The Middle East is burning with fever
From Israel’s perspective, military reactions to current developments fundamentally shape Israel’s future relations with the Islamic world and Arab countries, and essentially determine Israel’s position in the future Middle East.
In fact, Israel’s reaction to Iran is rooted in the nature of war.
Israel has had tumultuous relations with the Arabs over the past decades, and the quality and ups and downs of this relationship have shaped a significant part of the existence and mindset of Israeli politicians.
For this reason, it has always tried to maintain its existence by resorting to force. Since 1948, the use of force has always been a major part of Israel’s strategy in the Middle East.
Therefore, given the details, expecting Israel to abandon this strategy at this particular time is not realistic.
The second factor is the United States. The Israeli army is very powerful, but it will certainly need the help of the U.S. to carry out a large-scale operation against Iran.
For the Israeli Air Force to reach targets in Iran and return safely, it must cover a distance of 1,600 kilometers.
Therefore, it needs access to aerial transit routes to pass through the airspace of other countries, especially Jordan and Syria. Additionally, Israeli fighter jets need aerial refueling, which the U.S. can provide.
Thus, Israel will need U.S. financial and military assistance in this regard. However, the issue is that U.S. aid usually comes with conditions. It is entirely natural for the U.S. to try to protect its interests in the conflict between Iran and Israel.
For this reason, it has told Israel to refrain from attacking Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities, but so far, it has shown no inclination to reduce the level of tension.
On the other hand, Iran has also shown that it is capable of harming Israel. The deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system in Israel is evidence of this claim.
However, in the end, Israel will probably have to prove that its ability to inflict damage is greater, and this very show of force will further escalate the tension.
On this side, Iran also knows that an attack is on the way, and therefore it has laid out its options. Iran has publicly declared that any response Israel gives will be met with a harsher response from Iran, but the internal atmosphere in Iran is not unified on this matter.
Within Iran’s political structure, some believe Iran should move towards de-escalation with Europe and the U.S., and if this de-escalation occurs, then Israel can be contained. However, others believe that Iran should continue to confront Israel more actively because if Iran retreats, Israel will advance further.
Therefore, if we look at the situation from this angle, we see that a severe Israeli attack on Iranian soil would eliminate any possibility of de-escalation between Iran, Europe, and the U.S., particularly resolving the nuclear negotiation.
Thus, even if Iran decides to respond to Israel again in such circumstances, its interests will not necessarily be fully secured.
Because on one hand, Iran is not inclined to get involved in a large regional war, and on the other hand, it faces military limitations.
For example, the Iranian navy does not have the capability to move towards the eastern Mediterranean, and if it attempts to do so, it will face U.S. obstruction.
Therefore, overall, Iran cannot deploy its navy to waters close to Israel.
If it attempts such a move, its control over the Strait of Hormuz will be severely weakened.
Iran’s air force is also not in a very good condition and has not been modernized. Iran’s air fleet consists of F-14, F-4, and MiG-29 fighters, and Iran’s refueling tanker is a KC-700, which is old and not stealthy.
Therefore, Iran’s air force cannot directly attack Israel, so Iran’s only option is a missile or drone attack on Israeli soil.
The recent missile and drone attacks have not yet caused serious damage to Israel.
One possibility is that Iran did not want to cause serious damage, and another possibility is that Israel’s air defense system has been successful.
A ground attack is also completely impossible.
Firstly, because Iran’s latest tanks can move 560 kilometers, and even if we account for their internal fuel, they will ultimately advance only up to 760 kilometers.
However, the closest land route for Iran’s tanks to move towards Israel is through Syria and Lebanon, which is nearly 1,800 kilometers.
Therefore, Iran would need a very long and cohesive logistical chain to guarantee the movement of its tanks towards Israel.
So, if Iran wants to deliver a very severe response to Israel, it will likely have to first act through its allied armed forces and then move towards a direct missile attack, which means more weapon consumption, more intelligence needed, more expertise required, more money needed, and more equipment necessary for a broader action.
It is true that Iran’s armed allies in the region are under intense pressure, but it cannot be said that the quality of their relationship with Iran has been damaged.
For the simple reason that these groups have no other supporter in the region besides Iran, and if Iran is weakened beyond a certain point, these groups will also see their existence at risk.
Therefore, if things reach a critical point and if Iran makes a request, new fronts against Israel will likely open, and they can even expand the scope of the frontline with Israel.
However, if this happens, the Israeli army will probably endure a lot of pressure, and this is where the U.S. might enter the war.
Therefore, considering what has been said, ultimately the most important factor playing a role in the conflict between Iran and Israel is the United States.
That is, if we want to compare Iran’s power in confronting Israel with the U.S.-Israel relationship and conclude which of these two is more effective in expanding the scope of the conflict, it seems that the U.S.-Israel relationship has a much greater effect.
Therefore, the U.S. has probably imposed limitations on Israel’s response to Iran.
Although these limitations may not be very extensive.
Hezbollah and Israel
On October 8th, a day after Hamas attacked Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu announced that once the Gaza war is over and Hamas is neutralized militarily, Israel will turn its attention to the northern front and Hezbollah and will try to change the Middle East.
Now place these words alongside Netanyahu’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly.
In his speech, Netanyahu held two maps, naming one the ‘Map of Catastrophe,’ marking Iran and the axis of resistance countries, and the other as the ‘Map of Blessing,’ highlighting the Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel.
Saudi Arabia was also marked on the second map, even though it has not yet normalized relations with Israel.
Therefore, in the same speech, Netanyahu clearly stated that Israel intends to eliminate the axis of resistance, and immediately after the speech, he ordered the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
After that, a ground attack on southern Lebanon began to put more pressure on Hezbollah and to force Syria to comply with Israel’s demands.
It is completely clear that the current war Israel has started with Hezbollah is very different from their last war in 2006.
The current war might be the last war between Israel and an Arab force over territorial disputes, and whatever the outcome, it might change the regional order.
Israel’s goal is the complete defeat of Hezbollah because it considers Hezbollah a vital arm of Iran in the region.
Meanwhile, Iran is engaged on two main fronts: first, on the diplomatic front with the West and the U.S., and second, on the military front with Israel. Since coming to power, Masoud Pezeshkian promised to solve internal issues and improve Iran’s economic situation.
During his trip to New York, Pezeshkian explicitly stated that Iran is willing to resume nuclear negotiations and emphasized that all Middle Eastern countries have the right to live in peace and stability. Many inside interpreted Pezeshkian’s stance as a betrayal of the axis of resistance, particularly Hezbollah.
But the reality is that in international relations, a country’s survival takes precedence over ideology, and international politics is not an arena of permanent alliances but rather one of permanent interests.
The uncertain future of Lebanon
Lebanon has been in a turbulent state and is facing strange challenges. In countries like Lebanon, when the situation is like this and factional conflicts increase, politics in the conventional sense loses its meaning, especially if the country’s military force is not very strong.
For years, Hezbollah has been considered the dominant political force in Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s military branch has been even more powerful than the Lebanese army.
This power of Hezbollah had prevented the Lebanese army from siding with any particular faction amid internal conflicts.
During the Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1989, the Lebanese army twice sided with factions and was severely weakened both times. Now, if Israel can inflict more damage on Hezbollah, the likelihood of internal conflict in Lebanon will increase.
Hezbollah forces also have families, and currently, Lebanese Shiites are in a very bad state. Some reports indicate that Sunnis and Christians are not treating the displaced Lebanese Shiite families well.
If the situation worsens further, how can it be guaranteed that Hezbollah forces will not rise to defend the security of their families?
But can it be said with certainty that Israel’s operation against Hezbollah will be completely successful? Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah have so far inflicted serious damage on this group and have perhaps challenged Iran’s regional strategy.
But the reality is that these attacks also make Israel’s strategic environment insecure, and interestingly, even if Europe and the U.S. force Israel to accept a ceasefire, this strategic environment will become even more insecure.
In any case, Iran and Hezbollah know Israel well and are aware of Israel’s military power. Despite all of Israel’s attacks, neither Iran nor Hezbollah has yet retreated.
Their assessment is probably that they can still endure Israel’s attacks to the point where the international community eventually concludes that Israel has overstepped its bounds and as a result, increases pressure on Israel. But here a question arises: Will Israel succeed in forcing Iran and Hezbollah to retreat before the situation gets out of control? This is a question that no one knows the answer to yet.
However, what is clear is that Iran’s regional situation has been severely challenged. The weakening of Hezbollah and Israel’s free hand in continuing its attacks have placed the Middle East on the brink of a major geopolitical change, and this is a change that is not in Iran’s favor at all.
The weakening of Iran will allow the U.S. and the region’s Arabs to take advantage of the opportunity and increase pressure on Iran. We have seen an example of this pressure in the recent support of the European Union for the UAE’s statement regarding the three islands.
Hezbollah was so successful that Iran based its regional strategy on Hezbollah’s power. Therefore, damage to Hezbollah’s military capabilities is a heavy blow to Iran’s regional influence and national security.
Weakening Hezbollah is not just weakening an armed group in Lebanon; weakening Hezbollah means jeopardizing Iran’s position in Syria and Iraq and giving more courage to Iran’s rivals like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to advance their plans in the region.
In these types of conflicts, some countries always lose, but their loss is considered a gain for some other countries. One of the countries that greatly benefits from Iran’s weakening is Turkey.
Iran’s weakening may also provide an opportunity for the region’s Sunni Arabs to shift the balance of power in their favor, but if we look at the issue realistically, it must be said that Turkey has a stronger hand compared to the Arabs.
Of course, Turkey currently has many internal problems, but this change we are talking about might be a long-term and tense change, and Turkey will probably be able to prepare itself over time to play a role in the process.
Weakening Hezbollah means weakening Iran’s influence in the eastern Mediterranean, and this means a good opportunity for Turkey. The fact that Hezbollah has been forced to bear most of Israel’s attacks alone shows that Iran’s reliance on its armed allies in the region also has limitations, and it is precisely here that an opportunity arises for Iran’s rivals like Turkey.
One of the main foundations of Iran’s regional strategy has been competing with Turkey and blocking Turkey’s influence in the region.
Iran increased its influence in the Arab world during the Arab Spring unrest and especially during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and this influence reached Turkey’s southern flank in Syria.
Therefore, now that Iran is facing challenges and losses, it is natural that Turkey will benefit the most.
Recently, Turkey has tried to repair its relations with Bashar al-Assad as well. Syria has been seeking resources for post-war reconstruction for years, but the necessary resources for reconstruction will not come to this country as long as Syria is close to Iran and Hezbollah.
Therefore, it is not unlikely that Bashar al-Assad will also try to balance his relations with Iran and Hezbollah with relations with the region’s Arabs to benefit from the Arabs’ substantial investments.
We have also seen signs of this trend in the past year.
Right in the middle of Israel’s conflict with Hamas, Bashar al-Assad decided to send signals to his former enemies and take steps to repair relations.
In the past year, the fronts that could have been opened from Syria for intervention in the conflict with Israel have been surprisingly quiet and calm.
It seems that Bashar al-Assad has decided to adopt a silent approach as long as the Gaza conflict continues.
Of course, Syria’s approach has its reasons. First, if Syria gets involved in the conflict, it will suffer greatly.
Entering the war is very costly for Syria.
Whether Israel attacks Syria or Syria becomes so insecure that armed rebel groups expand their activities again, in either case, Syria will suffer greatly.
For this reason, Syria has acted in a way that its silence seems clear. Syria’s supportive statements for Iran and Hezbollah have not been very strong or impactful.
Even Syrian media are more focused on internal issues, as if no war is ongoing.
Two days after the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Syria issued a statement in support of Lebanon. After the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Syria also issued a statement condemning the violation of Iran’s sovereignty and made a very brief reference to Haniyeh.
This type of behavior is not normal, and probably Iran does not intend to pressure Syria on this issue.
Perhaps Syria has declared that it does not intend to enter the conflict, and Russia has also supported this stance, so Iran cannot object to Syria’s approach.
Since a year ago, Syria has also taken steps towards improving relations with the region’s Arabs.
For example, just a few days after the start of the war in Gaza, Syria closed the Yemeni embassy in Damascus and expelled Yemeni representatives from Syria.
On October 8th, a day after Hamas attacked Israel, Bashar al-Assad had a phone conversation with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the leader of the UAE.
On the same day, Sheikh Mohammed also spoke with Israeli, Egyptian, and Jordanian officials.
Apparently, Mohammed bin Zayed told Assad not to participate in the war and not to allow his country’s territory to be used for attacks on Israel.
Some reports also indicate that the Assad government has not allowed Iraqi resistance groups to open a front against Israel from Syrian soil.
At the end of January, the UAE also sent its ambassador to Syria.
In May this year, Saudi Arabia also appointed its ambassador to Syria, and on September 9th, it reopened its embassy in Syria.
Therefore, currently, all Gulf countries except Qatar have restored diplomatic relations with Bashar al-Assad.
The efforts of Gulf countries and Turkey to normalize relations with Assad each follow their own logic.
From Turkey’s perspective, having close relations with Syria is a good tool to counter the U.S.-backed Kurds in northern and northeastern Syria.
From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, engaging with Syria aligns with bin Salman’s new strategy to improve relations with neighbors and reduce their involvement in regional conflicts.
Saudi Arabia hopes that by engaging with Syria, it can also control drug trafficking in the region.
From the UAE’s perspective, having relations with Syria can control Islamist movements in the region.
Assad’s approach shows that although Syria is Iran’s strategic ally, it is willing to choose an independent path whenever its interests dictate.
Apparently, Bashar al-Assad believes that normalizing relations with Turkey and the Gulf countries is the first step towards normalizing relations with European countries.
Therefore, given the current conditions, if Syria continues on this path, Iran’s challenges in the eastern Mediterranean will increase.
