The Death of the JCPOA: A Return to Square One
The death of the JCPOA is a return to square one, while Europeans constantly expressed optimism about reaching an agreement, and Western, mainly Israeli, media were busy leaking details of the multi-stage agreement amidst Iranian silence. However, it now seems that not only is there no sign of the white smoke of agreement, but the reactions from the Iranian and American sides are so opposed that it seems they have moved more towards divergence than convergence.
Iran claims that the text sent in response to the U.S. was prepared with a constructive approach, but the American side has stated the exact opposite, saying unfortunately, Iran’s response to the JCPOA revival text is not constructive.
Another official from the Biden administration has said it seems we are moving backward. Another has stated that Iran’s response does not look good at all. The American magazine Politico has reported that the U.S. has labeled Iran’s response as a step backward, and now the nuclear negotiations are in danger of collapsing.
Who is to blame for an agreement that was claimed to be close to completion but is now again nearing the game over stage? Is it America’s excessive demands, the victory of the Israeli lobby, or Iran’s hesitation and insistence? Perhaps all three.
Iran’s Mistaken Tactics
Were Iran’s tactics of prolonging the negotiations a mistake? The Rouhani administration claimed it was on the verge of reviving the JCPOA when the conservative parliament disrupted it with its nuclear resolution in 2020. The power structure also seemed unwilling for the JCPOA to be revived by the same government that created it. With the arrival of the Raisi administration, the start of negotiations was deliberately postponed. With Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Iran thought it had gained a trump card, believing the West was preoccupied with Russia and the energy crisis in Europe would ultimately benefit Iran.
It seems Iran had placed special emphasis on the fuel crisis in Europe, and this is likely why the Europeans showed more inclination to resolve the JCPOA issue during this time and constantly expressed optimism.
Meanwhile, if the problem of Iran’s sanctions is to be resolved so that it can supply part of Europe’s fuel for this winter, the time to solve the problem is now. If more time is wasted, firstly, Europe will devise alternative measures to align its consumption with the fuel supply and will not wait for the outcome of negotiations. Secondly, there will not be enough time to lay the groundwork and create the necessary infrastructure to sell and deliver fuel to Europe.
Hamid Aboutalebi, who was a political advisor to the president’s office in the Rouhani administration, tweeted about these delays, saying the winter cold in Europe is not much linked to the economic freeze in Iran. History will first write how Europe’s winter passed and why Iran’s economic freeze has persisted.
Then it will judge which countries have successfully and correctly served their people’s interests. A year has passed since the tactic of prolonging nuclear negotiations. The second year of the government began with the tactic of throwing the ball into the opponent’s court, which may take months. Then entering into election discussions will pollute the political space, and no agreement will be possible. Is direct negotiation not the only solution?
The Death of the JCPOA in Favor of the Abraham Accords
Israel has repeatedly said it opposes the revival of the JCPOA and does not consider itself obligated or committed to it if it is concluded. In recent weeks, the interactions of Israeli political and security officials with Americans on the subject of Iran’s nuclear agreement had intensified. Now, Reza Nasri, an international law expert, has said that the main rival to the JCPOA in the region is the Abraham Accords led by Israel, and they will gain the most from the death of the JCPOA. Reza Nasri, an expert in international relations, said I believe the JCPOA is a serious competitor to the Abraham Accords.
In fact, a new regional order will form either around the JCPOA led by Iran or around the Abraham Accords led by Israel. If Iran delays in concluding the JCPOA and then initiating a new local order with neighboring countries, Israel will quickly weave the Abraham Accords around Iran like a spider’s web, isolating Iran politically, economically, and security-wise.
Last week, the former head of the Israeli National Security Council, referring to the return of the UAE ambassador to Tehran, said that signing a nuclear deal with Iran would affect this regime’s reconciliation agreements with Arab countries or the Abraham Accords, which were essentially aimed at countering Iran’s influence.
Divergence Instead of Convergence
Previously, media unofficially published a text that included part of the lengthy U.S. response to Iran’s questions and showed that significant Iranian demands were not accepted by the U.S. Most likely, Iran also insisted on its demands again and sent the same to the U.S.
The U.S. did not accept three major Iranian demands related to foreign companies’ activities, non-sanctioning of multinational companies, and Iran’s entry into SWIFT, and did not provide guarantees on them. On the other hand, the U.S. claimed that Iran had backed down from some of its demands, such as the requirement to remove the IRGC from the terrorist list.
Iran also wanted a strong guarantee from the U.S. for non-withdrawal from the agreement. It seems that neither side is willing to back down from their demands, and rather than negotiations leading them towards convergence, they have led towards divergence.
Now, with the likely delay and renewed prolongation of the negotiation process, we should expect a new obstacle to be added to the previous ones. Ali Vaez, a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group on Iran, also said that with the current opportunity lost, imagining that an agreement might be reached before the U.S. midterm elections is difficult. The issue of elections has always been a new obstacle to the conclusion of Iran’s nuclear agreement, with opponents of the JCPOA revival having the upper hand in the U.S. Congress.