Raisi’s Clumsy Imitation of Ahmadinejad’s Government
According to Iran Gate, many experts believe that the economic policies of Ebrahim Raisi’s government have previously been implemented by the ninth and tenth governments led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, many believe that even this imitation has not been done correctly, and the thirteenth cabinet has acted clumsily in this regard.
After Raisi’s government took steps to eliminate government currency for importing essential goods, many pointed out the numerous similarities between this policy and Ahmadinejad’s government’s economic management approaches.
Now that about a year has passed since the implementation of this policy within Iran’s economy, the government has newly realized that under sanction conditions, such actions cannot be taken, and the widespread consequences in society cannot be ignored. Consequences that have led to the shrinking of the middle class and the expansion of poverty in the country.
Denying Reality by Relying on Strange Statistics
One of the main and central similarities between Raisi’s and Ahmadinejad’s governments is the reliance on controversial statistics, which have always been used by the ninth, tenth, and now thirteenth governments to escape criticism. This similarity can be seen in both heads of state dealing with inflation discussions or the resources of the Central Bank or the National Development Fund.
In the mid-2000s, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad managed to form the ninth cabinet, the inflation rate began to rise. This happened at a time when inflation in the years 2003 and 2004 had reached its lowest level in the past 50 years. However, this trend quickly stopped, and the implementation of Ahmadinejad’s and his team’s strange policies in the economy led to an inflation spike.
The same thing happened in mid-2021 with the coming to power of Ebrahim Raisi. Although the consequences of the incoherent policies of Raisi’s economic team continue, it became clear after only three months that he and the thirteenth cabinet lacked the competence to manage the country’s economy. The inflation rate, as the main economic indicator, showed this and indicated that contrary to the election campaign claims, Raisi’s government not only did not bring about an opening but also accelerated the growth of inflation.
However, both the ninth and thirteenth governments had a similar approach in facing criticisms arising from inflation spikes. In 2006, Ahmadinejad stood against critics and deemed the Central Bank’s statistics during Mohammad Khatami’s presidency as flawed and unreliable.
This was while the presidency of the Central Bank, despite the change in government, remained with Tahmasb Mazaheri, and no new policy had been adopted by this supervisory body. However, shortly after, Ahmadinejad removed Mazaheri from the presidency of the Central Bank, which experts believe was mainly due to Mazaheri’s resistance against the government’s desire to change the approach and method of calculating economic indicators, including the inflation rate.
Ebrahim Raisi has also adopted a completely similar approach in the past 20 months. He sat in front of the cameras of the national media and claimed to control inflation in the thirteenth government. This was while experts, minutes after this interview aired, deemed the president’s claim false and misleading. Interestingly, Raisi presented statistics from the Central Bank that had not been published since 2018, and no one knew the criteria and method for calculating these figures.
Tragic Encounter with Economists
The economic policies of Ahmadinejad’s government in the mid-2000s had plunged society into such a crisis that many economists began to protest. The result of correspondence and criticism from economic professors led to a meeting between Ahmadinejad and the country’s economic specialists. This meeting, which was also broadcast on television, contained tragic and regrettable scenes. The head of the ninth government, in this meeting, said a key phrase in response to economists’ criticisms, reflecting his stance towards scientific engagement with economic issues.
Ahmadinejad told Dr. Sasan, one of the renowned economists, ‘Don’t complicate the economy. The issue is very simple. If you want to know how the economy is doing, go and ask people if it is better now or during the previous period.’
Raisi and his government also continue their work with similar rhetoric when facing such criticisms. Whenever Raisi faces a critique, he raises his voice in a strange and incomprehensible way and says, ‘The train of the country’s progress is moving fast, and some are upset and dissatisfied with this progress.’
Of course, Ahmadinejad had the courage and ability to face critics of his economic policies, but Raisi, due to evident scientific shortcomings and even debate, which was Ahmadinejad’s art, has not had any meetings with economists and economic specialists so far.
The Grand Actions of Mahmoud and Ebrahim
Ahmadinejad still claims, even ten years after the tenth government, that implementing the plan to liberalize subsidies and pay cash subsidies to the people required courage and bravery that no one else saw in themselves. He believes this policy was the best plan executed in the country’s economy after the revolution and should be continued.
Although there is much room for discussion and review about whether this plan was correct, it should be noted that its design and planning were done by the late Jamshid Pajouyan, one of Iran’s prominent economists. It is said that he initially supervised its implementation, but it wasn’t long before he, too, joined the critics due to the government’s deviation and unscientific performance and deemed Ahmadinejad’s economic policies incorrect.
Raisi’s government also implemented a similar plan at the beginning of 2022, which only after a month brought the critics’ voices. The elimination of preferential currency for medicine and essential goods, which was due to the pressure of sanctions after Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, is the grand action that he and the government’s economic team now boast about.
Although this plan cannot be compared quantitatively or qualitatively with the energy subsidy removal plan or the targeting of subsidies, it can be considered a clumsy imitation of the policies implemented by the ninth and tenth governments by Ebrahim Raisi and his allies. Policies whose implementation has led to the shrinking of people’s livelihood and endangered the health of the middle and lower classes of society.
One Big Difference
There is a significant difference between these two governments that could lead to different results from what we witnessed in 2013. In the late 2000s, oil prices reached their highest level in the history of exploration and trade of this valuable fossil fuel, a record that remains unbroken despite surges after the Ukraine war. This event gave Ahmadinejad and his government a great opportunity to fill the gap of expertise and efficiency in the country’s economic management through financial distribution.
Of course, it should not be forgotten that oil and banking sanctions did not yet exist, and the government could easily export oil. However, the foreign policy of the ninth and tenth governments led to a situation where Hassan Rouhani formed the eleventh government under very complex and difficult conditions of sanctions on the oil and banking industry.
But this matter is very different in the thirteenth government compared to what happened during Ahmadinejad’s time. Although, as mentioned, Putin’s invasion and the Russian army’s aggression into Ukrainian territory caused tension in the oil market and the price once again exceeded $100, Raisi’s government could not capitalize on this opportunity.
In other words, it can be said that the missed opportunity by the thirteenth government in the diplomatic arena caused Iran to fail to capitalize on the golden period of the first half of 2022 in the energy market. Therefore, it is said that Raisi’s government does not have the tool that Ahmadinejad had to cover the managerial gaps of his government. A tool that could allow financial distribution in markets and spending in various organizations, but ironically, his disappointing performance in reviving JCPOA negotiations even took away this chance from him and the thirteenth government’s economic team.