Voices That Were Not Heard
Voices That Were Not Heard: Mohammad Fazeli, a sociologist, about a month ago in a debate program on IRIB, referred to a study by two sociologists in the early 1970s about recent protests. This study somewhat predicted an event similar to the 1979 revolution, but no official took it seriously; instead, they mocked it. Now it has become clear that there were more such studies, but no one was willing to listen.
The Foresight Project
The Foresight Project, conducted by Majid Tehranian (1937-2012) and Ali Asadi (1931-2014) in 1974, included surveys of the Iranian people and interviews with various elite groups. Majid Tehranian’s main question was how much the Iranian society of the 1970s could endure the vast changes resulting from economic and social modernization, and how Iranians lived under such conditions, how they viewed their world, and how they interpreted social conditions.
In his research, Ali Asadi showed that among the masses and elites, the desire to return to the past, especially to seek refuge in religion, was growing due to the intensity of changes. The research indicated that the values favored by the government of the time were not prevalent, even among the groups that were considered its base. The results of this research were presented in 1975 at a conference titled ‘The Foresight Project’ with the participation of experts in Shiraz, attended by some government officials, but it was not taken as seriously as it should have been.
According to Mohammad Fazeli, history showed that Majid Tehranian and Ali Asadi were right. They had identified political alienation, refuge in religion, social dissatisfaction, and the potential for disruption in the power structure. However, there were those who, out of conservatism or attachment to the political structure, resorted to rejecting social sciences instead of scientific critique.
The Pahlavi political system preferred to label the researchers and their methods as Western rather than face the reality, as if the truths expressed by social sciences were a hell that politicians could not confront. The research by Ali Asadi and Majid Tehranian was published after the revolution in a book titled ‘A Voice That Was Not Heard.’ Now it has become clear that similar warnings and studies existed.
Warning from the Planning and Budget Organization
Another warning at the end of 1971 foretold unfortunate events in the future. A preliminary report on the economic and social outlook of the country during the Fifth Development Plan (1977-1982), based on figures, statistics, and information, was prepared by the Planning Organization. For the first time in a government report, it was stated that if the trends, inequalities, and imbalances of the past few years continued, there would undoubtedly be a social and political explosion in Iran in a few years.
The report was presented to the High Council of Planning in the presence of the Prime Minister. Hoveyda did not like the critical tone of the report and said he did not accept it at all, claiming it was entirely negative and critical, ignoring the country’s significant progress in recent years, and insisted that the report should be completely revised. However, the then head of the Planning and Budget Organization did not give in and insisted that the report be brought to the attention of the Shah.
It was decided that the report would be read to the Shah at an Economic Council meeting. However, as soon as the report reached the critical parts, the Shah suddenly said, ‘What are these words? What are these topics? Again, our economists are sitting and saying this nonsense about the country and ignoring all the country’s progress, creating pessimism and despair.’ The Shah continued, ‘Who told you to write these things? You don’t need to get involved in these matters at all, and we know what to do ourselves.’
He further said, ‘The financial shortages you mentioned in this report are not important. Yes, we know we have financial shortages, but we will fix all of these ourselves. Our oil revenue will soon increase from about two billion to five billion dollars, and this will solve all your problems. I am watching everything myself, and you just stick to your work and don’t get involved in these matters.’
‘I don’t accept this nonsense and theory and these words. You economists don’t know what you’re talking about. We know very well what we’re doing, and we have a bright future ahead for the country. It’s better for you to put these words aside and focus on more fundamental work.’
Report on Iran’s Issues
In 1972, Mohammad Reza Shah, in a speech, said, ‘Why don’t a group of thinkers come together regularly to examine the country’s issues and directly report their findings to me with utmost freedom and confidence, pointing out the flaws, and I will be very receptive.’ Eventually, the Shah told Nahavandi, ‘We hear a lot of reports of dissatisfaction. Give us a report without any cover-up on the causes of people’s dissatisfaction, but ensure it is prepared by reliable individuals, and it doesn’t leak.’
Nahavandi, who was then the president of Tehran University, formed a group consisting of dozens of people in several committees based on this suggestion from the Shah, named the ‘Group for Examining Iran’s Issues.’ In the summer of 1974, the report was prepared. The report predicted the danger of a revolution with a religious background and the joining of radical leftist elements. Corruption, lying, empty promises, lack of communication with the clergy, the distressing situation in Tehran, inflation, and showy projects were cited as factors creating dissatisfaction.
Fighting corruption, removing notorious individuals, very strict supervision of SAVAK’s activities, dialogue with the clergy, and more freedom for mass media were presented as solutions. The Shah read the report carefully and discussed it with Prime Minister Hoveyda. Hoveyda told the Shah, ‘These are a bunch of intellectuals who want to ruin Your Majesty’s vacation. Throw them away.’ Nahavandi later said in his memoirs, ‘Deep down, His Majesty wanted someone to say these things are nonsense.’ They never mentioned the report again, except in Mexico after the revolution, when they said, ‘You were right.’
Even four years after presenting that report, Nahavandi, in a military government decision-making session on September 7, 1978, again tried to convince Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and other cabinet members that martial law without identifying the causes of dissatisfaction, addressing them, and punishing corrupt individuals would be futile. He said, ‘If this martial law is not accompanied by the pursuit and punishment of thieves, violators, and those who create dissatisfaction, we have betrayed. Those who, in the six or seven years since the increase in oil money from 1974, treated people worse than the Mongols did.’