The Caucasus is restless
The Caucasus became restless with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s, and the introduction of Glasnost, which means openness in Russian, led to the eruption of suppressed and dormant ethnic, territorial, and border disputes during the Soviet rule.
One of the most active centers of territorial and border crises in the Soviet Union was the Caucasus, which alongside economic and international political factors, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Black January or Black Saturday of 1989 in Baku, resulting from the conflict between Armenians and Azeris, laid the groundwork for a crisis that, even after three decades, has turned the South Caucasus into a hotspot of insecurity and conflict.
The dispute was over the issue of the Armenian-populated autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh within the borders of Soviet Azerbaijan, which, for certain reasons during the formation of the Soviet Caucasian republics, had been placed within Azerbaijan’s territory, although it was near the borders of the Republic of Armenia, located to the west of this area.
The relationship between the Armenians of Karabakh, the indigenous inhabitants of this region, and Armenia, which was possible during the Soviet period, at the brink of the Soviet collapse and the readiness of this region to join Armenia or gain independence from the Republic of Azerbaijan, marked the beginning of a deep crisis in the region that still remains the main obstacle to establishing peace and security in the Caucasus.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the fourteen republics forming the Soviet Union, and the transfer of the Soviet Union’s permanent seat in the Security Council to Russia as its successor, despite the signing of the Alma-Ata Declaration in 1991 recognizing and respecting the former borders and independence and territorial integrity of the former Soviet republics, signed by the leaders, the possibility of establishing security and calm was accompanied by conflicts that ultimately led to a devastating war between Armenians and Azeris.
Within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, with political instability resulting from gaining independence in the political structure of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Armenians of Karabakh, who found themselves surrounded by Azerbaijani military forces, with the help of Armenia and, according to some reports, with the help of Red Army cadres who had remained in the Caucasus, managed to declare a self-proclaimed independence and engage in military conflict with the Republic of Azerbaijan, eventually leading to the military occupation of five Azerbaijani districts surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
With the arrangements of the UN Security Council, a ceasefire was declared, and the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was tasked by the Security Council with managing the affairs of Karabakh and resolving the issue through diplomatic channels. Since the ceasefire was declared, Armenia and Azerbaijan have each pursued separate paths. Azerbaijan, due to significant oil and gas resources, with the participation and investment of Western oil companies, succeeded in exporting energy outside of Russia’s control, the big brother of the Soviet era.
Meanwhile, Armenia focused its efforts on maintaining the occupied territories and meeting the military and welfare needs of the people in this region. As Azerbaijan benefited more economically and from Western support, strengthening its economic, military power, and political stature, Armenia, with a population about one-third of Azerbaijan’s, became weaker in terms of defense and economy, relying on assistance from Armenians residing in other countries.
In November 2020, the Republic of Azerbaijan, with military and advisory assistance from Israel and Turkey, and according to some reports, extremist forces from Syria, succeeded in a lightning attack over 44 days in expelling Armenians from the occupied territories.
The direct entry of Russia, with the initiative and direct participation of Putin, into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan and the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the two conflicting parties and Russia started a crisis more complex than the main crisis.
Russia intended to connect Nagorno-Karabakh, adjacent to the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to two military presence centers of Russia in Georgia’s South Ossetia province and the autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, and the declaration of independence of these two separatist units of Georgia in 2008, and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from the Republic of Ukraine to Russia in 2014, and to create a defensive buffer line against NATO to prevent the expansion of this military alliance from the west and south of Russia’s territory. Russia itself was the biggest violator of the Almaty Declaration that it had signed.
Russia’s military attack on Ukraine in 2022 disrupted many of the Caucasus equations. Ukraine’s resistance, with Western help, against Russia’s advances, kept Russia away from the Caucasus issue and caused dissatisfaction in Armenia, Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Russia’s inaction in helping Armenia during Azerbaijan’s military operations and Armenia’s defeat, as well as Azerbaijan’s security threats against Armenia’s territorial integrity within the framework of non-legal interpretations of a non-legal agreement outside the Minsk Group’s competence, without the participation of the other two Minsk Group co-chairs, France and the United States, where Russia alone took the initiative and signed a ceasefire agreement, made the Caucasus equation more complicated.
According to the provisions of that agreement, the Republic of Azerbaijan provided a corridor named Lachin within its territory, which had been liberated from Armenian occupation, for the Armenians of Karabakh, allowing them to travel to Armenia under Russian supervision. In return, Armenia committed to enabling a land connection between the main part of Azerbaijan and its exclave in the west, named the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. In practice, the Lachin corridor was not opened, and the military and paramilitary forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan besieged the mountainous Karabakh region, eventually leading the native Armenian inhabitants of Karabakh to be forced into self-imposed exile to Armenia.
Currently, the Armenians residing in Karabakh have filed a complaint against the Republic of Azerbaijan in the International Court, accusing Azerbaijan of ethnic cleansing. Although the Azerbaijani government welcomes the return of Armenians to their homes in Karabakh and guarantees their security, the Armenians, for their safety and due to the insecurity and lack of security assurance from the Russian peacekeeping forces stationed in Karabakh, have withdrawn from returning to Karabakh.
The conflict between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan continues. Armenia has announced its withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the continuation of Pashinyan’s cabinet faces widespread protests. Armenians oppose Pashinyan’s agreement to hand over four Armenian villages to the Republic of Azerbaijan.
The Caucasus remains restless. India’s and France’s involvement in Armenia has led to protests and warnings from Aliyev in Baku.
Pashinyan is criticized by many in Armenia for his inability to manage affairs, and widespread demonstrations against his cabinet are ongoing. The course of events in the region shows that the heads of governments who have come to power solely through emotional currents without the backing of political, legal, and economic knowledge have caused political and economic instability in their countries.