We must learn diplomacy from Finland
We must learn diplomacy from Finland
The unprecedented tension and heated argument between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump at the White House, which led to the early departure of the Ukrainian president from the White House, has provided an opportune moment for isolationist and reactionary groups in Iran. These groups are taking advantage of the tumultuous and dusty diplomatic atmosphere to promote their narrow-minded views, portraying this event with superficial and fallacious analyses as a direct result of any interaction and negotiation with global powers.
These groups, which have access to powerful platforms ranging from municipalities to unaccountable parallel institutions, continue to insist on promoting their narrow-minded and contentless views by riding the wave of public opinion and exploiting nationalist sentiments. They are oblivious to the fact that what occurred at the White House was not the product of dialogue and negotiation but rather the result of weak governance, lack of prudence in managing the country, poor management of foreign relations, and the Ukrainian government’s disregard for regional geopolitical realities.
Ukraine has been the scene of intense confrontation and rivalry between political factions for over two decades, where national interests have been sacrificed to power games, and politicians have only thought of eliminating their rivals at any cost.
Since gaining independence in 1991, this country has been grappling with identity and geopolitical challenges, gradually becoming an arena for confrontation between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces.
Meanwhile, widespread and structural corruption that has penetrated deep into the governing institutions has acted like a parasite on the body of this country, depriving successive governments of effective governance capabilities.
International reports indicate that Ukraine ranked 152nd out of 183 countries in the corruption index in 2010, and although this index has slightly improved, it still ranks 105th in 2023, remaining among the countries with high corruption indices.
American diplomats have described the previous governments of this country as examples of kleptocracy, a government based on theft and embezzlement.
This deplorable situation, combined with chronic political instability and the inability to adopt a balanced foreign policy, has paved the way for successive crises and ultimately the current bloody conflict.
A review of Ukraine’s political developments from 2002 to the present reveals a picture of a fragile and unstable domestic scene.
The conflict between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions gradually intensified, and since 2011, these internal conflicts have posed serious challenges to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
In fact, the root of the tension between Russia and Ukraine can be traced back to the internal crisis in this country, a crisis stemming from the ruthless competition of political parties and factions supporting Russia and the West to seize power and eliminate rivals from the political scene.
The lack of geopolitical realism and the inability of Ukraine’s political elites to accept the harsh reality that Russia, regardless of ideological inclinations, is their neighboring geographical and border country, has exacerbated the current tragedy.
Ukraine’s political sphere needed to reach strategic understanding and maturity, recognizing that to preserve its national interests and territorial integrity, it requires the design and implementation of a sophisticated, innovative, and dynamic foreign policy that acknowledges the regional geopolitical realities.
As a country located in the geostrategic buffer zone between Russia and the West, Ukraine should have developed high-level relations with the European Union and the United States while avoiding escalating sensitivities and tensions with Russia.
This required a proper understanding of Moscow’s security concerns and designing an interactive framework that also considered Russia’s interests.
The experience of countries like Finland, which also shares a wide border with Russia, shows that it is possible to adopt a smart and balanced foreign policy to maintain independence and national sovereignty while avoiding geopolitical tensions with major powers. This, of course, requires having a coherent political structure with effective oversight mechanisms and transparent electoral processes so that smart and astute politicians can take charge.
Therefore, instead of persistently pursuing NATO membership, which was considered a red line by Russia, Ukraine could have established multilateral relations with regional and trans-regional powers based on the principle of balancing and a balanced foreign policy.
At the same time, the fundamental difference in Russia’s perception of Ukraine and Finland should be sought in the dimension of historical identity.
Russia perceives Ukraine as part of historic Russia, whereas it does not have such a perception of Finland. This distinct view has made Moscow’s sensitivity to Ukraine’s inclination towards the West much greater than towards Finland.
However, historical evidence confirms that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was ready to reach a compromise regarding Ukraine, provided its special position in this country was preserved.
During that period, Moscow preferred to maintain its influence in Ukraine through political and economic tools rather than military conquest. This approach was consistent with Russia’s overall policy in the near abroad, which sought to create a safe and stable belt of regional countries around its borders.
A balanced foreign policy is the secret of Finland’s success in turning geopolitical threats into development opportunities.
Finland’s history is a thoughtful and effective example of how a small country can maintain its independence while neighboring a superpower.
After declaring independence in 1917 and being recognized by the newly established communist regime in Moscow, Finland faced significant challenges.
During World War II, the Soviet Union was concerned about a German attack and wanted to keep them away from its western borders and Leningrad.
Therefore, in October 1939, it asked the Finns to push their western borders further west and establish a naval base on the southern coast of Finland near Helsinki. All Finnish political spectrums, from leftists to rightists, opposed further compromises with the Soviet Union.
As a result, on November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Finland, leading to the war known as the Winter War.
The Finns believed they could exploit the harsh winter against the invading enemy and overcome it, but ultimately they had to cede parts of their territory to the Soviet Union.
Finland’s bitter experience in facing the Soviet Union in 1939 taught its leaders a valuable lesson about the necessity of realism in foreign policy rather than mere idealism. This historical event showed that in the realm of international relations, a correct understanding of the balance of power and geopolitical limitations can determine the fate of a nation.
On the eve of the Winter War, a deep rift in the approach of Finnish politicians was evident.
Individuals like Juho Kusti Paasikivi and Marshal Mannerheim, with a realistic view of regional power dynamics and understanding of Soviet security sensitivities, supported accepting some of the demands of the superpower they faced.
In contrast, another faction led by Erkko and Aimo Cajander, with excessive optimism and overconfidence in domestic military capabilities, considered Soviet warnings as merely diplomatic bluffs.
This clash of views ultimately revealed an undeniable truth: smaller states, despite having national sovereignty rights, face serious practical limitations in foreign policy when dealing with major powers.
In such circumstances, adopting preventive diplomacy and taking the initiative in negotiations can be a vital strategy for preserving national interests.
Historical reviews indicate that if Finland had entered serious negotiations with the Soviet Union with a more flexible approach before the situation worsened and accepted some of the demands of the other side, it might have been able to prevent a devastating war and heavy human casualties.
This historical lesson became a model for subsequent Finnish governments in managing relations with the powerful neighbor.
After World War II, Finland designed a new policy to prevent being overrun by the Soviet Union.
This policy became known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, named after two Finnish presidents who interacted with the Soviet Union for 35 years as presidents.
These Finnish leaders believed that their country could not expect substantial help from Western allies in a crisis with the Soviet Union while maintaining excellent relations with Europe and America. Therefore, they had to always be aware of the positions of Soviet leaders and pay attention to them.
They realized that they needed to regularly engage in dialogue with Soviet officials and assure them that Finland was committed to its words and would fulfill its obligations, thereby reducing Moscow’s concerns.
To expand its interactions with the West, Finland sought to alleviate the Soviet Union’s chronic suspicion about the possibility of Finland’s economic integration with the West.
At the same time, while Western countries were Finland’s main trading partners, this country became the Soviet Union’s second-largest Western trading partner after West Germany.
For the Soviet Union, Finland was considered the main source of Western technology and the primary window to the West. Thus, the Soviet Union had no motivation to conquer Finland. In the discourse of international security, there is literature about ‘Finlandization,’ which has its roots in the 1960s and 1970s.
This concept was used to indicate the reduction of decision-making autonomy of a Western European government in complying with Soviet sensitivities.
During this period, anything that was inconsistent with Soviet strategic interests was generally opposed in Finland.
Parties strongly opposed to the Soviet Union had no chance to be in power, and there was a general atmosphere where it was strongly recommended that political statements against Russian interests should not be made.
In this process, we witnessed strategic flexibility and realism within a democratic system, a system in which respect for civil institutions and the guarantee of freedom of expression within an inclusive framework were not only accepted but considered fundamental requirements for good governance.
This balanced approach represents the political maturity and diplomatic capacity of systems that can create coexistence between democratic principles and national security considerations.
At the same time, Finland tried to maintain its neutrality and also involve the United States and the West economically. This was a balancing policy stemming from the doctrine of two astute Finnish presidents, Paasikivi and Kekkonen.
In 1975, at the height of the détente of the 1970s, Urho Kekkonen, then President of Finland, hosted an important summit of American and Soviet leaders, where Gerald Ford, President of the United States, and Leonid Brezhnev, leader of the Soviet Union, met in Helsinki and signed the Helsinki Accords.
The Ukraine crisis and the Finnish model: missed opportunities for balanced diplomacy
In Ukraine, however, since the 1990s, we have witnessed a deep political and social duality.
This country is known as divided, with the western part being more industrial and favoring the development of relations with Europe and the West, and the eastern part considering itself closer to Russia.
This duality and the government’s inability to manage it gradually led to severe polarization of the political space, placing pro-Western and pro-Russian forces in serious confrontation with each other.
The turning point and onset of this crisis’s conflict was in early 2014, following the annexation of Crimea by Russia.
Although this annexation marked the beginning of a military conflict and tense relations, politically, the first friction stemmed from Viktor Yanukovych’s decision against Ukraine’s agreement with the European Union in 2013.
Since then, political movements advocating a nationalist approach to oppose Russian influence led to a period of protests against Yanukovych’s government, ultimately resulting in his removal from power in 2014. After this period, Ukraine’s inclination towards the West increased tensions between this country and Russia.
The post-revolution Ukrainian government, instead of adopting a subtle diplomatic game to balance its economic and security interests with Russia, the European Union, and NATO members, was inclined to commit the country to a future in the European Union and NATO.
This shift in orientation faced a strong reaction from Russia.
Undoubtedly, Ukraine needed strong relations and continuous negotiations with the United States and the West to create a barrier against Russian aggression, and this was an essential and undeniable matter.
However, what was overlooked was geopolitical realism and aligning relations with the United States within the framework of realistic and long-term national interests.
Ukrainian leaders should have, like Finland during the Cold War, maintained relations with the West while also considering Russia’s security sensitivities.
Neglecting this geopolitical reality placed Ukraine in a position where today we witness tensions in its relations with Donald Trump’s America.
Meanwhile, if it weren’t for relations with America, Russia would have had an additional incentive to at least politically occupy Ukraine.
The importance of the time element in diplomacy: a realistic approach to good governance in foreign policy. The fundamental difference between Iran and Ukraine is that Iran has had stronger leverage.
Iran’s geopolitical position, energy resources, significant population, strategic depth, and long history of independence and sovereignty could all be used as levers of power in international negotiations.
In the realm of international politics, characterized by fluidity and constant changes in the balance of power and international structures, a correct understanding of diplomatic opportunity windows and timely utilization of them can determine a country’s fate in geopolitical equations.
As noted in international relations literature, in the world of politics, five days is a long time, and five years is a short time, reflecting the fluid, active, and changing nature of the time element in foreign policy.
In the 21st century, time has become a rare, complex, and highly valuable and strategic commodity, thus confronting the very important issue of time management and control in foreign policy.
In the current anarchic and fluid international system, characterized by rapid geopolitical changes and shifting power balances, the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the lack of precise forecasting of international trends and delegating foreign policy management to agents lacking a deep understanding of strategic realism, has lost a significant portion of its leverage and bargaining power.
This strategic opportunity loss has also limited the favorable space for securing national interests through beneficial negotiations.
Under current conditions, it is necessary to quickly create optimal negotiation conditions with a correct understanding of the principle of balancing and the fluidity of interests in international relations, and even to open communication channels with the United States at intermediate levels.
As historical experience has shown, an actor not present at the negotiation table will inevitably become the subject of others’ negotiations.
In today’s world, where the West and America are recognized as economic, financial, technological, and political poles of the world, negotiation and interaction with these powers is essential.
No country can achieve sustainable development and security without engaging with these power poles, assuming, of course, that sustainable development and security are the priorities of the governments.