Weak Performance of Araghchi in the Position of Minister
Weak Performance of Araghchi in the Position of Minister
It seems that the overall performance over the past six months has been such that at least in three areas, the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is being diminished and weakened.
It seems that the Minister of Foreign Affairs needs serious advice for caution, and before taking any step towards any deal or negotiation, it is appropriate to set aside hasty and showy behaviors and slogan-driven speeches lacking realistic backing by the head of the diplomatic apparatus.
Seyed Abbas Araghchi was the first figure whose presence in the fourteenth government became certain.
Almost no faction came forward with serious criticism and opposition to him, except for the most extreme right-wing groups, who fundamentally oppose negotiation and interaction with the world. Other political factions welcomed Araghchi’s ministry with a positive outlook.
Even the worried right-wingers did not consider Araghchi as one of their serious opposition options during the parliamentary vote of confidence. In fact, Araghchi can be considered one of the most consensus-driven governmental figures who came to power with a discourse and idea of consensus.
The consensus over Araghchi was so obvious that even before the formation of the steering council and committees for forming the fourteenth government, his name was heard as the definite option for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the ranks of government supporters, Araghchi’s background in the JCPOA negotiation team and his deputy role under Mohammad Javad Zarif in Hassan Rouhani’s government gave hope to reformist and moderate forces.
At the level of governmental institutions and main right-wing factions, Araghchi’s background in the IRGC and his inclination towards the Islamic Coalition Party made him appear more familiar and trustworthy than Mohammad Javad Zarif and even Hassan Rouhani. So much so that during the three-year period of the thirteenth government, Araghchi was appointed by the leader as the secretary of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations.
This collection of backgrounds put the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the consensus government in a position of agreement, which was also cited in Massoud Pezeshkian’s election speeches as a prerequisite for solving foreign issues. This political-governing backing and positive executive-diplomatic backgrounds raised expectations from Araghchi, but as about six months have passed since the fourteenth government, this backing is gradually fading.
Although national interests require that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as a national figure representing the country on the international stage, be less criticized, at the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should also protect the value and status of this national position. According to the proverb, the sanctity of the shrine should be preserved more by its custodian.
Meanwhile, the performances of the past six months indicate a weakening of the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in three areas. Firstly, unlike Hassan Rouhani’s government, in the fourteenth government, we are witnessing that the role of executor and agent of negotiations, especially in the area of potential talks with the United States, is not very clear, and it seems that competitions and alignments among different factions supporting negotiation have already formed.
Some figures like Ali Shamkhani, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, although having no official responsibility, still introduce themselves as responsible for the nuclear file, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government remain silent in response to this claim—a silence that, if not out of satisfaction, stems from inattention to the dignity and position of the diplomatic apparatus.
Or some positions of Seyed Kamal Kharrazi, head of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, expressed in interviews with foreign media, although they seem to be coordinated, also display traces of competition and independent performance beyond usual relations, and it feels like this council is gradually moving beyond a consultative and strategic institution and directly entering the executive domain of diplomacy.
Here too, we witness a kind of silence and passivity from the official foreign policy apparatus.
Whereas in Rouhani’s government, the management of the nuclear file and negotiations with European and American parties were completely concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Moreover, the history of informal and secret negotiations in various periods after the revolution has practically shown that they do not yield results for the country and merely exacerbate gaps and conflicts—a lesson most notably seen in the McFarlane affair.
Secondly, Araghchi’s behavior and sometimes speeches in the past six months are far from those of an experienced Foreign Minister and a recognized diplomat, and the repetition of certain actions damages the principles of the captain of the country’s diplomatic apparatus.
Frequent trips to various countries in the early days of the government, when the risk of the country getting involved in a full-scale war was present, had meaning and significance, and it seems that in the first hundred days, it brought a positive track record for Araghchi.
But after that, during the effective Middle Eastern tour and trips to important countries in the region and the Arab world, we witnessed trips that increasingly distanced from diplomatic initiatives and approached a kind of display.
The trip to Beirut during the peak of Israeli attacks on Lebanon and worse, the trip to Damascus a few days before Bashar al-Assad’s fall, left negative points in the record of the fourteenth government’s Foreign Minister.
Araghchi, in these trips, tried to portray a kind of field and courageous presence, showing that Iran stands with its allies even in days of crisis and the toughest times, but in practice, the Lebanon ceasefire and worse, the fall of Assad, provided an image of incorrect and unrealistic analyses that reduced Iran from an effective player to a passive observer of events.
It was as if the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with these trips, was bidding farewell to the position of a high-ranking diplomat and was slipping into the role of a daring tourist wandering through restaurants and cafes for better display of his actions.
Thus, after the ceasefire, Lebanese officials like Nabih Berri spoke to Iran with an unconventional and critical tone, let alone the new rulers of Syria who have fundamental hostility towards Iran, and Araghchi’s last-minute trip only fueled their fire further.
If the trips to Damascus and Beirut and the presence in the cafes and restaurants of these two capitals can be justified from the perspective of bold diplomacy, the repetition of this behavior in subsequent trips, including the recent trip to Kabul, does not find even this level of justification and remains merely a repetitive tourist behavior.
Behaviors that can gradually erode the principles and position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs as the main external symbol of Iran, especially in these complex conditions, and reduce Araghchi’s capacities.
Thirdly, the most complex area of Iran’s foreign policy after the revolution has been the United States—a field that from the very day after the revolution turned into a subject of internal conflict, and after the embassy takeover, its political-ideological halos increased, and the penetration of diplomatic views and discourse in it decreased.
Attempts that were made at various times, both openly and covertly, to change this atmosphere failed each time, and radical forces in America or Iran worked towards its failure. The most prominent of these cases was the outcome of the JCPOA. This complex situation and negative history have made the re-entry of the fourteenth government and its like-minded individuals into negotiation, especially in the presence of Donald Trump, more difficult than ever and face serious resistance within the power structure, particularly from the election-defeated faction.
Beyond that, Trump’s authoritative stance towards various countries from Europe and Canada and Panama to China and Egypt and Jordan makes the transmission of any message, even conditionally and implicitly, face serious political and reputational costs.
The harsh attacks on Mohammad Javad Zarif, Ali Abdolalizadeh, Fatemeh Mohajerani, and even Massoud Pezeshkian in recent weeks indicate the sensitivity of positioning in this area. But beyond these attacks and internal sensitivities, which may somewhat diminish with the clarification of the political system’s major decision, the more sensitive aspect is the approach towards the new US government and Trump himself.
Trump is generally recognized as an unpredictable personality with populist poses and frank and unreserved speech, but this very personality of Trump possesses some known characteristics, including his largely transactional view of the international system.
One of Trump’s main arguments for withdrawing from the JCPOA was the lack of economic benefit for American companies from the agreement with Iran, while also criticizing Barack Obama’s administration for unblocking Iran’s frozen assets.
Regardless of how much Trump’s claims were based on reality, it is clear that in any positioning directed at the new US government, one must speak in a way that suits his transactional nature. In fact, the leader’s remark about keeping our eyes open and being aware of whom we are negotiating and speaking with is most meaningful regarding Trump.
In fact, the serious responsibility of the diplomatic apparatus in the current circumstances is to employ all possible tools at various levels within America and international circles to gain the necessary understanding of Trump and his team of advisors, ministers, and representatives in the region, and then, based on that, take steps towards designing and advancing possible and effective policies.
Unfortunately, it is observed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, without paying attention to these requirements, in an interview with Al Jazeera, raises the issue of unblocking Iran’s frozen assets in America as steps for confidence-building by the US government. If even a slight understanding of Trump’s nature and backgrounds were considered in this positioning, certainly anything could have been said except for demanding claims and assets. This questionable statement is made by Araghchi while, for instance, Mr. Abdolalizadeh, Vice President for Maritime Development, with language indicating an understanding of Trump’s nature, discusses the possibility of American companies investing in Iran after reaching an agreement.
Or the necessity of a stable, developed Iran with an adequate level of welfare for the future of the Middle East and reducing ongoing regional tensions could have been raised—a topic that aligns with Trump’s slogan about ending wars and restoring peace in the Middle East and Ukraine.
In fact, Iran’s intentional or unintentional connection to the two major current world wars, while posing serious threats to the country, with a different approach, can provide a basis for opportunity creation and opportunity finding for Iran in the new US government.
That the Minister of Foreign Affairs shows inattention to such obvious matters in his interviews and raises a topic that could potentially be the final step and ultimate outcome of a potential agreement with Trump as initial steps for confidence-building and a kind of precondition for negotiation is questionable.
With all these issues, it seems that the Minister of Foreign Affairs needs serious advice for caution, and before taking any step towards any deal or negotiation, it is appropriate to set aside hasty and showy behaviors and slogan-driven speeches lacking realistic backing by the head of the diplomatic apparatus.