Qatar’s Reassessment of Regional Mediation
Qatar’s Reassessment of Regional Mediation
Following the events of October 7, 2023, and the escalation of conflicts in the Gaza Strip, Qatar’s role as a mediator in the region has undergone significant changes.
This note attempts to provide a clear picture of Qatar’s proactive balancing against future regional developments by examining the background of Qatar-Hamas relations and recent shifts in Doha’s diplomatic stance and reasons for its cautious approach towards the Gaza crisis.
Over the past two decades, Qatar has emerged as one of the most important regional mediators. By adopting a multifaceted approach, including preventive diplomacy, third-party mediation, and support for multilateral solutions, it has played a role in resolving complex regional conflicts.
A prominent example of these mediations is the Doha Agreement in 2020 between the Taliban and the United States, signed under Qatar’s auspices. Since 2013, Qatar has also facilitated peace talks by hosting the Taliban’s political office in Doha.
Qatar’s mediation efforts have not been limited to Afghanistan.
In the Libyan crisis in 2022, Doha played a significant role in preventing the escalation of civil war by hosting talks between conflicting parties. Additionally, Qatar hosted talks to revive the JCPOA, aiming to bring the parties’ positions closer.
Background and Context of Qatar-Hamas Relations
Although Qatar-Hamas relations began in 2006 after Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections, a turning point occurred in 2012. Two major events that year elevated Doha-Hamas relations to a new level: the historic visit of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, then Emir of Qatar, to Hamas-controlled Gaza, marking the first visit by an Arab leader to the region since Hamas came to power in 2007, and Doha hosting Hamas’s political office, which became the main decision-making base for the movement outside Palestine.
The establishment of Hamas’s political office in Doha played a crucial role in enhancing Qatar’s regional status. This office, hosting senior Hamas leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the political bureau, and Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas abroad, enabled Qatar to act as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The presence of this office in Doha also allowed Qatar to play an effective role in Gaza’s reconstruction after the 2014 and 2021 wars through the Gaza Reconstruction Committee established in 2012.
However, Qatar-Hamas relations have always faced challenges. On one hand, these relations have drawn criticism from Western countries and their regional allies. On the other hand, Qatar has tried to maintain limited relations with Israel to preserve its mediation role. These relations have faced serious challenges, especially after the October 7, 2023 attacks, with increased pressure from the U.S. and Israel on Qatar to exert more pressure on Hamas.
Pressure from the U.S. and Israel
In recent weeks, the U.S. has informed Qatar that Hamas’s presence in Doha is no longer acceptable. This pressure increased after Hamas rejected a ceasefire proposal in October. Previously, in April 2024, Qatar had reassessed Hamas’s presence due to its efforts being undermined by American and Israeli politicians, leading to the temporary relocation of Hamas leaders to Turkey. Interestingly, two weeks later, the Biden administration and Israel requested Qatar to invite Hamas back, as negotiations during the leaders’ stay in Turkey were ineffective.
Failure of Recent Negotiations
The latest round of negotiations ended without result in mid-October. Hamas rejected a short-term ceasefire proposal, while Israel had previously rejected some proposals for a longer ceasefire. Major disagreements focused on the long-term future of Hamas and Israel’s presence in Gaza. These failures demonstrated that despite Qatar’s extensive efforts, its mediation role faces serious obstacles.
Change in the Balance of Power in the Region
Recent developments, especially the assassination of senior Hamas leaders, have changed the balance of power. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Iran in July and the elimination of Yahya Sinwar in Gaza last month have posed serious challenges to Hamas’s leadership structure. Although potential successors like Khalil al-Hayya, who leads ceasefire negotiations for Hamas, and Khaled Meshaal are present in Doha, these leadership changes have impacted the group’s ability to make decisions and negotiate.
Additionally, Qatar’s announcement that Hamas’s political office has lost its purpose indicates that Doha is reassessing its role in regional dynamics, especially as it is recognized as a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. and hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East.
Proactive Balancing Against Future Threats
Within the framework of Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, Qatar’s recent decision to stop mediating in Gaza and reassess hosting Hamas’s political office can be seen as a proactive response to the changing balance of power in the region with Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential elections.
Trump, with his pragmatic approach and emphasis on deal-making in foreign policy, is likely to exert more pressure on America’s regional allies to align with Washington’s policies. Qatar, as a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. that hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East, is well aware of Trump’s deal-making approach from the previous term. Therefore, Doha, understanding that maintaining a balance between relations with the West and regional groups will become more challenging in the new Trump presidency, prefers to redefine its position before the new term begins.
From Walt’s theoretical perspective, Qatar is balancing against a threat arising from a combination of factors: first, Trump’s more aggressive approach towards Iran and its regional allies, which could lead to increased regional tensions; second, the potential increase in pressure on Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel within the framework of the Abraham Accords; and third, Trump’s harsh stance towards Islamist groups, which could increase the cost of hosting Hamas for Qatar.
In this context, Qatar, by taking a proactive approach and announcing the cessation of mediation in Gaza and reassessing the presence of Hamas’s political office, seeks to prevent any potential tensions with the new U.S. administration. This decision shows that Doha, in its security calculations, considers the threat of potential tension with the Trump administration more serious than the costs of reducing its mediation role in the region. In other words, understanding Trump’s pragmatism and deal-making approach, Qatar prefers to adapt its position to the new conditions before new developments occur to reduce potential future pressures.
Scenarios and Alternative Options
Following Qatar’s decision to stop mediating in the Gaza crisis, the most likely scenario is a managed transition, where Doha moves towards gradually reducing its role instead of completely severing ties with Hamas or maintaining the status quo.
This approach allows Qatar to reduce Western pressures while still maintaining some of its regional influence. In this scenario, we will likely see the gradual transfer of Hamas’s political office to a third country like Turkey, while Qatar maintains its indirect communication channels and defines a new role within a multilateral coalition.
In the near future, the mediation model in the Gaza crisis seems to be moving towards a multilateral structure where different countries will take on specialized roles. In this new structure, Turkey is likely to host Hamas’s political office, Egypt will handle security negotiations, Qatar will provide financial and logistical support, and Oman will undertake diplomatic mediation. This multilateral model can distribute risks among various actors, create more flexibility in negotiations, and enjoy higher regional legitimacy.
