Ups and Downs of Corruption in the Shamkhani Family Part Three

The Ins and Outs of Corruption in the Shamkhani Family

The Ins and Outs of Corruption in the Shamkhani Family: According to Iran Gate, there are numerous circles surrounding the unofficial oil and petrochemical export mafia, but the collaboration between Hossein Shamkhani and Ehsan Taheri is among the most significant.

However, the most sensitive chapter of this case pertains to the method of transferring Iranian oil to destination countries, with multiple Chinese ports being among the most important. Information obtained by Iran Gate indicates the existence of a line known as Hamburg-China, which is the main axis for bypassing oil sanctions by the mafia ring under the management of Hossein Shamkhani.

For more than a year, the corruption case in the Shamkhani family has been a topic of discussion. In this case, Hossein Shamkhani’s role is so prominent that one cannot overlook the importance of tracking his activities. The most crucial part of Hossein Shamkhani’s activities relates to his interactions with several key figures in the aforementioned case, which are addressed in this report.

The investigation into the Shamkhani family’s corruption case has reached its third part, with Hossein Shamkhani’s activities being scrutinized more than ever. Iran Gate has obtained new documents and evidence that could greatly aid in solving the Shamkhani family puzzle. The third part of this case delves into the documents and evidence that clarify Hossein Shamkhani’s role in bypassing oil sanctions.

The Ghost Fleet

As has been repeatedly stated in the media, the Islamic Republic of Iran generally uses oil tankers that turn off their radars to evade tracking by international oversight bodies in order to bypass oil sanctions. The Shamkhani mafia group follows this exact pattern to circumvent oil sanctions.

This is why journalists like Saeed Aganji refer to the oil tankers used by the Shamkhani mafia group as the Ghost Fleet. The Ghost Fleet is broadly a group of tankers that secretly deliver oil to customers. This fleet’s use is also clearly visible in the process of bypassing Venezuelan oil sanctions.

Tracking the Ghosts by Iran Gate

Iran Gate has obtained information revealing the routes used by the Ghost Fleet to bypass oil sanctions. According to this information, one can discern the routes of the ships and the locations where flags are changed.

Among the most important routes taken by the Ghost Fleet under Hossein Shamkhani’s guidance is the Hamburg-China line. The main artery of this line is the Suez Canal, known as the gateway for these ships to the Mediterranean Sea. This route, the most significant unofficial oil export line to China, has been accompanied by numerous controversies.

As mentioned, the ghost ships on the Hamburg-China line move through the Suez Canal towards China, but their main destinations also include the ports of Ningbo, Shanghai, Nansha, and even Busan in South Korea.

Shamkhani’s International Partners

As mentioned, the Hamburg-China line starts from the Mediterranean waters and even the North Atlantic waters, ending in the China Sea and East Asia. In this context, the role of four countries in facilitating the smooth passage of Shamkhani’s Ghost Fleet is much more prominent than other countries. According to documents obtained by Iran Gate, Germany, Turkey, India, and Malaysia are Shamkhani’s most important international partners in bypassing oil sanctions.

These countries, in some cases with direct government intervention and in others through private companies, oil brokers, and even the notorious mafia active in these countries, facilitate the transfer of Iranian oil to East and Southeast Asian countries. Thus, it is not surprising that the mafia group led by Hossein Shamkhani has extensive corruption and money laundering rings in at least these three countries.

Among the most significant mafia groups collaborating with the Shamkhani-Taheri gang are Malaysian brokers in the energy market. These brokers, alongside Turkish intermediaries, play a very important role in bypassing Iranian oil sanctions. In some cases pursued by the United States government, the role of these oil brokers has been highlighted.

However, Shamkhani’s international partners are not limited to oil brokers alone. Corruption groups also active in money laundering are among the most important active circles in this corruption case. Among the most significant of these circles are the roles of Ehsan Taheri and Mostafa Mahzoon, as introduced by Saeed Aganji.

As mentioned in the second part, the scope of the Shamkhani-Taheri mafia group’s activities is very broad. This group requires collaboration with other circles in various fields, including money laundering. The fourth part of this case examines the role of other collaborators in the Hossein Shamkhani mafia group.

The special Shamkhani case has been exclusively reviewed and written by Iran Gate. You can read other sections of this article through the links below.

• The Ins and Outs of Corruption in the Shamkhani Family Part One

• Corruptions of the Shamkhani Family under the Support of the Supreme National Security Council Part Two

• The Ins and Outs of Corruption in the Shamkhani Family Part Three You are currently reading this section