The Position of the Leader of the Islamic Republic in the Post-Mahsa Era
The position of the Leader of the Islamic Republic in the post-Mahsa era, according to Iran Gate, has been significantly impacted by the Women, Life, Freedom movement, which has brought about profound changes in Iran’s political landscape. This movement not only reflects the fundamental transformations that have been latent within Iranian society over the past years but also serves as a platform for their expansion and deepening. Moreover, it has a specific connection with the experiences gained in Iran after the February 1979 revolution and is influenced by them.
The Islamic Republic and its internal balance of power have also been affected by this movement, leading to a new situation. Although the arrangement of forces and power equations have not yet undergone fundamental changes, signs of emerging cracks and new rifts have become evident.
The division over how to deal with the nationwide protests and their origins, whether internal or external, has revealed the main structure of the new rift, which in turn has deepened old divisions. The conflict over the necessity to stop appeasement was the code name for this internal rift. It should be noted that in the mindset of the extremist faction of the government, appeasement means widespread violence and massacre. The Islamic Republic has resorted to blatant violence and widespread suppression in these protests.
However, this conflict, even with Ali Khamenei’s decision to adopt a non-flexible and maximum confrontation approach, led to a non-hasty approach in suppression, and the hardline factions could not fully advance their views. Khamenei’s prudence in managing the suppression also played a role, as he emphasized minimizing killings and executions. He has realized through years of governance that spilled blood and lost lives fuel and drive the protests.
As a result, it can be observed that the type of suppression by the Islamic Republic and the judicial actions following it in the recent widespread protests have meaningful differences from past behavioral patterns. Although about 500 people have been killed, nearly a thousand have suffered vision impairment, thousands have been arrested, and hundreds have received judicial sentences, considering the revolutionary and overthrowing nature of the nationwide protests, their continuation, and wide political, geographical, class, gender, and cultural scope, and the radical intensity of the slogans, it is relatively less severe than the usual practice of the Islamic Republic.
The reason for this event, which may change, is a combination of inability and unwillingness, given the more severe security consequences and the disastrous outcome of the November 2019 suppression, which forced the government to adopt relative caution. The main factor, however, was the power of the protest action and the widespread support for it in society.
Instability in the Forces’ Base
Following this, the erosion and instability in the government’s social base and its inability to mobilize the desired social support have played a significant role. The government could not showcase street power with supporters as in past experiences. The network of government-affiliated preachers did not activate, and the government-affiliated clergy also did not have an active presence.
The statements of Hamid Abazari, advisor to the IRGC commander, who explicitly mentioned the resistance of some officials and the opposition of some IRGC commanders to Khamenei’s views, closely match the observed signs and unofficial news of disagreements within the power bloc. According to unverified reports, the level of disobedience and requests for leave and absence from the scene of conflict among the middle and lower ranks of the IRGC and Basij has been high. In the recent suppression, relatively more roles were played by forces affiliated with the army and law enforcement.
This situation, especially the lack of support from religious authorities and prominent clerics within the country for Khamenei’s positions, and particularly the use of the religious punishment of ‘moharebeh’ to issue death sentences, indicate an intensifying crisis of legitimacy for Khamenei’s governance, which has relatively faced more isolation within the government.
The Leader of the Islamic Republic, sensing danger from this situation, in his first reaction to the movement, addressed former and current government officials as ‘the elite’ to take a stance against the protesting people. However, only Hassan Khomeini, the Larijani brothers, and Mohammad Reza Bahonar positively responded to his request. Yet, their response did not meet Ayatollah Khamenei’s expectations. None of them were willing to attribute the origins of the protests to the hostile policies of Western governments and ignore the role of government inefficiency and the crisis of acceptance and legitimacy.
Reaction from the Religious and Clerical Circles
In the recent protests, Khamenei’s situation in the religious seminaries has worsened. None of the religious authorities, even those who were supporters of the government and the principlist faction, supported the government’s positions. Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani and Mousa Shobeiri Zanjani have remained silent. Nasser Makarem Shirazi, Abdullah Javadi Amoli, and Hossein Noori Hamedani not only did not support but also implicitly criticized.
The opposition of Morteza Moqtadaei, a former senior judicial official, to the ‘moharebeh’ sentence issued for protesters was a significant event, alongside the opposition of critical clerics close to the reformist faction such as Mostafa Mohaqqeq Damad, Mohsen Kadivar, Mohsen Ayazi, Mohsen Mousavi Bojnourdi, and Mohammad Reza Rahmat. The more explicit and active stance of Sunni scholars like Molavi Abdolhamid has also been noteworthy.
Only clerics appointed by Khamenei, such as Ahmad Khatami, Kazem Seddiqi, Ahmad Alamolhoda, Mohsen Araki, Abbas Kaabi, and Mohsen Heidari Alkatir, and the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom have supported him. The silence of Seyyed Hashem Hosseini Bushehri, the head of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, is also controversial, raising questions about how the statement issued by this association was released.
Attacking the Silent Ones in the Usual Manner
The criticism of the silence and lack of expected activity from former and current government officials by Ebrahim Raisi and some IRGC commanders like Gholamhossein Gheibparvar, deputy commander of the IRGC at the Imam Ali Ground Base, has also been repeated but has not yielded results so far. The situation in the network of preachers known as ‘Valai’ has been worse. A few of them were active in the suppressions this time, but most remained silent. Even Mahmoud Karimi explicitly stated in a government ceremony celebrating the Prophet of Islam’s birth that he does not interfere with women’s hijab in his ceremonies.
Among the senior IRGC officials during Khamenei’s leadership, his situation, at least outwardly, is relatively better. Mohsen Rezaei, Rahim Safavi, Hossein Salami, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Ali Fadavi, Mohammad Bagheri, Ahmad Vahidi, Amir Hajizadeh, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, Hossein Taeb, Gholamhossein Gheibparvar, Esmail Qaani, Alireza Tangsiri, Yadollah Javani, Mohammad Pakpour, Gholamreza Soleimani, Hossein Ashtari, and Ramazan Sharif have shown support. Only Aziz Jafari, Hossein Dehghan, Ali Shamkhani, Mohammad Kazemi have not shown support, and Hossein Alaei has taken a critical stance.
Therefore, the intensification of Khamenei’s isolation among former and current government officials has both a political and discursive dimension. His framing of the situation as the country being on the path to reaching the peak of progress, the protests being a conspiracy by the U.S. and Israeli governments, and maintaining strict political and cultural measures, especially in the realm of mandatory hijab, has faced more opposition and criticism within the power bloc and has few buyers.
Short-term Outlook
This situation has led to the maintenance of the current state being tied to more use of force and maximum interventions by Khamenei. As a result, Khamenei’s position has become more fragile. Increasing dissatisfaction with him inside and outside the government has the potential to lead to his removal if his security authority becomes compromised. At the same time, his isolation is both a desired and undesired consequence of an authoritarian mindset and a tendency to monopolize power. When he was not willing to distribute power and engage with critical and moderate opinions within the power bloc, he inevitably had to experience a reduction in supportive forces.
Of course, if the wave of the revolutionary movement subsides, his dominant position in the government may be strengthened. However, this potential event is unstable given the numerous challenges in the country and the high level of dissatisfaction and anger toward the government. The 2021 movement has so far shown that it has the capacity for continuation, and even if it stops, it will not be completely extinguished but will be like a fire beneath the ashes, paving the way for a larger wave of widespread and comprehensive protests.
Thus, Khamenei is in the most challenging period of his leadership, not only being the target of the majority of Iranians’ anger and harsh slogans but also facing increased support constraints within the government. However, he still maintains his dominant position due to his control over the main sources of power, but there is no guarantee of its continuation.
The high risks of Khamenei’s actions, such as insisting on belligerence in foreign policy, irrational actions, and living in a parallel world of reality, have increasingly worried government officials. However, the perspective of internal government critics differs from that of the majority of protesters who wish to move beyond the Islamic Republic, but the intersection of their positions weakens the autocratic leadership of the Leader of the Islamic Republic.