Soon It Becomes Late

Soon it becomes late

Soon it becomes late. The new government has named its discourse as national and social consensus. Consensus has a close and meaningful connection with hope. One cannot expect consensus and empathy in an atmosphere of hopelessness. One of the fundamental issues in Iranian society is the weakness of hope and the relatively bleak future and the lack of horizon-opening capacities in social and political life. This issue is reflected on one hand in national surveys and on the other hand in the level of participation in elections.

Although about 62% of the Iranian society believes that the current situation should be addressed through reforms, nearly 60% of eligible voters did not participate in the last elections held in the country. On the other hand, the hope for an improvement in the country’s situation in a specific future is very weak.

Approximately 80% of respondents in the fourth wave of the national survey on Iranian values and attitudes in 2023 believed that the country’s economic conditions have worsened compared to five years ago, and about 71% also believed that the economic conditions will worsen in the next five years. Regarding the spread of good qualities in society, about 74% believed it has worsened compared to five years ago, and about 65% said the spread of these qualities will worsen in the next five years.

These few statistics clearly show that today’s Iranian society evaluates itself as worse than yesterday and its future as worse than today. This assessment of the trend of life in the country indicates a lack of a positive and hopeful outlook towards the future.

One of the fundamental issues in Iranian society is the dominance of such a situation over a long period. Almost the same assessment can be found in the results of the first to third waves of the survey on Iranian values and attitudes. In other words, based on the findings of national surveys from 2000 to 2023, which is a little over two decades, and considering other findings, Iranians have believed that the moral, economic, political, and social conditions and social harms in Iranian society have been on a deteriorating trend.

The existence of this mindset, coupled with some existing deadlocks and official interventions in daily life, has negatively shaped Iranians’ understanding of the possibility of a desirable life in the country. The widespread emigration of Iranians over the past two decades has been primarily due to such understanding and recognition of the current situation and the effort to choose another environment to achieve a desirable and intended life.

The emergence of a kind of hope in the early months of new governments coming to power, including the fourteenth government, is not due to structural and lasting changes but rather due to the psychological atmosphere of the elections and the hope for changes in trends, policies, and programs in the new government and the creation of new conditions for improving the social living environment in various moral, economic, political, and social dimensions.

This hope arising from the psychological atmosphere of elections will not be very sustainable.

The thirteenth government, despite many experts initially speaking about its inability to improve the current situation, also enjoyed this hope in society, which was not very sustainable. Despite all the official propaganda to showcase its various successes, it could not, for various reasons intertwined with people’s lived experiences, create hope in society and provide a positive outlook and perspective. The withdrawal of the country’s intellectual community in various scientific, cultural, and artistic sectors during those years added to the lack of this perspective.

The new government has named its discourse as national and social consensus. Consensus has a close and meaningful connection with hope. One cannot expect consensus and empathy in an atmosphere of hopelessness. Moreover, consensus is not only at the level and layer of power centers and political forces and generally within the layer of official and political structures that can advance society and make it hopeful for the future. This consensus must also be reproduced at various social levels and layers. Only then will society feel that the social environment for a dignified life is changing.

In this process, the government must pay attention to the 60% who, despite the full-fledged entry of reformists, did not participate in the elections. In the current atmosphere, although there are many doubts from a significant part of society about the new government’s ability to improve the chaotic internal situation and foreign relations, since we are in the honeymoon period of the government, an implicit hope arising from the elections and the establishment of the new government has emerged. It seems that this doubt has extended to this area as well, and part of that 60% is also alongside the participants in the elections, waiting for actions from the government to reassess their view of the country’s conditions.

If Mr. Pezeshkian’s government can take tangible steps in the coming months to reduce pressure on society in social, cultural, and economic fields, which can include minimal openings in issues concerning women and youth, the internet, business environment, and foreign relations, then it can be expected that the seeds of more sustainable hope will be sown in Iranian society. This hope, as a driving force for society to face problems in cooperation and empathy with the government, i.e., consensus, will be activated and with the improvement of living conditions, will brighten Iranians’ view of the future and open up a relatively wide horizon, and will manifest itself in the reduction of Iranian emigration trends, especially among young elites, and a sense of vitality and assessment of the future in the national survey on Iranian values and attitudes in 2027. Mr. Pezeshkian knows well that sometimes soon it becomes late, therefore timely changes are essential to achieving goals.