The beginning of an erosion war
The start of an erosion war in the Middle East over the past two weeks has entered a new and more challenging phase. Netanyahu, three days after Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, spoke of a change in the Middle East map and named the operation that led to the killing of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah as ‘New Order Operation’. Netanyahu’s remarks and extremist Israelis indicate that they had planned from the beginning to turn the October 15 operation into an opportunity for engaging with resistance groups and confronting Iran.
Based on this, Israel, which was unaware of Iran and Hezbollah’s attack on October 7 during the first three months and aimed at focusing on Hamas, spoke. After a relative break from Hamas in Gaza, through unprecedented attacks on January 25 and April 2, they martyred several high-ranking IRGC officials in Syria. Despite Iran’s limited and measured response to the April 2 operation, Israel’s next provocative move was the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on August 1 against the Iranian consulate section in Damascus.
Iranian authorities made efforts to avoid any action that could lead to escalating war in the region towards Israel. However, the US government had little impact in preventing a serious confrontation between Iran and Israel, as Washington knows that in such a clash, it may have no choice but to intervene in favor of Israel.
Ultimately, in the so-called Middle East map change process, Hezbollah became the next target on Israel’s agenda. Striking Hezbollah is a consensus in Israeli domestic policy and has political benefits for Netanyahu’s future. Diplomatically, almost no country, except Iran, seriously opposes it. However, Netanyahu’s problem was that Hezbollah also avoided an all-out war, and the operational goal of the operations initiated on October 8th was merely to pressure Israel to cease fire in Gaza.
It is well known that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had said that if he had known in July 2006 that attacking the Israeli patrol and killing three Israeli soldiers and capturing two Israeli soldiers would lead to a 33-day war, he would not have taken that action. Therefore, Israel used the return of displaced residents of northern Israel to their homes and the removal of the Hezbollah threat as an excuse for the war against Hezbollah. The question now is how far this change in the Middle East map and the new order is going to continue.
Israel’s goal seems to be to take advantage of the opportunity of the October 7 operation to end the shadow war or the unlimited and uncontrolled attrition war managed by the Axis of Resistance groups in their surrounding areas. This strategy could be pursued with the support of Europe and America, the silence of China and Russia, and the indifference of Islamic-Arab countries. In a situation where Israel has turned the threat of an all-out war into a pretext for attacks to stop attrition war, the question is: what can Iran do? Iran’s policy of avoiding an all-out war has been the right policy.
First, the expectation is that Hezbollah, despite the blows it has suffered, is able to maintain its formations and military capabilities and defend itself. Second, some spectrums expect Iranian authorities to take actions that could lead to a full-scale war. It is not expected that in case of a serious confrontation between Iran and Israel, especially in these electoral conditions, the US will hesitate to enter into war. Military forces of a medium power are not prepared to confront global powers. In addition, the existing problems in economic, social, domestic policy, foreign policy, intelligence, and security domains further provide a reason to avoid a widespread war.
Third, it is unlikely that Israel would initiate a war with Iran without US support, unless it can find a pretext. This pretext could be Iranian attacks against Israel or actions in the nuclear field. Some recent recommendations suggest Iran’s nuclearization as a way to avoid an all-out war and as a response to weakening deterrent arms. However, such recommendations could pose a significant threat to Iran’s security. Moving in this direction requires meeting multiple conditions, such as having a strong information barrier, information security, nuclear security, and safety.
Serious movement in the nuclear field will mobilize many against Iran, and even if China and Russia do not join, they will at most remain silent. Additionally, nuclear deterrence requires a large number of atomic bombs and a variety of delivery tools through air, missile, and submarine. Having just one or two bombs not only does not provide deterrence but also if on-site nuclear facilities are targeted and the ability to deliver a second strike is not present, a significant part of the country could become uninhabitable.
