What was the Agency’s report about Iran

What was the agency’s report about Iran?

What was the agency’s report about Iran?

On Saturday, May 30, Reuters reported on the latest confidential and comprehensive report by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic. This report, prepared at the request of the 35-member Board of Governors of the agency last November, paves the way for Western powers, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, to issue a resolution against Iran, identifying the Islamic Republic of Iran as violating its commitments to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

According to some diplomats, the draft of this resolution is expected to be presented at the next Board of Governors meeting in the week leading up to June 9.

This is the first time in about 20 years that Iran might officially be in a state of non-compliance.

According to this report, the Iranian government has conducted secret nuclear activities using undeclared materials at three locations that have long been under investigation by the agency. This is not a new issue, but it may have significant details. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Atomic Energy Organization have issued a joint statement calling this report political and biased, emphasizing that they will respond appropriately to any potential actions at the Board of Governors meeting.

After the release of this report, Laurence Norman, a Wall Street Journal reporter who covers the Islamic Republic’s nuclear news and has also reviewed this report, wrote that many of the details in this report were somewhat known, but some details are noteworthy.

Some details of this report mentioned by the Wall Street Journal reporter are as follows: Lavizan-Shian – Natural uranium was mined, processed, and used in the production of neutron sources with explosive initiators, known as EDNS, at the Lavizan-Shian site at least twice in 2003.

These neutron sources use small amounts of natural or depleted uranium and are designed to activate a nuclear device by producing neutrons in response to an explosive shock wave.

The agency’s assessment is that the EDNS produced at Lavizan were small scale and designed for testing. These sources were integrated into scaled explosive systems and were explosively tested twice in 2003. Additionally, the agency’s assessment shows that equipment, including neutron detectors and their chambers, were developed and tested at Lavizan-Shian.

A similar chamber for a neutron detector was used in an explosive test at Marivan on April 15, 2003.

The agency believes that about 10 kilograms of undeclared natural uranium metal were used by the Institute of Applied Physics at Lavizan during 2002-2003. The agency emphasizes that its investigations into Lavizan are not resolved, but there is no further opportunity for pursuit. The agency notes that the phrase ‘not currently on the table’ does not mean resolved; in fact, the agency’s assessment has not changed.

This means that Lavizan-Shian was a location where undeclared nuclear materials were stored and processed to produce components for tests related to nuclear devices, and Iran did not declare these nuclear materials and related activities. These issues have led to a more complex matter. The agency believes that Iran reported less uranium than actually worked on at Lavizan when part of it was dissolved in 2022.

The agency states that the amount of undeclared nuclear material indicates that more uranium metal than the approximately 10 kilograms previously assessed was available to the Institute of Applied Physics, which operated at the Lavizan-Shian site. The current location of this nuclear material remains unknown to the agency.

Thus, the agency cannot determine whether this material has been consumed and combined with declared materials or remains outside the safeguards system.

Marivan site – The assessment of information available to the agency shows that Iran conducted several explosive tests at this location in 2003.

In four of these tests, Iran used complete hemispherical explosive systems and recorded these tests with at least one high-speed camera.

Iran also prepared to use neutron detector equipment in future tests at this location and conducted a test on April 15, 2003, to prepare the explosive shield for these devices. The agency reminds that it was previously determined that after uranium samples were found at Turquoise, Iran began dismantling the Marivan site, then delayed the agency’s access to Marivan, and later allowed sampling.

Afterward, the agency observed that the shelters at the Marivan explosive test area had been removed. The agency asked for the reason, and Iran gave a response that was not technically valid.

Based on further assessments of information related to safeguards, the agency believes that Iran intended to continue producing neutron sources at Marivan in 2003, which required the use of small amounts of natural or depleted uranium. Iran later claimed that the uranium particles might have originated from mining activities of another member country in the 1960s and 1970s, specifically the Soviet Union. This claim led the agency to set aside the Marivan case, although there were many doubts about this claim.

The agency now reminds that, similar to Lavizan, setting aside the case does not mean it is resolved.

The agency states that its assessment remains that Iran conducted several explosive tests at this location in 2003. These tests used complete explosive systems and were recorded with at least one high-speed camera.

Iran also intended to use neutron detectors in future tests and tested their protective shields for these tests.

Varamin site – The agency says this location was related to Lavizan and the Nuclear Physics Research Center. When Iran shut down part of its nuclear program in 2003-2004, materials, including nuclear materials, were sorted, categorized, and transferred from Varamin.

These equipment included all necessary items for a uranium conversion facility, including small but highly contaminated UF6 cylinders and possibly uranium extraction materials like tributyl phosphate, uranium extraction and conversion equipment, fluorine-based chemicals like hydrofluoric acid and potassium difluoride, and radiation monitoring equipment.

The agency says Iran classified eight of the 13 shipments of materials as non-essential and five as essential.

One of these five included small UF6 cylinders and other specific materials, all of which were classified as having the highest level of contamination.

In 2020, Iran again delayed the agency’s access but eventually allowed sampling, and the agency identified man-made uranium traces.

According to the report, containers transferred from Varamin were eventually moved to Turquoise when activities ceased and were stored there until 2018.

Since then, the Iranian government has provided several explanations about the origin of these materials, which the agency has found technically invalid, including the claim that these materials resulted from sabotage. Last year, Iran even claimed that there was no site in Varamin that the agency needed to be informed about.

The agency concluded that Iran conducted research and development activities in Varamin related to the nuclear fuel cycle and that this location was an undeclared experimental facility for processing and milling uranium ore and converting it to uranium oxide and possibly on a laboratory scale to UF4 and UF6.

The agency states that a full-scale production facility was also planned to continue the work, but it is unclear whether this facility was actually built.

Because Iran has not responded, the agency concludes that it still cannot determine whether the nuclear materials in Varamin have been consumed and combined with declared materials or remain outside the safeguards system.

Turquoise – Regarding the fourth site, Turquoise, there is nothing new. The agency says this indicates that the nuclear materials and/or highly contaminated equipment stored at this location originated from Varamin, possibly Lavizan-Shian, and other locations.

While some of the containers stored at Turquoise have been opened on-site, others may have been completely moved from there in 2018 and transferred to an unknown location. The current location of these containers remains unknown.

In a meeting held on May 28, Iran once again presented its explanation about the origin of the nuclear materials, claiming that everything was the result of foreign sabotage. Iran claimed that a secret network, including Iranians (some with dual citizenship), in cooperation with foreign nationals from at least three countries, engaged in activities aimed at creating false accusations to tarnish Iran’s reputation. The agency says when asked, Iran could not provide any evidence of sabotage activities at Turquoise, despite the fact that security cameras were active at that location.