The Middle East is burning with fever
The Middle East is burning with fever; in Israel’s view, military responses to current developments will fundamentally shape Israel’s future relations with the Islamic world and Arab countries, essentially determining Israel’s position in the future of the Middle East.
In fact, Israel’s reaction to Iran is rooted in the nature of war.
Israel has had tumultuous relations with the Arabs over the past decades, and the quality and fluctuations of this relationship have shaped a large part of the existence and mindset of Israeli politicians.
For this reason, it has always tried to maintain its existence by resorting to force. From 1948 until now, the use of force has always been a significant part of Israel’s strategy in the Middle East.
Therefore, given the details, expecting Israel to abandon this strategy at this particular time is not realistic.
The second factor is the United States. The Israeli military is very powerful, but for a large-scale operation against Iran, it will definitely need U.S. assistance.
The Israeli Air Force must travel 1,600 kilometers to reach targets in Iran and return safely.
Therefore, it needs access to aerial transit routes to pass through the airspace of other countries, especially Jordan and Syria. Additionally, Israeli fighter jets require aerial refueling, which the U.S. can provide.
Thus, Israel will need American financial and military assistance in this regard. However, the issue is that U.S. aid usually comes with conditions. It is entirely natural for the U.S. to try to preserve its own interests in the conflict between Iran and Israel.
For this reason, it has told Israel to refrain from attacking Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities, but so far, it has shown no inclination to reduce the level of tension.
On the other hand, Iran has also demonstrated its capability to harm Israel. The deployment of the THAAD missile defense system by the U.S. in Israel is evidence of this claim.
But ultimately, Israel will probably be forced to prove that its ability to inflict damage is greater, and this very show of force will further escalate the tension.
On this side, Iran also knows that an attack is imminent and has therefore laid out its options. Iran has openly stated that whatever response Israel gives, Iran will respond more severely, but the internal atmosphere in Iran is not coordinated on this issue.
Within Iran’s political structure, some believe that Iran should move towards de-escalation with Europe and the U.S., and if this de-escalation occurs, then Israel can also be contained. However, others believe that Iran should continue to confront Israel more actively because if Iran retreats, Israel will advance further.
Therefore, if we look at the matter from this angle, we see that a severe Israeli attack on Iranian soil would eliminate any possibility of de-escalation between Iran, Europe, and the U.S., and especially resolving the nuclear negotiations.
Thus, even if Iran decides to respond to Israel again in such circumstances, its interests will not necessarily be fully met.
Because on one hand, Iran is not inclined to be drawn into a large regional war, and on the other hand, it faces military limitations.
For example, Iran’s navy does not have the capability to move towards the eastern Mediterranean, and if it attempts to do so, it will face U.S. obstruction.
Therefore, overall, Iran cannot deploy its navy to waters near Israel.
Even if it attempts such an action, its control over the Strait of Hormuz will be severely weakened.
Iran’s air force is also not in a very good condition and has not been modernized. Iran’s air fleet consists of F-14, F-4, and MiG-29 fighters, and Iran’s refueling tankers are KC-700s, which are old and not stealthy.
Therefore, Iran’s air force cannot directly attack Israel, so Iran’s only option is a missile or drone attack on Israeli soil.
The recent missile and drone attacks have not yet caused serious damage to Israel.
One possibility is that Iran did not want to cause serious damage, and another possibility is that Israel’s air defense system has been successful.
A ground attack is also completely impossible.
Firstly, because Iran’s latest tanks can travel 560 kilometers, and even if we calculate their internal fuel, they will ultimately advance up to 760 kilometers.
But the closest ground route for Iranian tanks to move towards Israel through Syria and Lebanon is close to 1,800 kilometers.
Therefore, Iran needs a very long and integrated logistical risk to ensure its tanks can move towards Israel.
So if Iran wants to give a very severe response to Israel, it will likely have to first act through its allied armed forces and then move towards a direct missile attack, which means consuming more weapons, needing more information, requiring more expertise, needing more money, and needing more equipment for a broader action.
It is true that Iran’s armed allies in the region are under intense pressure, but it cannot be said that the quality of their relationship with Iran has been damaged.
For the simple reason that these groups have no other supporter in the region besides Iran, and if Iran becomes weakened beyond a certain level, these groups will also see their existence at risk.
Therefore, if things get tight and if Iran makes a request, new fronts against Israel will likely be opened, and they can even expand the frontline of the war with Israel beyond this.
But if this happens, the Israeli military will likely endure a lot of pressure, and this is where the U.S. might enter the war.
Therefore, considering what has been said, ultimately the most important factor playing a role in the conflict between Iran and Israel is the United States.
That is, if we want to compare the power of Iran in confronting Israel and the relationship between the U.S. and Israel and conclude which of these two is more effective in expanding the scope of the conflict, it seems the U.S.-Israel relationship has a much greater effect.
Therefore, the U.S. has probably imposed restrictions on Israel’s response to Iran.
Although these restrictions may not be very significant.
Hezbollah and Israel
On October 8th, one day after Hamas attacked Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu announced that when the Gaza war ends and Hamas is militarily neutralized, Israel will turn towards the northern front and Hezbollah and will attempt to change the Middle East.
Now place these statements alongside Netanyahu’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly.
In his speech, Netanyahu held two maps; he named one the ‘Map of Catastrophe,’ marking Iran and the axis of resistance countries, and the second the ‘Map of Blessing,’ marking Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel.
Saudi Arabia was also marked on the second map, even though it has not yet normalized relations with Israel.
Therefore, in that very speech, Netanyahu clearly announced that Israel intends to eliminate the axis of resistance and immediately after the speech, ordered the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
After that, a ground attack on southern Lebanon began to put more pressure on Hezbollah and force Syria to comply with Israel’s demands.
It is quite clear that the current war that Israel has started with Hezbollah is very different from their last war in 2006.
The current war may be the last war between Israel and an Arab force over territorial disputes, and whatever the outcome of this war, it may change the regional order.
Israel’s goal is the complete defeat of Hezbollah, as it considers Hezbollah Iran’s vital arm in the region.
Meanwhile, Iran is engaged on two main fronts: first, on the diplomatic front with the West and the U.S., and second, on the military front with Israel. Since coming to power, Massoud Pezeshkian has promised to resolve internal issues and improve Iran’s economic situation.
During his trip to New York, Pezeshkian explicitly stated that Iran is willing to restart nuclear negotiations and emphasized that all Middle Eastern countries have the right to live in peace and stability. Many inside interpreted this stance by Pezeshkian as a betrayal of the axis of resistance, especially Hezbollah.
But the reality is that in international relations, a country’s survival takes precedence over ideology, and international politics is not the arena of permanent alliances but rather the arena of permanent interests.
The uncertain future of Lebanon
Lebanon has been in a turbulent state and faces strange and peculiar challenges. In countries like Lebanon, when the situation becomes like this and factional conflicts increase, politics in the conventional sense loses its meaning, especially if the country’s military force does not have much power.
For years, Hezbollah has been considered the dominant political force in Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s military wing has been more powerful than the Lebanese army.
This power of Hezbollah had prevented the Lebanese army from siding with a specific faction amidst internal disputes.
The Lebanese army intervened twice in the Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1989, and both times it was severely weakened. Now, if Israel can inflict more blows on Hezbollah, the likelihood of internal conflict in Lebanon will increase.
Hezbollah forces also have families, and currently, Lebanese Shiites are in a very bad situation. Some reports indicate that Sunnis and Christians are not treating the displaced Shiite families of Lebanon well.
If the situation worsens, how can it be guaranteed that Hezbollah forces will not rise to defend the security of their families?
But can it be said with certainty that Israel’s operation against Hezbollah will be completely successful? Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah have so far caused serious damage to this group and perhaps can be said to have challenged Iran’s regional strategy as well.
But the reality is that these attacks also make Israel’s strategic environment insecure, and interestingly, even if Europe and the U.S. force Israel to accept a ceasefire, this strategic environment will become even more insecure.
In any case, Iran and Hezbollah know Israel well and are aware of Israel’s military power. Despite all of Israel’s attacks, neither Iran nor Hezbollah has yet retreated.
Their assumption is likely that they can still withstand Israel’s attacks until the international community ultimately concludes that Israel has overstepped its bounds and consequently increases pressure on Israel. But here a question arises: Will Israel succeed in forcing Iran and Hezbollah to retreat before the situation gets out of control? This is a question that no one yet knows the answer to.
But what is clear is that Iran’s regional situation has been severely challenged. The weakening of Hezbollah and Israel’s free hand to continue its attacks have placed the Middle East on the brink of a major geopolitical change, and this change is not at all in Iran’s favor.
The weakening of Iran allows the U.S. and the Arabs of the region to also take advantage of the opportunity and increase pressure on Iran. An example of this pressure can be seen in the recent support of the European Union for the UAE’s statement regarding the three islands.
Hezbollah performed so successfully that Iran based its regional strategy on Hezbollah’s power. Therefore, damage to Hezbollah’s military capabilities is a heavy blow to Iran’s regional influence and national security.
Weakening Hezbollah is not just weakening an armed group in Lebanon; weakening Hezbollah means jeopardizing Iran’s position in Syria and Iraq and emboldening Iran’s rivals like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to advance their plans in the region.
In these types of conflicts, some countries always lose, but their loss is considered a gain for other countries. One of the countries that benefits greatly from Iran’s weakening is Turkey.
Iran’s weakening may also provide an opportunity for the Sunni Arabs of the region to shift the balance of power in their favor, but if we look at the issue realistically, it must be said that Turkey has a stronger hand compared to the Arabs.
Of course, Turkey currently faces many internal problems, but this change we are talking about may be a long-term and tense change, and Turkey will likely be able to prepare itself for a role in its process over time.
Weakening Hezbollah means weakening Iran’s influence in the eastern Mediterranean, and this means a good opportunity for Turkey. The fact that Hezbollah has been forced to bear most of Israel’s attacks alone shows that Iran’s reliance on its armed allies in the region also has limitations, and it is precisely here that an opportunity arises for Iran’s rivals like Turkey.
One of the main foundations of Iran’s regional strategy has been competition with Turkey and blocking Turkey’s influence in the region.
Iran increased its influence in the Arab world by taking advantage of the unrest in Arab countries during the Arab Spring and especially the Israel-Palestine conflict, and this influence reached Turkey’s southern flank in Syria.
Therefore, now that Iran has faced challenges and losses, it is natural that Turkey will benefit the most.
Recently, Turkey has tried to restore its relations with Bashar al-Assad as well. Syria has been seeking resources for post-war reconstruction for years, but the necessary resources for reconstruction will not reach Syria as long as it remains close to Iran and Hezbollah.
Therefore, it is not unlikely that Bashar al-Assad will also try to create a balance in his relations with Iran and Hezbollah in relations with the region’s Arabs to benefit from the vast capital of the Arabs.
We have also seen signs of this trend over the past year.
Right in the midst of the Israel-Hamas conflict, Bashar al-Assad decided to send signals to his former enemies and take steps to mend relations.
Over the past year, the fronts that might have opened from Syria for intervention in the conflict with Israel have been strangely quiet and calm.
Apparently, Bashar al-Assad has decided to adopt a silent approach as long as the Gaza conflict continues.
Of course, Syria’s approach has reasons as well. First, if Syria enters the conflict, it will be severely damaged.
Entering the war is very costly for Syria.
Whether Israel attacks Syria or Syria becomes so insecure that armed rebel groups expand their activities again, in either case, Syria will be severely harmed.
For this reason, Syria has behaved in a way that its silence seems clear. Syria’s supportive statements for Iran and Hezbollah have not been very strong and impactful.
Even Syrian media mostly focus on internal issues as if there is no war going on.
Two days after the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Syria issued a statement in support of Lebanon. After the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Syria also issued a statement condemning the violation of Iran’s sovereignty and made a very brief reference to Haniyeh.
This type of behavior is not normal, and Iran probably does not intend to pressure Syria on this issue.
Perhaps Syria has announced that it does not intend to enter the conflict, and Russia has supported this position, so Iran cannot object to Syria’s approach.
Since a year ago, Syria has also taken steps towards improving relations with the region’s Arabs.
For example, just a few days after the start of the war in Gaza, Syria closed the Yemeni embassy in Damascus and expelled Yemeni representatives from Syria.
On October 8th, one day after Hamas attacked Israel, Bashar al-Assad had a phone conversation with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the President of the UAE.
Sheikh Mohammed also spoke with Israeli, Egyptian, and Jordanian officials on the same day.
Apparently, Mohammed bin Zayed told Assad not to participate in the war and not to allow his country’s territory to be used for attacks on Israel.
Some reports also indicate that Bashar al-Assad’s government has not allowed Iraqi resistance groups to open a front against Israel from Syrian territory.
At the end of January, the UAE also sent its ambassador to Syria.
In May of this year, Saudi Arabia appointed its ambassador in Syria and reopened its embassy in Syria on September 9th.
Therefore, currently, all Gulf countries except Qatar have restored diplomatic relations with Bashar al-Assad.
The efforts of the Gulf countries and Turkey to normalize relations with Assad each follow their own logic.
From Turkey’s perspective, having close relations with Syria is a good tool for countering the U.S.-supported Kurds in northern and northeastern Syria.
From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, engaging with Syria aligns with Bin Salman’s new strategy to improve relations with neighbors and reduce their involvement in regional conflicts.
Saudi Arabia hopes that by engaging with Syria, it can also control drug trafficking in the region.
From the UAE’s perspective, having relations with Syria can control Islamist movements in the region.
Assad’s approach shows that although Syria is Iran’s strategic ally, it is willing to choose an independent path whenever its interests require it.
Apparently, Bashar al-Assad believes that normalizing relations with Turkey and the Gulf countries is the first step towards normalizing relations with European countries.
Therefore, given the current conditions, if Syria continues on this path, Iran’s challenges in the eastern Mediterranean will increase.