The Abraham Accords in Limbo
Why the Middle East War Challenges Riyadh’s Goals
The Abraham Accords in Limbo: According to Iran Gate, the conflict between Hamas and Israel is putting pressure on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries and also threatens the policy of normalizing relations with Israel and regional stability. It should be noted that not only is the Abraham Accord at risk, but the regional de-escalation policy between Saudi Arabia and Iran will also be affected by the new war between Hamas and Israel—a potentially disruptive conflict for the balance of power in the Middle East, where the war boundaries are still undefined.
Of course, Israel’s very harsh reaction to Hamas’s terrorist attack will put the Arab Gulf states under pressure, especially if the siege of Gaza continues for a long time, which will create more anger in Arab public opinion. However, it is still too early to consider the Abraham Accords as ended—an agreement under which the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain recognized Israel in 2020, and this also applies to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
The war will slow down this historically significant process, which is supposed to continue at least as an informal dialogue since it is the result of a broader strategic plan facilitated by the generational change of rulers in the Arab Gulf countries.
For Saudi Arabia, this war represents a very subtle shift in foreign policy and also a leadership test for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who currently cannot openly take a stance against Israel because previous negotiations between the two countries had progressed to the point where Mohammed bin Salman declared in an interview with an American media outlet two weeks ago that ‘we are getting closer to an agreement every day.’ Normalization is the axis of many fundamental actions and developments for the Saudi kingdom.
Beyond the Call for De-escalation: The Polyphony of Gulf Kingdoms
The reaction of the Gulf kingdoms to the Hamas-Israel war has not been uniform. All have called both parties to moderation and restraint, but the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, signatories of the Abraham Accords, preferred to focus primarily on the concern for civilians and hostages. Moreover, the UAE is currently a non-permanent member of the Security Council.
Saudi Arabia noted that it has warned the Israeli government about the risk of an explosive situation resulting from its occupation policies and has not yet openly condemned Hamas’s actions.
The official statements from Kuwait and Qatar regarding Israel were very harsh, and Doha accused the Israeli government of being solely responsible for escalating tensions. Since 2014, Qatar has provided significant economic aid to the Gaza Strip and has even hosted some of Hamas’s political leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, and also maintains a very strong communication channel for dialogue with the Palestinian militant movement and with Iran.
Israel, the United States, the Economy, and Iran: Why the War Harms Saudi Arabia
The war between Hamas and Israel will harm Saudi Arabia’s regional interests for at least three reasons. The first is the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel. Mohammed bin Salman uses the potential recognition of Tel Aviv to renegotiate the special relationship between the Saudis and the United States. Saudi Arabia aims to secure necessary security guarantees from America in case of an attack on Riyadh and Washington’s support for the Saudi kingdom’s nuclear program for non-military purposes at a time when Iran and its allied non-state actors are increasing the regional threat level. Halting diplomatic negotiations with Israel will slow down the progress of the two files of interest to the Saudis.
The second reason is the economy. The new war between Hamas and Israel is still unpredictably progressing, and the risk of conflict expansion is unacceptable for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms that have prioritized economic development. Of course, a potential increase in the price of each barrel of crude oil will benefit Riyadh’s treasury.
However, Vision 2030 or Saudi Arabia’s plan for economic transformation post-oil requires regional stability because this project is based on foreign investment, infrastructure, major events, and tourism. On the other hand, this conflict could lead to the resumption of intergovernmental rivalries and weaken the environment for dialogue and economic cooperation in the region.
The third reason is Iran. Hamas is an actor trained by Tehran and also financed and armed. If the responsibility of the Islamic Republic in designing this complex Hamas attack on Israel is confirmed, the foundations of de-escalation between the Saudis and Iranians will be at risk. Even if other Iran-backed armed actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias in Syria enter the conflict or carry out significant attacks, we will face more than just the endangerment of regional de-escalation policy.
In an agreement signed in March 2023 in China, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed not to interfere in each other’s affairs. However, the aggressive role of Iran-backed militias and their missile arsenals, even before Tehran’s nuclear power, is a real concern for Riyadh and the Gulf states because they destabilize the region.
Saudi Arabia’s Awareness of Two Realities
For the Middle East, this war is a Pandora’s box—a box that, according to Greek myths, contained all the unknown calamities and misfortunes of humanity. For Saudi Arabia, this conflict will be a test of the political maturity of Mohammed bin Salman with regional and domestic consequences. The Crown Prince must demonstrate strong leadership and try to balance opposing forces, meaning combining traditional support for the Palestinian cause with today’s Saudi goals based on recognizing and understanding two realities.
The first concerns the danger of Islamic extremism and Islamist terrorism, on which the Hamas-Israel war could even reignite this extremism in other countries. The Saudi kingdom has previously experienced this between the 1990s and early 2000s when the Saudi Al-Qaeda cell attacked foreign targets and security forces and even attempted to assassinate then-Deputy Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef in 2009, although the assassination attempt was unsuccessful. This is a fundamental and important issue for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is trying to redefine Saudi identity by weakening its religious concept.
The second awareness is the centrality of defending national borders. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has experienced on a completely different scale than Israel what it means to face missile and drone attacks on its territory. The war in Yemen, which worsened with Saudi military intervention, led to a series of Houthi attacks against Saudi targets.
Then there was Iran’s attack on Saudi Aramco in 2019. The United Arab Emirates also experienced attacks in early 2022, which were also carried out by drones. For Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and the Gulf kingdoms, national security is a priority more than ever, and Iran-backed non-state armed groups are a threat that must be contained.
These two recognitions, along with economic reasons and leadership, make the abandonment of the Abraham Accords by the Saudis an unlikely hypothesis, although it has become a more challenging goal than a few days ago. However, despite an unpredictable war, the possibility of continuing the negotiation and agreement path still exists.
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