Britain and Europe are moving past Brexit; now it’s time for real give-and-take.
Britain and Europe are moving past Brexit; now it’s time for real give-and-take.
Everything was just like the old days: sleepless nights, last-minute negotiations, accusations of betrayal, surrendering, joining the European army, and even a reference to Theresa May’s Chequers agreement to complete the scene. Brexit, which had long dominated British life, was back.
But what was completely different was the content of the discussions. After their negotiations at Lancaster House in London, the British Prime Minister and his European counterparts presented a list of areas where they intend to have closer cooperation.
Since the 2016 referendum, and even if we look back to David Cameron’s premiership, such efforts to strengthen UK-EU relations had not been seen.
This strengthening of relations was deemed necessary by both sides as Britain faces significant economic and political challenges at home, and international crises have complicated matters further.
These global crises have created specific problems for a country that decided to leave the massive continental bloc it was a member of.
Brexit has not only increased the cost of trade with Britain’s closest and largest trading partner but has also made the country more vulnerable to global instabilities, including by separating it from the EU’s joint efforts to bolster European defense spending.
The ongoing war in Ukraine, the unreliability of the Trump administration, and the gradual decline of global free trade have all created specific problems for post-Brexit Britain.
But as always with Brexit, any decision for closer cooperation involves compromises.
Measures to improve economic growth through alignment with the EU require sacrificing some national sovereignty.
In the security realm, it is the EU that must decide whether to prioritize self-sufficiency or the greater effectiveness that cooperation with Britain brings.
And there are signs that these compromises are finally being openly examined and discussed.
A few points became clear at the London meeting: firstly, the imbalance of power between the two sides. This should have been obvious to anyone who followed the initial Brexit negotiations, where Britain quickly retreated on issues of money and the sequencing of talks—a dispute that David Davis, the then Brexit minister, had predicted as a summer row that never happened.
At least at that time, the EU was keen to avoid a no-deal outcome. The absence of a default option from the status quo provided both sides with an incentive to negotiate.
But now the EU is relatively satisfied with the current economic situation resulting from Boris Johnson’s December 2020 trade and cooperation agreement. Thus, at the brink of this meeting, the default option of no deal was considered entirely acceptable.
As a result, EU negotiators were able to pressure London for its willingness to agree on agricultural matters and, in return, insisted on extending the current fishing quotas for 12 more years.
None of Britain’s key demands—access to EU defense procurement programs or an agreement on agricultural trade—were formally approved.
Proving that Brexit has made Britain more prosperous was never easy, but now there is data suggesting it hasn’t.
However, both sides were conscious of the appearance of failure in reaching an agreement. For the first time, geopolitical issues played a major role in bilateral talks, with many believing this should have played a more prominent role from the start.
Failure to reach a security agreement over fishing disputes would have presented an unfavorable image of the negotiations, and nowhere was this new determination to achieve practical results more evident than from the British side.
After years of posturing and unrealistic claims like ‘no deal is better than a bad deal,’ the pragmatic approach of the British government was surprising.
While acutely aware of political pressures to set red lines, it clearly understood the need to reduce trade frictions and establish stronger security cooperation.
The outcomes achieved, though not revolutionary, were solid and sensible—broader than expected in terms of topics under consideration but narrower in terms of what was actually agreed upon. Many of the issues raised still require more detailed negotiations.
Nevertheless, an agreement for greater cooperation in security in a broad sense was reached. Both sides also committed to agreeing on measures that, while preserving the trade and cooperation agreement, would reduce some of its rough edges.
Specifically, Britain has agreed to engage in dynamic alignment negotiations in agriculture and energy, meaning it would automatically accept EU regulations and be subject to the ultimate authority of EU legal institutions.
And all this only made the reaction of traditional media appear stranger.
The usual faces emerged: ‘caught like fish in a net,’ ‘Sun surrenders,’ ‘Goodbye to Brexit,’ said the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph.
Seeing those who once applauded Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal now calling the extension of the same fishing quotas he negotiated a betrayal is bizarre.
But what was truly striking was how outdated and out of touch the Brexit debate had become.
Britain’s real challenges far exceed the theatrical uproar about betrayal or surrender.
Proving that Brexit makes Britain more prosperous was never easy, but now there is data suggesting it hasn’t.
Exiting the EU has had a negative impact on both trade and investment, leading to higher food prices and reduced government revenues.
Of course, for some Brexit supporters, any negative impact on trade was entirely worth the freedom to regulate.
They have long argued that outside the EU, Britain could freely set its own regulations, thereby increasing its competitiveness relative to its neighbors.
But after the referendum, these same Brexit supporters failed to capitalize on this newfound independence, revealing a deep chasm between their rhetoric and actions.
In a campaign video featuring a paper shredder and stacks of A4 sheets, Rishi Sunak—competing to succeed Boris Johnson—promised to review or repeal all remaining EU laws within his first 100 days in office.
But when he became Prime Minister, not only did he delay numerous plans for regulatory divergence—including the mandatory use of a new product quality mark called UKCA, a story closely followed by FT journalist Peter Foster—but he also significantly backtracked on his campaign promise to eliminate EU laws.
In other words, the opportunities arising from Brexit have not endured in the face of reality, raising questions about the purpose of regulatory freedoms.
It turns out that the leading choice between two options is not simple: on one hand, aligning with EU regulations; on the other, adopting a smart and agile regulatory approach that gives Britain a competitive edge over a slow and overly cautious union.
But the reality is either having regulations nearly identical with limited access to the single market or officially accepting alignment with the EU and enjoying full market access—or, in the words of the most comprehensive recent studies, choosing between replication and integration.
Given these circumstances, the government’s decision to accept a limited level of integration in specific areas is a logical step to reduce trade frictions resulting from the trade and cooperation agreement.
Especially considering Britain’s current situation: mired in a severe economic growth recession, severe financial constraints, partly a product of its own policies, public services on the brink of real collapse, and a significant decline in public support for major political parties.
Taking gradual steps to prevent food price increases and facilitate cross-border energy trade are logical decisions in such conditions.
This is particularly important when considering that alignment in agriculture and energy sectors could help resolve some of the border issues created between Great Britain and Northern Ireland after Brexit.
All this is happening while the world has drastically changed since the vote to leave. Perhaps the image of post-Brexit Britain as a trade-focused adventurer seemed logical in 2016, though trade deals could never compensate for the economic impact of leaving the EU.
Perhaps even in 2020, when Johnson promised in Greenwich that Britain would re-enter the world and re-emerge as a champion of global free trade after decades of hibernation, this notion was defensible.
But global free trade was on the brink of a major blow. The COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and most importantly, rising tensions with China rapidly transformed the domestic and foreign economic policies of major powers.
Now, concepts like reshoring and economic resilience are the new buzzwords.
The EU and the United States have allocated billions of dollars in subsidies to domestic industries—amounts the British government can only dream of.
Even before Donald Trump’s return to the scene, globalization was retreating, and Britain’s main trading partners were adopting inward-looking policies.
Then Trump himself returned, someone whose unpredictable tariff policies undermined the foundations of free trade. The United States, once a defender of a rules-based global trading order, is now dismantling that very order.
Thus, Brexit—due not to Britain’s fault but to global changes—occurred at the worst possible time. These days are not good times for a medium-sized open economy in a world where massive continental trade blocs are building new barriers to trade.
Britain must move beyond simplistic slogans and decide which forms of pragmatic cooperation align better with its interests.
Nonetheless, so far, the relatively new British Prime Minister has skillfully played the very weak hand he was dealt.
He has pursued a strategy that involves agreeing wherever possible and avoiding being forced to choose between potential partners.
He has managed to maintain good relations with both Britain’s closest security partner, the US, and its largest trading partner, the EU, while simultaneously strengthening its trade relations with the EU, even as tariffs imposed by the US have begun to cause harm.
In fact, to date, the British government has succeeded in keeping a sizable portion of the very cake that Boris Johnson claimed it could both have and eat.
This government has decided to align with the EU where it makes sense, such as in agriculture and energy, but to take a different path in areas like financial services and technology, where it sees an advantage in an independent approach.
How long this situation will last remains an unanswered question.
It is still unclear whether regulations related to the genetic editing of agricultural products will conflict with the provisions of dynamic alignment in the agricultural trade agreement, which the two sides are set to negotiate.
And this balancing act in the defense domain becomes even more challenging.
The Trump administration has questioned America’s reliability as an ally, prompting Europeans to envision a world where they can no longer rely on Washington to guarantee the continent’s security.
Where the United States will ultimately head remains uncertain.
But as Nathalie Tocci, director of the Italian Institute of International Affairs, said at a Chatham House event, the future path of America ranges from indifference to betrayal.
The difference between these two scenarios is a world where America gradually reduces its commitment to European security, versus a world where Washington sides with our adversaries.
The closer American politics get to the second scenario, the harder the task will be for Keir Starmer, the leader of the British Labour Party.
In such a situation, it is inconceivable that the British Prime Minister could continue to avoid making tough decisions between both sides of the Atlantic.
Regardless of the outcome, Europeans must significantly stand on their own feet.
This, in turn, means that the EU and Britain must have closer cooperation with each other.
It makes little sense for the EU to speak of increasing self-reliance while sidelining one of the continent’s prominent military powers.
However, the Lancaster House meeting was disappointing in this regard; the texts were full of idealistic language but lacked sufficient practical content.
The security and defense pact declared with grand rhetoric that Europe’s security faces the greatest threat in a generation, yet very few practical measures were proposed to address it.
Expanding dialogue structures, while inherently a good thing, is by no means sufficient if Europeans are truly serious about increasing their self-reliance.
All of this is an important reminder that Brexit is not just about Britain.
It is not only on the British side of the Channel that discussions need to move forward.
The question is whether the EU can overcome the rigidity that shaped the approach of its former Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier, whether it is willing to act more flexibly and blur the lines between members and non-members in security cooperation, and ultimately whether it accepts that Europe has a definition beyond the EU.
The answers to these questions will ultimately determine how effectively Europeans will act in facing the security challenges ahead.
Despite many questions that remain, the Lancaster House meeting established one point—a point that was oddly downplayed this week: the Brexit debate as a live political issue is largely over.
The Labour Party has been involved in designing a Brexit agreement based on leaving the single market and customs union, and Keir Starmer is one of the signatories to this project.
Secondly, given the challenges Britain faces, there is a need for much greater focus on practical realism rather than abstract principles.
And this is while the level of discussions on practical issues has significantly declined.
The fact that the Treasury Secretary’s obvious statement that Britain’s trade with the EU is greater than its trade with America is reported as major and surprising news—or requires clarification from the Prime Minister’s office—is truly ridiculous.
A more honest conversation about the trade-offs resulting from Brexit has long been necessary.
Ultimately, the discussion needs more nuance and precision because it is no longer just about Britain and the EU.
Starmer has managed to play a prominent role in what is called the coalition of the willing because although the EU plays an important role in developing military capacities, it is not designed for large-scale military deployment.
Therefore, the issue is not just about bilateral cooperation but the potential of alternative institutions that can be used to ensure European accountability.
It is hard to claim that Brexit has made Britain wealthier or more secure.
But it is also unfair to blame Brexit as the sole cause of problems that have arisen since the referendum.
Shouting about Brexit betrayals or attacking Brexit itself is no longer useful.
Britain must move beyond superficial slogans and decide which forms of pragmatic cooperation align better with its interests.
And it’s important to make the best use of any momentum the meeting has created.
The Prime Minister implied in his press conference that more agreements were made than in reality, but now it is the responsibility of both sides to quickly give practical and detailed shape to what has been agreed upon.