Russia has blown away the JCPOA agreement
Russia has blown away the JCPOA agreement. The revival of the JCPOA, which seemed very close, has once again entered a loop of suspension. The responses from the American side suggest divergence rather than convergence. But whom should we blame for the current situation?
Can we specifically trace this back to a country or a group? Some speculations point to the recent visit of Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian to Russia last week and suggest that what transpired between him and his Russian counterparts has likely influenced the content of the text Iran sent to the American side.
It is said that although the Foreign Minister’s trip to Russia was ostensibly aimed at mediating in the Ukraine war, in reality, Iran was seeking to finalize its positions and consult with the Kremlin before sending its final response to the European and American sides.
In fact, less than 48 hours after Amir-Abdollahian’s presence in Moscow, Iran’s response to the draft was given. Many believe that Moscow also played a role in this response. The main question is how significant is the northern country’s footprint in the lack of convergence in the negotiations so far, and as some analyses had predicted, has Russia really blown away the Iranian nuclear agreement?
Of course, this is not the first time the finger of blame has been pointed at Russia. Last March, when the negotiations entered a period of suspension, this country’s name was heard again, with claims that Russia was seeking guarantees to ensure that US sanctions would not violate Russia’s rights in the JCPOA.
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov officially stated that they requested from their American colleagues a written guarantee, at least at the level of the foreign minister, ensuring that the recent US sanctions would under no circumstances harm their right to free and comprehensive trade, investment, and economic and military-technical cooperation with Iran.
The soup that got too salty
With the start of a new round of negotiations to revive the JCPOA, or as Iran insists, negotiations to lift sanctions, one name became widely mentioned: Ulyanov, the Russian representative in international organizations, who was sometimes even referred to as the spokesperson for the Iranian side of the negotiations.
The visits of Iranian officials to Moscow and the request for greater Russian involvement in the Vienna negotiations, along with the remarks of Mikhail Ulyanov, the country’s representative, indicated that the Russians were playing a central role in the post-Zarif negotiations. In the media silence of the negotiators, especially from Iran, only the Russian representative was providing information. The situation became so intense that in August, Ulyanov tweeted, asking a BBC reporter to avoid spreading false stories about Russia’s role in the nuclear negotiations.
The reason the finger of blame is often pointed at Russia these days is that Zarif, in his secret six-volume collection on the process leading to the JCPOA and in his leaked interview file, both directly and indirectly revealed Russia’s lack of willingness or its obstructions in the negotiation process.
This issue escalated to the point where even an Iranian Twitter user questioned Ulyanov about it, and Ulyanov’s response, which was a dig at Mohammad Javad Zarif, faced strong reactions from Iranian users, forcing him to change his stance.
Russia’s interests in Iran
It is said that the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin, views the Vienna negotiations through three lenses: political-security, diplomatic, and economic. Russia sees Iran as its infantry in the Middle East, which can act against the interests of the US, NATO, or any hostile country or group at critical moments. The Vienna negotiations allow Russia to increase its weight in domestic and international political equations surrounding Syria.
On the other hand, following Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions by the US and Europe against Moscow, some Western officials claimed that Russia was obstructing the Vienna negotiations by demanding guarantees for the continuation of its dealings with Iran.
In a new alignment between the Eastern and Western blocs, Russia can have the upper hand in resolving the Ukraine issue in exchange for controlling Iran’s nuclear program, which is a red line for European countries and the US. Moscow knows well that even if the JCPOA is revived, few European companies will be willing to cooperate with Tehran, providing a suitable environment for Russia to increase economic interactions with Iran in various fields.
Russia is a very good market for Iranian food products. On the other hand, this country can be a vast and untapped market for Russian industries, especially in the fields of metals and oil and gas. Additionally, Iran has a particular interest in procuring weapons from Russia.
Strategic or tactical partner
It seems that Iran is also satisfied with this situation and has not only set its hopes on Russia but has also opened a special account for it. So much so that in August, Babak Negahdari, head of the Parliamentary Research Center, told Levan Jagarian, the Russian ambassador to Iran, that so far, good agreements have been made in the fields of oil and gas and swaps between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia, which will be effective in neutralizing sanctions against the two countries.
He then added that prolonging the time in advancing the cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia will be to the detriment of both parties and will provide an opportunity for the US and its allies to conspire and exploit.
Iran believes it has reached a level of strategic cooperation with Russia, considering this country now a strategic partner or friend. However, it seems this view does not have roots in reality. Not only do none of the Russian officials acknowledge such a thing, but the document of Russia’s strategic foreign policy doctrine does not testify to this either.
On the contrary, there is ample evidence that Russia views the Islamic Republic as a card in its gamble with the West. In line with this view, Iran has always denied any negative role of Russia in the negotiation process.
Noor News, a site close to the Supreme National Security Council, recently wrote, referring to the core of the criticisms, that one of the issues wrongly turned into a focal point of these marginalizations is the claim of the Iranian delegation being led by the eastern side of the negotiations, especially Russia.
This claim is generally based on some comments by Mikhail Ulyanov, the Russian representative in the negotiations, which, incidentally, following the intelligent actions of the Islamic Republic to encourage this country to cooperate with Iran, tries to facilitate the path to achieving a good agreement.
These internal marginalizations align with the efforts of hostile media outside the country to create a rift between Iran and the eastern side of the negotiations. A single example of this was the deliberate and incorrect translation of Ulyanov’s remarks by the Iran International network, leading to a strong reaction from him and the subsequent return of the network’s reporter from Vienna.