Netanyahu’s Plan for Lebanon
Netanyahu’s plan for Lebanon, following Israel’s persistent attacks on Hezbollah and the extensive disruption of Hezbollah forces’ communication structure, and subsequently the assassination of the Secretary-General and senior military commanders and political leaders of this group, has led Israel to enter a phase of ground assault in the south.
It seems that Israel is trying to take advantage of the opportunity created by the shock to Hezbollah’s command and communication structure, while Hezbollah is trying to reorganize its structure and compensate for the damages. Israel sees options for a ground assault on southern Lebanon, but the reality is that no ground operation in southern Lebanon can make this region safe for Israel.
As a result, Israel’s ground campaign in southern Lebanon may turn into a long and broader campaign, and even this prolonged campaign will not be able to achieve all of Israel’s objectives but will inflict devastating damage on Lebanon. Two days ago, Israeli tanks were stationed on the northern borders with southern Lebanon. American officials immediately announced that Israel had informed them of its intention to launch a limited ground invasion in southern Lebanon. Americans announced that this invasion might occur in the coming hours, after which signs of Israel’s readiness to execute this operation appeared.
However, before that, on September 28 and 29, Israeli military forces conducted extensive airstrikes across the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Syria-Lebanon border. These attacks occurred after the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on September 27. The aim of these operations was to weaken Hezbollah’s capabilities, dismantle its command structure, and block the routes of arms shipments from Syria to Lebanon. In fact, Israel’s goal was to militarily encircle Hezbollah and, by isolating this group from its allies, eliminate Hezbollah’s supply lines.
Parallel to these attacks, Sheikh Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah Lebanon, in his first speech after the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, pledged that Hezbollah would continue to fight and that the group still has the capacity and ability to carry out medium- and short-range attacks. Naim Qassem also announced that Hezbollah’s leadership and command structure had been quickly reorganized after Israel’s assassination operations, and the group is ready to defend against an Israeli ground invasion.
Some Israeli officials, who wished to remain anonymous, claimed that the Israeli military had launched a special operation against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in recent days and months, and had gained access to routes for gathering information about Hezbollah forces and assessing the group’s readiness for ground warfare. On the same days, September 28 and 29, Israel, in other attacks on Lebanon, assassinated some senior Hamas commanders such as Fatah Sharif and several other Palestinian officials.
It seems that Israel has so far taken advantage of the temporary chaos created in Hezbollah’s control and command structure. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely trying to use the opportunity to eliminate the military wing of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Some tactical victories by Israel in recent weeks, including persistent attacks on September 17 and 18 and the subsequent damage to Hezbollah’s command and control structure as well as the group’s military capabilities, have encouraged Israel to use the opportunity to create a territorial buffer zone in southern Lebanon.
Israel hopes that the Jewish settlers in northern Israel, who were displaced after Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on northern Israel, can return to their homes. Additionally, given that Hezbollah has so far, despite launching dozens of rockets including ballistic missiles towards major cities, not been able to complete retaliation for recent Israeli attacks, Israelis have become bolder and concluded that Hezbollah has significantly weakened and is incapable of defending itself in a ground confrontation in southern Lebanon and does not have the capability to target major Israeli cities.
Ultimately, Israelis are exploiting Iran’s apparent reluctance to hastily defend Hezbollah or take harsh revenge on Israel for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. On September 30, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant indicated that a ground operation inside Lebanon might be imminent. On the same day, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Iran would not send forces to fight alongside Hezbollah.
Israel will likely initiate at least a limited ground invasion of Lebanon as its first choice. Although Israel may adopt more aggressive strategies to create its desired buffer zone in southern Lebanon, it has announced that it is not seeking to destroy Hezbollah as it did in the 33-day war in 2006, but rather to weaken Hezbollah to the point where the group is forced to retreat from the borders to behind the Litani River and end its attacks on Israel.
If what the Israelis say is implemented, it should be noted that this goal is not so extensive as to require a comprehensive and all-out ground attack on southern Lebanon. As a result, Israel will carry out this attack with the aim of breaking Hezbollah’s political will to resist and defend and creating a buffer zone in the south, while at the same time trying not to divert its attention from military and security developments in Gaza and the West Bank. Overall, given the current conditions, four scenarios can be envisaged regarding Israel’s ground attack on southern Lebanon.
Israel’s Ground Invasion
1. The most likely option is Israel’s ground invasion of southern Lebanon followed by a withdrawal towards the border. This scenario is similar to the one Israel executed at the start of the ground invasion of Gaza. If Israel wants to implement this scenario, it should logically deploy a limited number of forces into southern Lebanon, similar to the tactics used against Hamas. The task of these forces is to target Hezbollah’s infrastructure, inflict casualties in face-to-face combat, and capture prisoners before retreating towards the border. Such an operation is likely to be carried out with the aim of creating a limited safe zone so that Hezbollah forces cannot be stationed in or enter it.
After the withdrawal of Israeli forces, Israeli artillery and air forces will control this safe zone with long-range fire, similar to Israel’s initial operations in Gaza. Israel’s goal with this action is likely to reduce the risk of its ground forces being trapped in guerrilla and partisan warfare, while also being less problematic diplomatically from the perspective of the United States and other Israeli supporters, as justifications can be provided, stating that this action does not count as an overt occupation of southern Lebanese territories.
However, the reality is that this operation will be a slow process, and this slow pace, against Hezbollah, which is far more powerful than Hamas and has much more maneuvering and logistical space than Hamas, may face challenges. Furthermore, if Israel wants to settle for this scenario, it will likely have to continue it for weeks or even months to break Hezbollah’s political will to continue the war.
The prolongation of the battle, given the increasing fatigue of the Israeli people from war, may politically weaken the Israeli cabinet to the point where it cannot continue this process. Israelis are generally accustomed to quick and early victories, and their resilience to endure difficult conditions in the long term is not high.
Limited Border Operation
2. The second scenario, which is less likely than the first, is the execution of a limited border operation to occupy a buffer zone within the southern Lebanese territories. Based on this scenario, Israelis will probably have to deploy forces 10 kilometers deep into southern Lebanon. This scenario will be more risky diplomatically and militarily than the first scenario, but Israel will probably try not to use a very large number of forces to deploy deep into southern Lebanon to reduce potential casualties.
However, it should be noted that this action will expose Israeli forces to repeated guerrilla and partisan attacks by Hezbollah forces much more than the first scenario. Within this scenario, if success is achieved for Israel, Hezbollah may eventually be persuaded to agree to a diplomatic agreement to reclaim this area, but such an agreement will likely be reached after a prolonged conflict between the two sides, and in the midst of this prolonged conflict, we will likely witness Israeli assassination operations against Hezbollah forces and more severe and intense Hezbollah attacks on major Israeli cities.
Pushing Back Hezbollah
3. In the third scenario, which is less likely than the second, Israel decides to push Hezbollah forces back behind the Litani River and then retreat towards Israel’s borders. Within this scenario, Israel will probably try to advance deep into southern Lebanon and reach the Litani River. Israel will try to fill this area with a large number of forces, destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure, and take as many casualties from Hezbollah as possible or capture them.
If this Israeli scenario is successful and it can shock Hezbollah, then it may announce that it has sufficiently weakened Hezbollah’s capabilities and then return its forces to 10 kilometers from Israel’s borders and then put a negotiation proposal on the table over this 10-kilometer buffer zone and force Hezbollah to accept the end of the conflict.
However, this operation will pose many risks for Israeli forces. In this scenario, in addition to involving a large number of Israeli ground forces, Lebanese army forces may also intervene and inflict heavy casualties on Israeli forces. Moreover, the implementation of this scenario may face diplomatic opposition from the United States and most of Israel’s supporters.
In this scenario, although Israel’s success cannot be guaranteed at all, if this operation succeeds, Hezbollah’s will to fight will be weakened, and Hezbollah will be forced to agree to a diplomatic agreement that creates a buffer zone, especially if Israel threatens to repeat this action not once but multiple times.
Occupation of Lebanese Territory
4. The fourth scenario, which is less likely than the third, is the advancement of Israeli forces to the Litani River and remaining in this area. In this scenario, Israel may conclude that occupying Lebanese territory is the only way to achieve Israel’s security objectives and force Hezbollah to negotiate to end the battle. Implementing this scenario requires a very large ground force and a very long time because Israel will have to keep the territory south of the Litani River under occupation until Hezbollah agrees to a diplomatic agreement.
This scenario will be seriously considered by Israel only if the Israeli military concludes that its recent attacks on Hezbollah have effectively disrupted Hezbollah’s command and control structure and that Israel has gained an opportunity to radically change the dynamics of the battle in southern Lebanon at a lower cost. The United States, Arab countries, and many European countries will certainly oppose the endless occupation of southern Lebanon. As a result, it is possible that Washington will stop sending arms shipments to Israel, such as heavy bombs.
However, if Hezbollah can inflict heavy casualties on Israeli forces within this scenario, Israel’s determination to occupy this buffer zone will be weakened, and Israel may be forced to end the war without achieving a guarantee of Hezbollah’s permanent withdrawal from southern Lebanon and retreat to behind the Litani River. Regardless of which of the four scenarios above Israel chooses, there is also the possibility that the Israeli military will have the prospect of a ground invasion deep into Lebanese territory in mind and expand the scope of ground operations to areas beyond the Litani River towards Beirut or the Bekaa Valley. Many of Hezbollah’s supply lines are located in the east of the Bekaa Valley.
This Israeli action will lead to a severe humanitarian crisis and increased instability in Lebanon. If the options mentioned above cannot achieve Israel’s goals and force Hezbollah into a diplomatic agreement, Israel will be trapped in an endless ground invasion campaign in southern Lebanon and will be forced to focus its ground invasion more towards northern Lebanon to break Hezbollah’s will to fight, cut Hezbollah’s communication lines, and destroy the group’s arsenals. Within the framework of these operations, the Israeli military may advance north of the Litani River and, like the 1982 attack, enter Beirut.
Israel’s advance towards the Bekaa Valley will probably be carried out not with conventional ground forces but with commando brigades. Israeli commandos are likely to conduct operations in Syrian territory as well to cut Hezbollah’s supply lines that pass through Syria. Meanwhile, Israeli airstrikes on other parts of Lebanon will intensify, and Lebanon’s transportation infrastructure will be destroyed with the aim of disrupting Hezbollah’s communication lines.
This action will also lead to another humanitarian disaster and a surge of Lebanese refugees to Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and even Europe. In the event of such humanitarian disasters, it is highly likely that domestic and political pressure from opposing parties and political movements on Hezbollah Lebanon will increase. If such an event occurs, then the prospect of Lebanon entering a period of internal instability and even a civil war is not unlikely.