Conflict with the West, a slap from the East
The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia and his presence at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit marked a new chapter of regional developments that had the most effects and implications for the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.
The Chinese President signed an anti-Iranian statement by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which directly questioned Iran’s ownership of the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, and also warned against the Islamic Republic’s interference in the internal affairs of regional countries.
China’s alignment with the positions of the Gulf countries might have been unimaginable even for the regime, but those conservatives who previously criticized Hassan Rouhani’s government and the moderate and reformist factions of the regime for their attempts to de-escalate tensions with the West, considering it a liberal and submissive approach, have now adopted a policy of silence regarding the communist China’s stance.
Reactions to China’s behavior
Many political activists and former statesmen who had previously warned against a one-sided policy of looking East are now, by recalling past criticisms, once again seriously critiquing this model of foreign policy. Perhaps one of the most noteworthy reactions comes from Abbas Akhoundi, the Minister of Roads and Urban Development in Rouhani’s government, who has referenced his experiences and collaborations with China.
Akhoundi expressed these experiences on his Telegram channel, stating that China’s stance was not new; a group in Tehran, for whatever reason, did not want to see the signs.
The issue of China’s stance was nothing new to me. China has adopted this approach for years, but a group in Tehran, for whatever reason, did not want to see the signs, perhaps due to the extraordinary level of corruption surrounding Chinese contracts. Let me mention just two examples, one general and the other specific.
China made a very large investment in developing the Oman Sea-Gwadar port corridor to China, a project reportedly worth over $42 billion. Crossing the Hindu Kush mountains with all its insecurities and through Pakistan from an engineering standpoint is not justifiable compared to crossing a relatively flat parallel route from Chabahar to China, which is largely ready for operation and requires one-tenth of the investment of that project. The road section is largely available and only needs service level upgrades, and the rail section is also largely implemented. The only thing that makes this project meaningful is bypassing Iran.
At that time, I suggested to the Chinese that they invest in this project, and if they wanted to enter Afghan territory, they should proceed through Khaf-Herat and then Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which has the least cost. I went to Kyrgyzstan and spoke with its president, who said he would also discuss the issue with the Chinese. The Kyrgyz were in great need of this corridor. I also shared this proposal with the Tajiks and made several correspondences, but there was not the slightest response.
It was clear that they had decided
to bypass Iran so that strategically they would have no dependency on Iran for access to the Oman Sea and the Persian Gulf. I finalized the project of electrifying the Tehran-Mashhad railway with a speed target of 200 kilometers per hour and a capacity of about 40 million passengers per year, with an amount of around $2 billion. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Tehran, the only contract signed was this one, which he had emphasized before his visit that he wanted signed in his presence.
Note that it was a contract, not a memorandum of understanding. A contract means all negotiations about the route, technical specifications, price, and details had been concluded, and everything was finalized, with both parties committed to executing the project. After that, we were supposed to deposit 15% of the project’s amount into the project fund. Despite the government’s foreign currency constraints, with the coordination of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, this was done immediately, and today, as I write this, the amount is available in the project fund.
That is, about $300 million was to be given to the Chinese side to start activities, and they were supposed to provide an advance payment guarantee to the Iranian side to activate the contract. An advance payment guarantee has the least risk because, against it, the contracting party takes the full amount. Since that date, the Chinese have not provided this guarantee to the Iranian side, and the signed contract is stalled. When the esteemed officials proposed the policy of looking East, I was not in office.
However, due to national duty, I took time from some friends whom I thought were influential in decision-making or at least in justifying matters, including Messrs. Mesbahi Moghaddam, Ahmad Tavakoli, and Morteza Nabavi, and told them the story is like this. This reliance on China is an illusion, but if your ear is your ear and my cry is my cry, it is a cry that reaches nowhere, and today we must witness the curtain falling on such a policy.
Invitation instead of summoning
According to conventional diplomatic protocols, any statement contrary to the national interests of a country or based on interference in the sovereignty’s policies is met with summoning the offending country’s ambassador and conveying a protest message. But it seems the strategic loneliness of the Islamic Republic in foreign policy and excessive reliance on China has created a new protocol, which is an invitation instead of summoning.
It seems the regime even exercises such caution and perhaps fear in the use of words that it is not even willing to declare a firm and clear stance in response to such anti-Iranian statements and positions from Beijing. In the statements of the Foreign Minister and Mojtaba Zolnour, the head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament, a kind of ambiguity and generalization is quite noticeable.
China: Choice or Compulsion
But the noteworthy point is examining this model of outlook and doctrine in foreign policy, which fundamentally involves looking East based on the necessity and a choice centered on national interests, or whether it has been imposed on us due to strategic loneliness in foreign and regional policy. Perhaps there is a third option, which is the compatibility of this option with the overall ideology overseeing the regime’s general policies. Whatever the reason, it does not diminish the bitterness and failure of this policy’s outcome.
According to foreign policy experts, balance in international relations is one of the main and logical principles of this field, and intelligence should replace slogans in foreign policy. Now, if the Islamic Republic, with the assumption that China and Russia, due to their numerous competitions and challenges with the West, like the Iranian government, categorize countries in foreign policy into friends and foes,
this seems to be a strategic mistake. Just as they should not rely on their enmity with the West, they should be even more skeptical about their friendship towards Iran and believe in their national interest-driven foreign policy. Now it remains to be seen whether the regime is still determined on the previous policy or whether such events will lead to a change in the foreign policy track.