What is Turkey seeking in Syria

What is Turkey seeking in Syria?

What is Turkey seeking in Syria?

In a surprising development, the defensive line of the Bashar al-Assad regime, supported by Iran and Russia, collapsed in northern Syria. This allowed Syrian rebels to enter Aleppo, the country’s economic heart, and then advance towards Hama. The coalition of rebels, consisting of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), has significantly altered the dynamics of the conflict in Syria since 2020.

The exact role of Turkey in this situation remains a subject of speculation. However, one thing is clear: even if Turkey was not directly involved, Ankara’s green light for this attack was based on its main interests in Syria. As a result, Turkey has now positioned itself as the most influential foreign player in Syria.

The rebel attack surprised many, but analysts familiar with the Syrian situation knew that the rebels had been preparing for this attack since mid-October. At that time, Turkey denied involvement because Ankara was focused on diplomatic efforts to establish communication with Damascus.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey, approached Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria, several times and demonstrated Turkey’s willingness to engage in dialogue.

However, the talks did not progress. Damascus interpreted Turkey’s tone as a sign of weakness. The Assad regime, encouraged by strengthening its ties with Arab countries and ongoing discussions in Europe about normalization, insisted on the complete withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria.

This demand is unacceptable for Ankara, as it would likely lead to a new wave of Syrian refugees heading toward Turkey and endanger Turkey’s national security strategy against the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party is recognized as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, NATO, and Turkey.

Damascus has shown no interest in discussing the return and resettlement of refugees. Russia and Iran, as the main supporters of the Assad regime, have also not used their influence to encourage Damascus to adopt a more constructive approach.

Ultimately, Moscow dealt the final blow to the diplomatic process. After the last Astana meeting held in November with the presence of Turkey, Iran, and Russia, Alexander Lavrentiev, Russia’s special envoy to Syria, expressed his strong opposition to any Turkish cross-border military operation against the YPG. A few days later, the Russians labeled Turkey as an occupying force in Syria and demanded the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from Syria, the cessation of Turkish support for Syrian opposition, and declared the impossibility of a meeting between Erdoğan and Assad.

Ankara realized that it could not persuade Damascus to engage in dialogue about a political solution for Syria. As a result, it decided to give the green light that the Syrian rebels were waiting for. As soon as the ceasefire was announced in Lebanon on November 27, the rebels quickly launched their attack.

The Syrian rebels saw this opportunity to advance while Iran was weakened in Syria and Hezbollah was focused on Lebanon, without the rebels being accused of collaborating with Israel.

No one, including the rebels themselves, had predicted their astonishing progress. The collapse of Assad’s forces in Aleppo led to achievements far beyond expectations. When the Assad regime began handing over its territories to the Syrian Democratic Forces dominated by the People’s Protection Units, another group called the Syrian National Army, supported by Turkey, launched a second operation from the Turkish-protected safe zone in northern Aleppo.

The Syrian National Army succeeded in cutting off the connection between Manbij and Tel Rifaat, capturing the strategic Kuweires airbase, and ultimately taking control of Tel Rifaat.

With the collapse of the People’s Protection Units, the Syrian National Army gained control of the same areas that the Russians had previously refused to withdraw from. This prompted Turkey to endorse this attack, a result no one had predicted. As of the writing of this piece, the military situation in Syria remains dynamic. It is unclear how far the rebels will advance after breaking the regime’s new defensive line in northern Hama, and the outcome of diplomatic negotiations is also uncertain. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, traveled to Ankara, and Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, had a phone call with his Turkish counterpart, but the escalation of conflicts in Syria continued.

Turkey has three main goals in Syria and has made progress in advancing them. The first goal is to achieve a political solution based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Before this attack, many believed that Damascus’s foreign relations could be normalized and the Assad regime reintegrated into the international system. However, it is now clear that peace in Syria will not be achieved if the needs and demands of the Syrian people and opposition are ignored.

Turkey’s second goal is to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to their country.

The refugee situation has become a significant issue in Turkish domestic politics and has influenced electoral behaviors. Turkey sees an encouraging opportunity with the capture of Aleppo and its surrounding areas. Aleppo has the housing, infrastructure, and economic conditions necessary to support the return of refugees.

The return to Syria will only reach a desirable level if security chaos is avoided and relative security is established.

The experience of refugees returning to Syria shows that they return to areas controlled by Syrian rebels, not to areas under regime control. As a result, various options, including cooperation with the European Union and the United Nations, may soon become subjects of negotiation.

Turkey’s third goal is to ensure its national security by eliminating the threat of the People’s Protection Units. Russia’s nearly decade-long support for this group in Tel Rifaat has now ended. Turkey now has more options to launch a new military operation against this group or support another attack by the Syrian National Army.

Turkey has also gained significant leverage on the diplomatic front. The country is likely to use the current situation in Syria for more effective negotiations with Moscow and Tehran and has an opportunity to reach an agreement with the new Donald Trump administration.

The President-elect Trump and his team have likely realized how Turkey’s policies over just four days reversed years of Iran’s investment in Syria. A Trump-led administration, intending to withdraw from Syria, will need to cooperate with Turkey.