Regional Areas of Action
Trump’s New Strategy for the Middle East: Deal or Confrontation, Part Two
In this framework, the United States views the Middle East as increasingly structured around bilateral axes and informal coalitions, where Washington exerts influence without fully accepting the responsibility of its commitments.
Gaza and the West Bank
In the United States’ perspective on the region, the Palestinian issue still holds significant importance, although the Trump administration has adopted a policy of unconditional strategic support for Israel, a stance that was solidified and radicalized during his first term.
This support has turned into comprehensive operational backing from Washington, politically legitimizing operations in the Gaza Strip and, more broadly, Tel Aviv’s view of the Palestinian issue. In this context, Hamas is perceived by the United States as a terrorist actor that must be destroyed, rather than a politically recognizable party. Consequently, any mediatory or institutional role for this movement in the future management of the Gaza Strip after conflict is systematically denied.
Simultaneously, and under Israeli pressure, the Palestinian Authority (PLO) is gradually losing its legitimacy and being marginalized. This process occurs through exclusion from direct negotiation channels and a significant reduction in U.S. financial aid, especially concerning the UNRWA agency. The official justification for this policy is rooted in the perception of the Palestinian Authority’s structural weakness, seen as ineffective, fragmented, and incapable of playing a real role in building a new regional order—an order increasingly aligned with Israeli coordinates.
In this context, an unofficial proposal emerged in early 2025, suggesting an updated version of the Abraham Accords, known as the Deal of the Century. This plan is designed as a program for regional economic integration, aiming to normalize diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab world, yet completely separate from offering a political solution for the Palestinian issue. In fact, this aspect is even further weakened, and the Palestinian issue is regarded as an internal matter for Israel or, at most, for Egypt concerning the humanitarian conditions of Gazan Palestinians, to be managed with technical tools and economic incentive packages, rather than as the unresolved core of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The pinnacle of this approach is manifested in the controversial proposal of the ‘Middle Eastern Riviera,’ or the luxurious Middle Eastern coast for Gaza. This project for urban renewal and economic development has been officially rejected by all Arab countries, aiming to transform this Palestinian area into a commercial and tourism hub under international or regional trusteeship without recognizing any rights for Palestinian self-determination. Key elements like the status of East Jerusalem, the 1967 borders, the right of return for refugees, and even the very concept of a Palestinian state are completely ignored or sidelined according to the clear political will of the United States.
All these developments indicate the final reconstruction of Washington’s classic approach to the two-state solution, which practically gives way to a one-state solution in favor of Israel. In this solution, Tel Aviv, with Trump’s full endorsement, assumes responsibility for the political, economic, and demographic future of the Palestinians. In this framework, the Palestinian issue is not solved but absorbed and transformed into a managerial variable within the framework of Israel’s integrated security, part of a new regional order serving the balance between Washington, Tel Aviv, and the Arab Gulf monarchies.
According to some observers, this situation creates an asymmetric dynamic where the United States no longer acts as a neutral mediator but plays the role of a guarantor of balance based on the selective exclusion of Palestinians from the Middle Eastern agenda.
This has profound implications for the future of international law, Palestinian political representation, and the legitimacy of any peace process.
Syria and the Arab East
In the context of the recent regime change in Damascus and the partial easing of U.S. sanctions against this country, the White House’s approach to Syria in 2025 has undergone a significant transformation. The Trump administration viewed the end of the Assad family’s power as an opportunity to redefine regional balance with the aim of containing Iran, focusing on removing Syria from its historical role as Tehran’s strategic hinterland and its affiliated forces, especially Hezbollah.
However, without a formal and direct commitment to managing the political transition or post-war reconstruction, Washington has adopted a strategy based on tactical and conditional support for the new Syrian government. This support is conditional on a gradual de-Iranization of Syria and the country’s readiness to coordinate with West-aligned actors in the region. In this context, a plan for normalizing diplomatic relations between Syria and Israel—on a broader basis than the Abraham Accords—has been proposed. The aim of this plan is to facilitate Damascus’s return to the international community, conditional on abandoning Iran as a strategic guarantor.
One of the key—and at the same time controversial—elements of this scenario is Turkey’s role, which the United States tolerates and even encourages to some extent despite ambiguities and tensions. At this point, Ankara is perceived as a stabilizing actor with variable geometry, whose field presence, especially in northern Syria, has curbed both Iran’s influence and Kurdish ambitions. However, Turkey’s position is highly dual. On one hand, it is officially a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and part of Western security mechanisms, but on the other hand, it has close energy-focused and diplomatic operational relations with Russia and pursues an independent strategy in advancing its regional influence, which often does not align with Western strategic priorities.
Turkey’s actions, although beneficial for some U.S. goals—such as fragmenting the Shia front, managing the jihadist threat, and weakening Russia’s theoretical presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)—simultaneously raise concerns regarding the management of buffer zones, the Kurdish issue, and the militarization of borders. Furthermore, Ankara exerts increasing influence over parts of the new power in Syria, creating a system of interdependencies that complicates the transition process and makes it less aligned with Washington’s desires.
In the military dimension, the United States has maintained a limited but highly operational presence in northeastern Syria, focusing on three main priorities: neutralizing remaining cells of the Islamic State group (ISIS), controlling energy resources in strategic areas, and monitoring activities of Iran-backed militias that remain active in some parts of the country.
Nevertheless, the main feature of the new U.S. stance towards Syria remains indirect management of the political transition. This model relies on remote influence, delegation to regional actors, and targeted pressures instead of direct intervention or structural reconstruction programs.
In this framework, post-Assad Syria is not considered a stage for political transformation but rather a negotiable geopolitical pivot.
Based on this logic, all discussions about Damascus joining the Abraham Accords are also interpretable. These talks were initiated by Trump during a meeting with Syria’s interim president, Ahmad al-Shara, in Riyadh. In this logic, Syria becomes part of the U.S. plan to contain rival powers—namely Iran and Russia—and selectively attract functional allies, such as Turkey, whose role remains key but within an ambiguous, independent structure often conflicting with Western interests.
The Red Sea and Yemen
In the Yemen axis and the southern Red Sea maritime route, the Trump administration has adopted a more flexible and multilayered approach, with a willingness to de-escalate tensions if possible, although the overall stance remains security-focused. The main objective is to protect trade routes and strategic infrastructure between Bab al-Mandeb, Aden, and Djibouti, which are vital for global energy flow and Western logistical-military interests.
In the context of increasing regional instability, the United States reached a tactical agreement in May 2025 to de-escalate tensions with the Houthis, mediated by Oman and Qatar. This agreement includes selectively limiting hostile actions by Yemeni forces against American targets in the Red Sea but not against Israeli targets, in exchange for concessions such as humanitarian aid, food and health support, targeted easing of secondary sanctions, and indirect recognition of their autonomy in some northern Yemeni areas.
However, this partial ceasefire is very fragile as it was formed amid a multi-layered war. In fact, with the opening of a direct front between Israel and Iran, the entire maritime arc from the Arab East to the Persian Gulf has become an integrated operational scene where Iran-backed Shia militias, including the Houthis, can once again become active asymmetric actors. Therefore, Iran’s strategic advance through its proxy forces is considered part of a unified operational chain, and potential attacks in the Red Sea are interpreted in coordination with possible crises in the Strait of Hormuz.
North Africa and the Mediterranean
Compared to other operational domains, North Africa and the Mediterranean are considered secondary scenes in the U.S. strategy. These areas are mainly important in terms of counterterrorism, migration control, and containing regional instability. In this context, the Trump administration intended to expand and guide these approaches through the perspective of the Abraham Accords. For this reason, during Trump’s first term, the White House succeeded in extending normalization agreements between Israel and Arab countries to Morocco, an event that occurred with the recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara region and, in return, Morocco recognized Israel.
Based on this logic, the Trump administration seeks to extend these discussions to Tunisia and Libya, countries that, for different reasons, are still far from any participation in the Abrahamic file.
Tunisia has officially always rejected the U.S. proposal due to the country’s historical ties to the Palestinian issue, but President Kais Saied might use these American openings as a tool to strengthen his regime and further suppress domestic opposition.
On the other hand, Tripoli is still confused by the diplomatic chaos created by Israel in August 2023 when the imminent announcement of a normalization agreement with this North African country led to widespread protests and tensions in Libya, ultimately resulting in a political crisis that ended with the dismissal of then-Foreign Minister Najla al-Mangoush. So far, there is no clear prospect for potential participation of Tripoli or Tunisia, although Tunisia might show willingness in exchange for clear and specific benefits.
If the United States pressures for the normalization of relations between Tunisia and Israel, Washington could offer significant concessions, especially in the economic and financial domain, to this North African country, perhaps through direct intervention by the International Monetary Fund, similar to the aid and financial support packages provided to Egypt in recent years.
However, this country still holds relative importance for the United States, especially concerning the threat of the spread of jihadist cells in the Sahel region and the necessity to control illegal migration flows from Africa. Despite this, its weight in U.S. strategic priorities remains low. Washington has long shown limited interest and clearly has no desire to actively intervene in a crisis that mainly concerns Europe. This non-commitment has created a hidden competition among local and regional actors, leading to a tactical stalemate aimed at preventing the emergence of a dominant player.
As a result, the U.S. approach has turned into a scattered and ineffective action that lacks a long-term strategic vision for the future of Libya. Meanwhile, the growing influence of Russia and China in this North African country is also evident, an influence aimed at countering NATO and weakening Western influence in Libya and Africa in general.
Also, in this region, America’s interest is primarily focused on maintaining strong relations with Egypt, seen as a factor for stabilizing balances between the Mediterranean and East Africa. In this context, U.S. support for Egypt’s positions on resolving the Nile water resource management issue with Ethiopia is also understandable. In this perspective, relations with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi remain central. Cairo is seen as an important partner with whom military and strategic cooperation is maintained without imposing democratic or human rights conditions on Egypt’s domestic policies.
Strategic Files
In line with the arguments presented so far, the main files at the regional level clearly indicate a shift in the orientation and outlook of the United States, particularly this administration, towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The Middle East is now viewed as a competitive arena that needs to be influenced and rebalanced to work in favor of the U.S. and resist the increasing advances of revisionist actors like Iran, China, and Russia.
Iran and the Nuclear Issue
The Iran file is considered one of the most important points of tension and strategic maneuvering for the United States in the region. The Trump administration distinguished itself with a strong return to a more assertive version of the maximum pressure strategy, clearly distancing itself from the previous Biden administration’s multilateral negotiation approach.
This strategy effectively blocked any possibility of returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Sanctions were reimposed and intensified, and at the same time, the official rhetoric once again introduced Iran as a direct threat to regional and global security.
Beyond the intensity of rhetoric and actions, it seems there is no specific strategic plan from the United States to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear capability.
Instead, a broad and stringent strategy has been shaped to contain Iran: political isolation, targeted attacks on military infrastructure, secondary economic sanctions, and support for Israeli operations against proxy militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Washington’s approach continues to rely on a dual logic: deterrence combined with opportunistic diplomacy, pressure alongside targeted openings.
Tehran is still seen as a destabilizing actor that needs to be limited, not as a potential partner for integration into the international system.
In this framework, any diplomatic openings, such as Qatar’s mediation following the June 24 ceasefire and previous negotiation rounds led by Oman, are seen as tools serving the main goal of the U.S. and Israel: preventing Iran from becoming a real nuclear power and limiting its regional influence.
What renders the diplomatic initiatives of Muscat and Doha ineffective is particularly the uranium enrichment issue by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The level has now far exceeded the limits set in the 2015 JCPOA agreement, posing a real risk of the country achieving the capability to build nuclear weapons. Additionally, there are other political and strategic obstacles, including restrictions on access for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran’s nuclear sites and Tehran’s demand for complete lifting of international economic sanctions and guarantees to prevent potential unilateral U.S. withdrawals in the future.
Therefore, it is not surprising that after the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA by the first Trump administration in 2018, neither Washington nor Tel Aviv has succeeded in halting the progress of Iran’s nuclear program or formulating a coherent strategy. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates, Iran has approached the threshold necessary for conducting a nuclear test, having successfully enriched 400 kilograms of uranium to 60% enrichment.
To prevent this scenario, Israel and the United States have launched a series of military operations, respectively named ‘Rising Lion’ and ‘Midnight Hammer,’ aimed at destabilizing the Tehran regime and implicitly provoking regime change. However, it seems the ceasefire reached on June 24 has not had a significant impact on the strategic outlook.
In fact, military operations have not been able to slow Iran’s progress towards nuclear capability beyond what the JCPOA agreement in 2015—initiated by Barack Obama and European partners—achieved. However, according to President Trump’s analysis, recent developments in Iran do not necessarily mean military escalation in the Middle East but could provide an opportunity to resume negotiations on the nuclear program.
Based on this assumption, an agreement between the U.S. and Iran is still possible, provided Tehran shows flexibility in nuclear negotiations—and Washington adopts a principled approach towards the demands of the Islamic Republic, including offering proposals for economic compensation with financial packages up to $30 billion in exchange for abandoning nuclear ambitions.
However, this prospect seems increasingly out of reach as military operations against the Islamic Republic have failed to create favorable conditions for returning to dialogue.
Furthermore, the escalation of military tensions between the Israel-U.S. axis has fundamentally changed the operational landscape and paved the way for highly unpredictable scenarios.
The Abraham Accords and the Marginalization of the Palestinian Issue
Although the Abraham Accords were presented as the main symbol of Trump’s diplomacy during his first term, strengthening these accords has now become one of the fundamental pillars of U.S. regional policy. Not only in terms of normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and some Arab Gulf countries but also as the axis of a new security structure in the Middle East.
These accords are considered a multi-level process aimed at redefining regional balances, a process that bypasses contentious issues and relies on the convergence of economic, technological, and strategic interests. In a situation where the region faces escalating military tensions between Israel and Iran and the ongoing crisis in Gaza, Washington’s goal is to expand the normalization framework—by attracting key players such as Saudi Arabia and, in a broader perspective, involving Asian Muslim countries like Indonesia, Uzbekistan, or Malaysia. This process is encouraged with multilateral packages, including economic cooperation, technology transfer, and security guarantees.
This pursuit follows a specific logic:
Creating and strengthening a joint Arab-Israeli front aimed at countering Iran, establishing Israel’s position as a legitimate and fully integrated actor in the regional system, and simultaneously marginalizing the Palestinian issue, reducing it to a secondary and less significant matter within Middle Eastern equations.
In this framework, the process of normalizing relations with Israel is not dependent on progress in the Israel-Palestine file but is pursued entirely independently of it, acting as a separate path for redefining regional agenda priorities. As such, despite the severe humanitarian crisis of the Gaza war, it has not had a meaningful impact on the structural approach of the United States. The Palestinian issue is still not considered the central unresolved geopolitical knot of the region but rather as a matter of Israeli domestic politics.
In this environment, initiatives like the Middle Eastern Riviera plan for Gaza, introduced as a stimulus for economic development and stability, are more viewed as efforts to depoliticize the Palestinian issue, shifting focus from national demand to functional and temporary management aimed at reducing tensions, not resolving the root of the conflict.
The fragmentation of Palestinian sovereignty between Gaza, the West Bank, and the diaspora migration also contributes to this process, further weakening the bargaining power of Palestinians and instead reinforcing a narrative based on pragmatic management of possibilities. According to this narrative, multilateral diplomacy and the Oslo process now appear outdated and ineffective, and field developments have practically eliminated the possibility of a two-state solution. Instead, selective and bilateral formulas are emerging where Palestinians are often seen as marginal actors and sometimes completely excluded from regional negotiation tables.
India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)
Although the Abraham Accords are considered the political pillar of the new Middle Eastern architecture supported by the United States, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) is regarded as the economic and infrastructural arm of this project.
This corridor was initially designed as a direct and systematic response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In fact, the IMEC corridor is not merely a regional connectivity project but a geopolitical platform with a selective and anti-Chinese approach, designed to contain Beijing’s strategic influence in West Asia, the Levant, and the Eastern Mediterranean. From the U.S. perspective, IMEC serves the following goals:
Limiting China’s connections with the Middle East through alternative routes.
Strengthening the India-Gulf-Israel axis within the framework of countering Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative.
Steering the European Union towards transatlantic convergence and distancing it from the duality between economic and strategic interests in relation to China.
From this perspective, IMEC is presented as a Western alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to redesign strategic flows between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe through a new economic corridor that removes China from the main Eurasian connectivity routes.
This project seeks to strengthen relations between India, Gulf countries, Israel, and the European Union, utilizing port infrastructure, high-capacity rail lines, digital terminals, and energy connectivity. From the U.S. perspective, IMEC complements the Abraham Accords and plays a role in the global challenge of countering China’s economic and strategic influence.
However, the continuation of intense regional tensions hinders the progress of this project.
The escalation of conflicts between Israel and Iran, ongoing instability in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, increasing risks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and the strategic vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz indicate that security of routes is a necessary and vital condition for the real implementation of this corridor.
In a region engaged in wars of varying intensities, geopolitical rivalries, and sectarian dynamics, ensuring the protection of logistical and infrastructural nodes is considered a complex challenge, especially in the absence of a shared regional security framework. The success or failure of IMEC, as well as its effectiveness, depends on the United States’ ability to lead this process and manage the multiple structural vulnerabilities of the Middle East by integrating security, development, and strategic cooperation in a deeply unstable and fragmented region.
The Middle East from Trump’s Perspective
Trump’s view of the Middle East appears instrumental and aligned with the preservation of U.S. national interests, not aimed at political transformation or particularly structural stability of the region.
The goal is no longer to export democracy or build sustainable orders but to contain threats, manage crises, and strengthen selective coalitions based on transactional logic. As a result, a highly reactive approach takes shape, not the result of a coherent and independent strategy.
This region is no longer a scene of compromise but an operationally fragmented space where Washington defines spheres of influence, delegates security responsibilities to local powers—Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt—and only intervenes when strategic balance is at risk.
Thus, the U.S. approach is influenced by external dynamics and agendas, especially Israeli agendas, as recent decisions regarding Gaza and the management of confrontation with Iran demonstrate.
In Trump’s framework, stability means a balance of deterrence, not a shared order. Structural tensions—from the Palestinian issue to the fragmentation of states, from sectarian rivalries to proxy wars—are neither resolved nor alleviated but are contained within regional subsystems that serve U.S. power, systems that are often unstable and hierarchical.
Direct U.S. intervention in the bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites reinforces the image of a Middle East governed by lines of friction, where force replaces negotiation, and fragmentation becomes a mode of governance.
However, this logic, while claiming to be stabilizing, carries the risk of creating new fractures. Every frozen or delegated crisis has the potential to escalate tensions in the future in an increasingly polarized, vulnerable, and lacking common architectures context.