Choosing between fundamentalist and more fundamentalist
The twelfth parliamentary elections are approaching their final stage. This is the first election held under the government of Ebrahim Raisi and in the prevailing conditions of unified fundamentalists.
In this election period, the Ministry of Interior and the Guardian Council have been playing with numbers from the outset. The trend that began in 2019 of tightening the election space has intensified, resulting in a more meaningless electoral competition.
During this period, governance over the density of registered candidates, mostly affiliated with fundamentalists or unknown individuals with no political or executive background, has been emphasized. Meanwhile, the diversity and plurality among qualified candidates are significantly lower than in previous periods.
Among them, reformists and moderates who have passed through the Guardian Council’s filter are both few in number and their positions and stances differ significantly from the desired aspirations of the protesting people demanding change.
Despite the extensive advertising by the thirteenth government and the spokesperson of the Guardian Council, the percentage increase in the number of registered candidates from the twelfth to the eleventh term is 15%, which is 22% less compared to the elections of the tenth and ninth parliaments. However, the major and important difference lies in their quality.
In the tenth parliament, the increase in candidates was natural, but this year it is artificial and organized. Furthermore, the diversity among the candidates of the tenth parliament is much greater than the almost homogeneous group of candidates in the twelfth parliament. The inclination towards candidacy, even among the reformists and moderates, has noticeably decreased in this period.
Another notable point is the consistent percentage of women among all registered candidates in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth parliaments. The total number of qualified candidates is 15,220, equivalent to 61% of all registered volunteers. This ratio is 51% higher than the eleventh term and 40% higher than the tenth term. However, since the candidates mostly belong to a government political orientation, the increase in qualifications does not signify openness and flexibility in the Guardian Council’s performance. It rather reflects a formal and superficial increase.
The number of clerical and seminary-educated individuals is around 200. Five thousand of the candidates were born in the sixties, and 400 were born in the seventies. According to the statistics announced by the political deputy offices of the governorates, the highest disqualifications occurred in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Ardabil, North Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchestan, and Kermanshah provinces, ranging from 55% to 48%, while the lowest disqualifications were in Ilam, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, and Markazi provinces, ranging from 28% to 20%.
Overall, despite the majority of registered candidates having conservative tendencies or lacking a political background, and despite the fact that reformist and critical tendencies had little inclination for candidacy in this period, the disqualification rate is high.
Furthermore, no significant correlation is observed between the degree of disqualification and the level of dissatisfaction or political opposition in the provinces. However, it seems that in provinces with higher disqualifications, there has been relatively more critical tendencies among the candidates.
Ultimately, 25 representatives of the eleventh parliament did not obtain permission to participate in the twelfth term elections. Esfandiar Ekhtiyari, a Zoroastrian representative, is one of the most important ones who did not receive confirmation of his qualification due to a letter to the Amini family defending the Achaemenids and rejecting baseless accusations of dualism towards Zoroastrians. Additionally, some critics of the Rouhani government’s performance were also disqualified.
The parliamentary elections in this term are held in 1,218 main and subsidiary electoral districts. There are around 59,000 polling stations, with 44,000 stationary branches and 15,000 mobile branches. 35,000 branches are urban, and 24,000 branches are rural. Fully electronic elections are only being held experimentally in four electoral districts: Abadan, Malayer, Qom, and Rasht. The total eligible voting population is approximately 61.173 million, with 3.5 million being first-time voters, as announced by the head of the election headquarters.
Internal battle among conservatives
The trivial and insignificant competition of this term’s elections has provided a ground for the expansion of differences and confrontations within the conservative front. Three distinct groups among conservatives are competing in this election period. The first is the Council of Coalition of Islamic Revolution Forces, known as Shana.
This force actually represents the hard power core, and the majority faction of the eleventh parliament belongs to this force. Ebrahim Raisi somehow leads this coalition, and Gholamali Haddad Adel coordinates its activities.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also plays an influential role in leading this coalition. Previously, there were disagreements within it by the Steadfast Front, which seems to have been resolved by meeting their demands in allocating their desired quotas. Groups such as the Sacrificial Supporters, Ansar Hezbollah, and Saeed Jalili’s supporters are also present in this coalition.
Another group is the Coordination Council of the Forces of the Islamic Revolution. This group operates with a focus on the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom and the Combatant Clergy Society of Tehran, continuing the traditional trend of principlists in the form of the Followers of the Imam and Leadership Front. Manouchehr Mottaki and Mohammad Reza Bahonar are the main figures coordinating this group. These two groups may have common candidates, but it is not yet clear whether they can reach a consensus in presenting a complete list in the elections. Alongside these two old groups, a new coalition called the Popular Coalition of the Forces of the Islamic Revolution is emerging.
The Amnā’ coalition is actually formed from 20 fronts of political and ideological union and organization. These forces are actually the most radical part of the fundamentalists, consisting of a faction centered around Mehrdad Bazrpash, Ali Akbar Ra’efipour, and Hamid Rasaei. They are aiming to confront Qalibaf and the pragmatic and old faces of the fundamentalists by attracting some of the Basij and young fundamentalist forces. Recently, the Kayhan newspaper launched a severe attack on them, claiming that they are seeking positions and influence and are trying to disrupt the elections and discourage people from participating by being under the influence of the enemy.
The legitimacy of this coalition is unclear and it may have been formed within the framework of government policy to create artificial competition to heat up the election atmosphere or to satisfy the opportunistic goals of fundamentalists who have no chance of being on the main lists. In this election period, various coalitions and power-building organizations have been formed, one of which is the Assembly of the Rising People’s Institutions of the Islamic Revolution, led by Zahra Elahiyan, a representative of the eleventh parliament. The possibility of presenting a common list between the Amnā’ and the Unity Council exists, but the likelihood is low.
Increasing the gap within the reformist front
The main stream of reformists, centered around the Reformist Front, has decided to present an electoral list in Tehran, although provinces have the discretion to submit their own lists, most provinces’ Reformist Councils have taken a similar approach. The negative reaction of most reformist groups to the twelfth parliamentary elections has widened internal divisions among them.
Groups such as the Facilitators of People’s Participation, National Trust and Neda have decided to participate. Negotiations have taken place between Ali Motahari’s camp and the Moderation and Development Party, and Hassan Rouhani’s supporters for joint electoral activities. In addition, some conservative and close-to-the-Guardian-Council forces among the reformists have decided to participate in the elections with justifications like border participation and opening up opportunities. However, the majority of reformist faces, especially well-known figures and their social base, turning away from the ballot boxes, are features of this period.
In fact, it is not wrong to say that due to the indifference of the majority of people to the elections, the dispute over participation or non-participation in this period is more within the reformists.
The great harmony of election boycotters
The refusal to participate in the twelfth parliamentary elections has created the largest convergence between opposition and critical political forces and various components of civil society. This convergence ranges from moderate reformists to classic opposition overthrowers. During this period, nationalist-religious forces and the freedom movement have also explicitly refrained from participating in the elections, indicating a significant change in their political behavior over the past decade.
It has been almost unprecedented for this level of political forces, both in terms of quantity and diversity, to decide not to participate in the elections and to have a negative attitude towards elections, considering it meaningless. Therefore, it can be said that the Islamic Republic is facing its biggest electoral crisis in this period.
