Voices That Were Not Heard Cannot Be
Voices That Were Not Heard Cannot Be: About a month ago, sociologist Mohammad Fazeli referred to a study by two sociologists from the early 1970s during a debate program on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, discussing the recent protests. The study had somewhat predicted an event similar to the 1979 revolution, but not only was it not taken seriously by any official, it was even ridiculed. Now it has become clear that there were more such studies, but there was no one to listen.
Foresight Project
The Foresight Project conducted by Majid Tehranian (1937-2012) and Ali Asadi (1931-2011) in 1974 included surveys of the Iranian public and interviews with various elite groups. Majid Tehranian’s main question was how much the Iranian society of the 1970s could withstand the vast changes resulting from economic and social modernization, and how Iranians lived under such conditions, how they viewed their world, and how they interpreted social conditions.
Ali Asadi’s research showed that among the masses and elites, the desire to return to the past and especially to seek refuge in religion was growing due to the intensity of changes. The research indicated that the values promoted by the government at the time were not widespread even among the groups considered its base. The results of this research were presented in 1975 at a conference titled the Foresight Project, attended by experts in Shiraz with the presence of some government officials, but it was not taken as seriously as it should have been.
According to Mohammad Fazeli, history showed that Majid Tehranian and Ali Asadi were right. They had realized the political alienation, the refuge in religion, social dissatisfaction, and the potential for the disruption of the power structure. However, there were those who, out of conservatism and attachment to the political structure, chose to dismiss social sciences instead of engaging in scientific critique.
The Pahlavi political system preferred to label the researchers and their methods as Western rather than face reality, as if the truths expressed by social sciences were a hell that politicians could not confront. After the revolution, Ali Asadi and Majid Tehranian’s research was published in a book titled ‘A Voice That Was Not Heard.’ Now it has become clear that there were more such warnings and studies.
Warning from the Plan and Budget Organization
Another warning at the end of the 1970s hinted at unfortunate events in the future. A preliminary report on the economic and social outlook of the country during the fifth development plan (1977-1981) was prepared by the Plan and Budget Organization, based on figures, statistics, and information. For the first time in a government report, it stated that if the trends, inequalities, and imbalances of the past few years continued, there would undoubtedly be a social and political explosion in Iran in a few years.
The report was presented in the High Council of Planning in the presence of the Prime Minister. Hoveyda did not like the report’s very critical tone and said he did not accept the report at all, claiming it was entirely negative and critical, ignoring the country’s significant progress in recent years, and insisted that the report be completely revised. However, the head of the Plan and Budget Organization at the time refused to comply and insisted that the report be brought to the attention of the Shah.
It was decided that the report would be read to the Shah himself at the Economic Council meeting. But as soon as the report reached the critical parts, the Shah suddenly said, ‘What are these talks? What are these topics? Again, our economists are sitting and saying this nonsense about the country, ignoring all the country’s progress, and creating pessimism and despair.’ The Shah continued, ‘Who told you to write these things? It is not necessary for you to get involved in these issues. We know what we are doing.’
He further said, ‘These financial shortages you mentioned in this report are not important. Yes, we know we have financial shortages, but we will fix all of them ourselves. Our oil revenue will soon increase from around two billion to five billion dollars, and this will solve all your problems. I am monitoring everything myself, and you should just focus on your own work and not get involved in these matters.’
He said, ‘I do not accept these nonsense and theories. You economists do not know what you are talking about. We know very well what we are doing and have a bright future ahead for the country. You better put these talks aside and focus on more fundamental tasks.’
Report on Iran’s Issues
In 1972, Mohammad Reza Shah said in a speech, ‘Why don’t a group of intellectuals gather and regularly examine the country’s issues and report directly to me with complete freedom and confidence, pointing out the flaws? I would be very receptive.’ Eventually, the Shah told Nahavandi, ‘We hear a lot of reports of dissatisfaction. Give us a report without any cover-up on the causes of people’s dissatisfaction, but let reliable people prepare it and ensure it does not leak.’
Nahavandi, who was the president of Tehran University at the time, formed a group consisting of dozens of people in several committees based on this proposal from the Shah, called the Group for Examining Iran’s Issues. In the summer of 1974, the report was ready. The report predicted the danger of a revolution with a religious background and the joining of extreme leftist elements. Corruption, lying, empty promises, lack of communication with the clergy, the dire state of Tehran, inflation, and showcase projects were listed as factors causing dissatisfaction.
Combating corruption, dismissing infamous individuals, very strict supervision of SAVAK’s activities, dialogue with the clergy, and greater freedom for the media were presented as solutions. The Shah carefully read the report and discussed it with Hoveyda, the Prime Minister. Hoveyda told the Shah, ‘These are a bunch of intellectuals who want to ruin His Majesty’s vacation. Throw them away.’ Nahavandi later said in his memoirs, ‘His Majesty deep down wanted someone to say that these things are nonsense.’ They never referred to the report again, except in Mexico after the revolution, saying ‘You were right.’
Even four years after presenting that report, Nahavandi, in a meeting about the decision to impose martial law on September 7, 1978, again tried to convince Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and other cabinet members that martial law would be futile without identifying and addressing the causes of dissatisfaction and punishing the corrupt. He said, ‘If this martial law is not accompanied by the pursuit and punishment of thieves, violators, and creators of dissatisfaction, we have betrayed. Those who, in the past six or seven years after the increase in oil money since 1974, behaved with the people worse than the Mongols.’