor negotiation can no longer respond to the field and diplomatic realities.
With the start of Donald Trump’s second presidential term and the intensification of the maximum pressure policy, new equations have been imposed on the region and the world, forcing Iran to choose between two options: either enter negotiations under conditions set by Washington or accept a higher level of tension that could even lead to direct confrontation.
Trump, in his new presidential term, has shown that he intends to minimize Iran’s diplomatic maneuvering space.
In other words, we are witnessing a daily reduction in Iran’s options.
The intensification of economic sanctions, increased restrictive measures against Tehran’s regional allies, and the strengthening of international coalitions against Iran all indicate this strategy.
In such an environment, the policy of neither war nor negotiation, which has so far acted as a deterrent strategy, is gradually losing its effectiveness, placing Iran in a position where maintaining the status quo seems more difficult than before.
While Iran seeks ways to manage the crisis without entering into negotiations or direct confrontation, it is Washington that is limiting the options.
Trump and his foreign policy team believe that Iran will only be willing to accept new conditions when faced with heavier pressures.
However, the important point is that the U.S. is not merely seeking negotiation to resolve disputes but intends to steer the negotiations in a direction that ultimately serves Washington’s geopolitical and economic goals.
In this framework, the negotiation that the U.S. is pursuing is by no means a balanced agreement based on mutual interests but rather a negotiation aimed at imposing broader restrictions on Iran and changing its regional and strategic behavior.
Challenges Facing Iran in Making Decisions
In this situation, Iran is facing a strategic crossroads: continuing the path of resistance against external pressures, which will have more economic and security consequences, or entering a path that Washington directs in any way.
Both options have their specific risks. Entering negotiations under U.S.-imposed conditions could weaken Iran’s strategic position, while refusal to negotiate might lead to harsher punitive actions from the United States and even its allies.
Given these equations, Iran is compelled to explore alternative options that can prevent the escalation of tensions without accepting Washington’s requirements.
Utilizing regional and international diplomatic capacities, strengthening economic and security alliances with other global powers, and creating new negotiation spaces in frameworks outside the U.S. desired scope could be proposed as ways to break the current deadlock.
Ultimately, the reality is that the current foreign policy landscape of Iran is no longer as flexible as before, and maintaining the status quo, especially in the year 1404, seems more challenging than ever.
Therefore, decision-making about the path ahead requires a realistic approach more than ever, based on a correct understanding of international developments and in line with securing the country’s long-term interests.
Buying Time for Nuclear Escape in 1404
The strategy of neither war nor negotiation, which in previous phases allowed Tehran to buy time to manage pressures and advance its nuclear program without entering direct conflict, is now facing new obstacles and limitations.
One of the most important challenges facing Tehran is the issue of time.
Estimates indicate that Iran has until late Ordibehesht or early Khordad 1404 to manage its interaction with the International Atomic Energy Agency in a way that prevents the activation of the snapback mechanism.
The snapback mechanism, which can lead to the automatic reinstatement of international sanctions, is one of the main pressure tools on Iran, and if Tehran cannot pursue an effective diplomatic process in its interactions with the agency and other international parties, it may face a new wave of international isolation and sanctions.
Therefore, contrary to some political and media analyses that present 1404 as Iran’s nuclear year or nuclear escape year, the field realities show that such a scenario does not align with the current situation.
Nuclear escape, meaning that Iran could reach the capacity to produce nuclear weapons in a short timeframe, is not only technically and diplomatically complex but also has serious implications for the country’s foreign policy.
Such a narrative, whether put forward by domestic analysts or foreign entities, would only legitimize potential actions by the U.S. and Israel against Iran’s nuclear program.
The Risk of Increased Aggressive Actions by the U.S. and Israel
The claim of Iran approaching a nuclear escape point could provide an excuse for aggressive actions by the U.S. and especially Israel.
Israel has always stated that it will not allow Iran to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and in recent months, the tone of Tel Aviv officials regarding Iran’s nuclear program has become more aggressive.
On the other hand, the Trump administration, in its second term, has pursued the maximum pressure policy with greater intensity and may be seeking to lay the groundwork for preventive actions against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
In such circumstances, any reckless action or creating the perception that Iran is on the verge of nuclear escape could have dangerous consequences.
Given these conditions, Iran must adopt a realistic strategy based on national interests.
Continuing the policy of buying time without considering practical considerations and international developments may have the opposite effect.
On the other hand, any decision regarding the nuclear program must be such that it not only prevents the legitimization of hostile actions by the U.S. and Israel but also creates new grounds for reducing pressures and increasing Iran’s bargaining power at the international level.
In this regard, active diplomacy and smart management of the nuclear dossier are of high importance and can play a decisive role in the future of the country’s foreign relations.