The Era of Decline in Iran’s Diplomacy
According to experts, the performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s diplomatic apparatus over the past three months, following the onset of the Gaza war, has been unstable, passive, and disorganized. The finger of blame is pointed more than anyone else at Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Foreign Minister and head of the diplomatic apparatus.
Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, during the past two and a half years of holding the position of Foreign Minister, has left behind a challenging record. He entered Raisi’s cabinet as one of the close associates of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the so-called traditional and classic conservatives.
Whose Minister is Amir-Abdollahian?
From the very beginning, there were whispers about Ebrahim Raisi’s inclination to appoint Ali Bagheri Kani as Foreign Minister, but it is said that the office of the Supreme Leader opposed this appointment. In a sense, it can be said that Amir-Abdollahian has the endorsement of Ayatollah Khamenei’s office. In other words, the weak record of the diplomatic apparatus under Amir-Abdollahian’s leadership can be attributed to the leadership of the regime, as he directly intervened in this matter and defended this choice. Therefore, many believe the current Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic is not only not the preferred minister of Raisi and his entourage but is precisely and directly Ayatollah Khamenei’s minister, and his performance is also attributed to him.
Passivity from Day One
The first and most important case that has existed and still exists in Amir-Abdollahian’s Foreign Ministry is Iran’s nuclear dossier and the nuclear negotiations. A dossier that has been ongoing for over 20 years, and Hassan Rouhani’s government had managed to bring this long-standing issue close to a conclusion. However, for reasons including Trump’s rise to power, the game changed, and Raisi’s rise in Iran completely altered the equations. In any case, Amir-Abdollahian took over the nuclear dossier when negotiations with Biden’s Democratic administration had reached a suitable point for reviving the JCPOA. Even Raisi had promised a strong and decisive implementation of the JCPOA during the elections.
But over time, it became clear that not only do the regime’s leaders have no interest in permanently and definitively resolving this issue, but the key players in the diplomatic apparatus also lack the ability to implement policies in line with national interests. Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, as the head of the Foreign Ministry, demonstrated that he not only lacks the ability to lead negotiation teams but also faces complete submission and passivity even in front of the head of the nuclear negotiation team.
Meanwhile, the relationship between Javad Zarif and the nuclear negotiation teams is still fresh in the public’s memory and has not been forgotten. This deficiency was so damaging that Ali Bagheri Kani, as the direct head of nuclear negotiations with European countries, Russia, and China, made disastrous decisions, the most important and famous of which was delaying negotiation and agreement under the pretext of a harsh winter in Europe. A policy that not only placed Iran’s interests under Russia’s interests but also caused a severe wave of currency price increases in the country.
On the other hand, in the summer of 2022, when such a decision was made by the negotiation team and the ruling hardline factions, no one imagined that just a few weeks later, we would face one of the most significant and widespread waves of nationwide protests in the country. Protests that dealt a severe blow to the Islamic Republic’s image in the world and further shook the country’s shaky and fragile economic foundations. Meanwhile, Amir-Abdollahian’s role as an uncertain and weak minister was entirely evident to the audience, and no one attributed any agency to him and his deputy team.
From the Gaza War to Pakistan’s Incursion into Iranian Territory
October 7, 2023, is one of the very important moments in Middle Eastern history that will likely be talked about more in the years and decades to come. The attack by Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants on Israeli kibbutzim in the south of the occupied territories not only resulted in the deaths of thousands of people in this region of the world but also marked the beginning of various crises in different parts of the world, especially the Middle East.
Naturally, from the outset, the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran was heard as one of Hamas’s main supporters and the primary instigator of this attack from Tel Aviv’s platforms. However, the Biden administration, insisting on the assertion that there is no evidence of Tehran’s involvement in the operation known as the Aqsa Storm, has so far refrained from direct confrontation with Iran. But Amir-Abdollahian’s performance in facing this significant transformation in the Middle East was surprisingly amateurish and clumsy.
The contradictory statements he made at the United Nations and his aimless and Don Quixote-like travels to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria led to the message being sent to Iran’s regional rivals that Tehran has no specific plan for dealing with the Gaza war. The peak of this clumsiness occurred when, slightly after the pressure of the war on the Israeli government eased, Netanyahu gradually managed to free himself from the immense volume of criticism.
At the same time, the Israeli government began targeting key Iranian figures in the region, including prominent Iranian Quds Force commanders in Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, the Israeli army, through coordinated airstrikes, killed several prominent figures and commanders of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Amir-Abdollahian’s passive stance in this situation was limited to slogan-like speeches in meetings with regional countries’ officials, to the extent that no one was waiting to hear the Islamic Republic’s positions from the Foreign Minister anymore, preferring to await Ayatollah Khamenei’s next speech to better understand the existing alignments.
However, this situation continued until terrorist attacks occurred in the port of Rask and also in Kerman, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilian men, women, and children. But the Islamic Republic attributed these attacks to Israel and organized operations in response, launching attacks on three countries: Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan. These attacks were mainly rocket and drone strikes, and according to Tehran’s claims, targeted terrorist positions in the region.
But the problem arose when the Islamic Republic extended the game to a new and dangerous field called Pakistan, a country that fundamentally had no essential conflict of interest with Iran and was not practically considered a threat. However, this action by the IRGC on January 16, 2024, angered public opinion and the Pakistani government. Initially, the chargé d’affaires of the Islamic Republic’s embassy in Islamabad was summoned, and the return of the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan was also banned.
This incident occurred while it was expected that Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, as the Foreign Minister, would use diplomatic tools to prevent any harsh Pakistani reactions. However, his weakness and the weakness of Ebrahim Raisi’s government led to the Pakistani army launching drone and rocket attacks on Iranian soil in the early morning of January 18, 2024. This attack was conducted while the Pakistani Foreign Ministry completely controlled the media narrative and guided the news outlets.
But in Tehran, the situation was different, with each official in Raisi’s government playing their own tune, and no specific position was adopted by Tehran. This passivity from the diplomatic apparatus was what caused the level of hostility to increase to this extent, putting the relations between Iranian and Pakistani parties at serious risk.
This passive stance of the Foreign Minister and the diplomatic apparatus in Tehran has continued, and it seems to be causing the scope of hostilities between Tehran and Islamabad to widen. It is said that Pakistani government officials have spoken of the need for a more serious confrontation with Iran, and the Iranian embassy in this country remains without a leader. This is while the function of diplomacy is precisely during times of war and conflict that it becomes apparent and is utilized, but it seems that neither the Foreign Minister of the thirteenth government is capable of such a task, nor is there any will to adopt such an approach.