Netanyahu’s plan for Lebanon
Netanyahu’s plan for Lebanon involves Israel’s airstrikes on Hezbollah and disrupting their communication structure, followed by the assassination of Hezbollah’s secretary-general, senior military commanders, and political leaders. Israel has now entered a phase of ground attacks in the south.
It seems that Israel is trying to take advantage of the shock to Hezbollah’s command and communication structure, while Hezbollah is trying to reorganize its structure and compensate for the damages. Israel sees options for a ground attack in southern Lebanon, but the reality is that no ground operation in the south can secure it for Israel.
As a result, Israel’s ground campaign in southern Lebanon may escalate into a longer and broader campaign that may not achieve all of Israel’s objectives. However, it will bring destructive damages to Lebanon. Two days ago, Israeli tanks deployed along the northern border with southern Lebanon, and American officials immediately announced that Israel had informed them of its intention to launch a limited ground invasion in southern Lebanon. The Americans stated that this invasion could take place in the coming hours, as signs of Israel’s readiness for this operation emerged thereafter.
However, on September 28 and 29, Israeli army forces carried out extensive air strikes across the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the border between Syria and Lebanon. These attacks took place after the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on September 27. The goal of these operations was to weaken Hezbollah’s capabilities, dismantle its command structure, and block the route of arms shipments from Syria to Lebanon. In fact, Israel’s aim was to militarily isolate Hezbollah and cut off its supply lines from its allies.
Alongside these attacks, Sheikh Naeem Qasim, the deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah in Lebanon, pledged in his first speech after the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah that Hezbollah will continue to fight. He also stated that the group still possesses the capacity and capability to carry out short-range attacks. Qasim also announced that the leadership structure of Hezbollah has been quickly organized after the Israeli assassination operations, and the group is prepared to defend against Israeli ground invasion.
Some Israeli officials, who did not want their names revealed, claimed that the Israeli army has recently initiated special operations against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon to gather information about Hezbollah forces and assess their readiness for a ground war. In the same days of September 28 and 29, Israel carried out other attacks in Lebanon, targeting high-ranking Hamas commanders like Fathi Shari and several other Palestinian officials.
It seems that Israel has so far utilized the temporary turmoil within Hezbollah’s command and control structure. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely attempting to take advantage of the opportunity to eliminate Hezbollah’s military branch in Lebanon. Some tactical victories by Israel in recent weeks, such as the drone attacks on September 17 and 18 and the subsequent damage to Hezbollah’s command and control structure and military capabilities, have encouraged Israel to capitalize on the opportunity to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.
Israel’s hope is that the Jewish residents of the northern settlements in Israel, who were displaced after Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel, can return to their homes. Furthermore, considering that despite launching dozens of missiles, including ballistic missiles, towards major cities, Hezbollah has not been able to retaliate against recent Israeli attacks, Israelis have become more daring and concluded that Hezbollah has significantly weakened and is incapable of defending itself in a ground confrontation in southern Lebanon, and lacks the ability to target major Israeli cities.
Ultimately, Israelis take advantage of Iran’s apparent reluctance to rush to defend Hezbollah or seek harsh revenge against Israel due to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah. On September 30, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant hinted that a ground operation inside Lebanon may be imminent. On the same day, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced that Iran will not send forces to fight alongside Hezbollah.
Israel is likely to initiate at least a limited ground invasion into Lebanon as its first choice, although Israel may adopt more aggressive invasion strategies to create the desired buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Israel has stated that it is not seeking the destruction of Hezbollah, as in the 33-day war in 2006, but rather aims to weaken Hezbollah to the point where the group is forced to retreat behind the Litani River and cease its attacks on Israel.
If Israel’s stated intentions are carried out, it can be said that the goal is not so extensive as to require a comprehensive and mutual ground attack on southern Lebanon. Therefore, Israel will conduct this attack with the aim of breaking Hezbollah’s political will for resistance and defense, creating a buffer zone in the south, while also trying not to be distracted by military and security developments in Gaza and the West Bank. In general, considering the current conditions, four scenarios can be imagined regarding Israel’s ground attack on southern Lebanon.
Israeli Ground Invasion
The most likely option for an Israeli ground invasion into southern Lebanon and subsequent withdrawal towards the border would be similar to a scenario that Israel executed at the beginning of a ground offensive in Gaza. If Israel were to pursue this scenario, it would need to deploy a limited number of forces into southern Lebanon employing tactics used against Hamas. The mission of these forces would be to target Hezbollah’s infrastructure, inflict casualties, capture prisoners, and then withdraw towards the border. This operation would likely aim to establish a limited safe zone to prevent Hezbollah forces from being stationed or entering that area.
After the Israeli forces withdraw, Israeli artillery and air forces will remotely control this safe zone, similar to Israel’s initial operations in Gaza. Israel’s objective with this action is likely to reduce the risk of its ground forces getting bogged down in a guerilla warfare and partisan conflict. Additionally, diplomatically, this action would be less problematic for the United States and other supporters of Israel as justifications can be provided stating that this action does not constitute an overt occupation of southern Lebanese territories.
The reality is that this operation will have a slow process, and this slow process against Hezbollah, which is much more powerful than Hamas and has a much greater maneuvering space and readiness than Hamas, may face challenges. Furthermore, if Israel wants to stick to this scenario, it will likely have to continue this scenario for weeks or even months until it can break Hezbollah’s political will to continue the war.
The prolongation of the battle, considering the increasing fatigue of the Israeli people from the war, may politically weaken the Israeli cabinet to the extent that it cannot continue this process. Israelis, in general, are accustomed to early and quick victories, and their resilience to endure tough conditions in the long term is not very high.
Limited border operations
The second scenario, which is less likely than the first scenario, involves a limited border operation to occupy a disputed area inside southern Lebanon. According to this scenario, Israelis will likely have to deploy forces up to 10 kilometers deep into southern Lebanese territory. This scenario will be more risky in terms of diplomatic and military aspects compared to the first scenario. However, Israel will probably try not to use a large number of forces for the deep incursion into southern Lebanon to reduce potential casualties.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that this action will expose Israeli forces to repeated guerrilla and partisan attacks by Hezbollah forces much more than the first scenario. Within the framework of this scenario, if Israel succeeds, Hezbollah may ultimately be convinced to agree to a diplomatic solution to regain control of the area. However, such an agreement will likely come after a prolonged confrontation between the two sides, and in the midst of this prolonged conflict, we may witness Israel’s assassination operations against Hezbollah forces and more intense and severe Hezbollah attacks on major Israeli cities.
Driving Hezbollah back
In scenario three, where the likelihood is lower than scenario two, Israel’s decision is to advance its forces behind the Litani River and then retreat towards the Israeli borders. In this scenario, Israel will likely attempt to advance into the southern depths of Lebanon and reach the Litani River. Israel will try to fill this area with numerous forces, eliminate Hezbollah’s infrastructure, inflict casualties on Hezbollah as much as possible, and capture or take prisoners.
If Israel succeeds in this scenario and manages to shock Hezbollah, it may announce that it has sufficiently weakened Hezbollah’s capabilities. Then, it may bring its forces back to 10 kilometers from the Israeli borders and propose negotiations for a 10-kilometer buffer zone in the same area, forcing Hezbollah to accept an end to the conflict.
However, this operation will pose many risks for Israeli forces. In this scenario, in addition to engaging a large number of Israeli ground forces, Lebanese army forces may also get involved and inflict heavy casualties on Israeli forces. Furthermore, executing this scenario may face diplomatic opposition from the United States and most supporters of Israel.
In this scenario, although success for Israel cannot be guaranteed, if this operation succeeds, Hezbollah’s will to fight will be weakened, and Hezbollah will be forced to agree to a diplomatic solution that will create safe zones, especially since if Israel threatens to do this, it will repeat it not once but multiple times.
Occupation of Lebanese territory
The fourth scenario, which has a lower probability than the third scenario, involves the advancement of Israeli forces to the Litani River and staying in this area. In this scenario, Israel may conclude that occupying Lebanese territory is the only way to achieve its security objectives and force Hezbollah to negotiate for an end to the conflict. Implementing this scenario requires a large ground force and a very long time because Israel will have to hold the southern Litani River area until Hezbollah agrees to a diplomatic settlement.
This scenario will be seriously considered by Israel if the Israeli army determines that its recent attacks on Hezbollah have significantly disrupted Hezbollah’s command and control structure and that Israel has an opportunity to change the battle dynamics in southern Lebanon at a lower cost. The United States, Arab countries, and many European countries will strongly oppose the endless occupation of southern Lebanon. As a result, there is a possibility that Washington may halt the shipment of arms to Israel, such as heavy bombs.
However, if Hezbollah is able to inflict heavy casualties on Israeli forces in this scenario, Israel’s determination to occupy this area will weaken. Israel may be forced to end the war without achieving a guarantee of Hezbollah’s permanent withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a retreat behind the Litani River, regardless of which of the four scenarios Israel chooses. There is also the possibility that the Israeli army may foresee a ground invasion deep into Lebanese territory and extend the scope of ground operations beyond the lands beyond the Litani River towards Beirut or the Bekaa Valley. Many of Hezbollah’s supply lines are located in the eastern Bekaa Valley.
Israel’s actions have led to a severe humanitarian crisis and increased instability in Lebanon. If the options mentioned above fail to achieve Israel’s goals and force Hezbollah into a diplomatic agreement, Israel will be trapped in an endless ground invasion campaign in southern Lebanon. Israel will be forced to redirect its ground invasion towards northern Lebanon to break Hezbollah’s will to fight, cut off Hezbollah’s communication lines, and destroy the group’s arsenals. As part of these operations, the Israeli army may advance towards the Litani River to the north and enter Beirut as it did in the 1982 attack.
Israel’s advance towards the Bekaa Valley will likely not be carried out by conventional ground forces but by commando units. Israeli commandos may also conduct operations in Syrian territory to cut off Hezbollah’s supply lines passing through Syria. Meanwhile, Israeli airstrikes in other parts of Lebanon will intensify, targeting Lebanon’s transportation infrastructure to disrupt Hezbollah’s communication lines.
This action will also lead to another humanitarian catastrophe and a wave of Lebanese refugees entering Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and even Europe. In the event of such humanitarian disasters, internal and political pressure from opposition parties and political movements against Hezbollah in Lebanon is likely to increase. If such an event occurs, the prospect of Lebanon entering a period of internal instability and even the outbreak of a civil war is not far-fetched.
