The people are the ultimate losers of the failure to revive the JCPOA agreement.
The people are the ultimate losers of the failure to revive the JCPOA agreement, while in the days following the resumption of JCPOA negotiations in Vienna, hopes for reaching an agreement increased day by day. Initial interactions after the end of the meetings led to several rounds of exchanging opinions between Iran and the United States.
Meanwhile, the Iranian people on one side and Europeans on the other followed the interactions between the two parties with their worried eyes. Serious optimism in the days following the negotiations was reflected by European Union officials in their media reactions and statements. After each round of exchanging opinions between Iran and the United States, the EU foreign policy chief and some European country officials expressed serious hope about finalizing the agreement based on the text prepared by the Union.
However, developments at the end of August were initiated by Iran sending its viewpoints, and subsequently, the first day of the new month was heated by the United States’ serious reaction to Iran’s demands. The United States is dissatisfied with what it received from Iran. American officials believe that Iran’s demands are not constructive and reasonable, and they have stated that they will continue to review what the Iranian side has proposed.
Europe is once again standing on the platform of hope and speaking. Borrell has expressed hope that the coming days will be the days of signing the agreement, and the President of France has also clearly stated the same point.
The Iranian regime and the government in Iran, which have presented their demands and were certainly aware in advance of the cold reaction of the Americans, are now resorting to the same phrases the Americans used a few days ago, saying that the ball is in the American court. From the perspective of the Iranian regime, words have now been presented, and they are waiting to receive a response to those words.
Sanctions and exemptions, the role of the agency’s inspection
Two specific topics can be considered as key issues that have slowed down the JCPOA wheel, in the absence of the precise text of Iran’s viewpoints being published. One of them is the issue of guarantees. The apparent story is that Iran seeks specific and strong guarantees for the possible withdrawal of a future hardline American government from the JCPOA in the coming years.
Some experts insist that a multi-year exemption for companies contracting with Iran from U.S. sanctions, if conditioned on Iran’s full compliance with the agreement in the event of U.S. withdrawal, does not solve the problem and also takes away the specific tools and solutions based on the JCPOA 2015 text from Iran. In this discussion, it must be considered that there is still a long way to go to solve the problem of cooperation between Iranians and American companies and businesses.
These sanctions and exemptions, and the discussion of guaranteeing non-sanctioning of foreign companies contracting with Iran, will focus more on non-American companies. Both the European Union and China and India have important tools in this regard to ensure the non-sanctioning of their companies. The American guarantee structure regarding non-sanctioning of companies contracting with Iran in the event of a future American government withdrawing from the JCPOA can be achieved with the agreement of the European Union and the U.S., and also the agreement of countries that Iran chooses and introduces to the U.S.
This solution is not a miracle or magic that has been discovered by us at this moment. The current U.S. government is in office until January 2025, and the power of Congress, even if it is entirely in the hands of Republicans, is not sufficient to dismantle the structure explained. It is very obvious and simple that convergence and de-escalation between Iran and the Arab Gulf countries will help improve the guarantee structure. The JCPOA is the structure for controlling Iran’s nuclear program.
Previously, in JCPOA writings, we narrated and explained that this control structure is operational, and the bargaining space and creating sensitivity within the framework of changing and transforming the nuclear program for Iran have not been opened and are not open. The current U.S. government cannot provide a guarantee that potentially allows Iran to exit the agreement.
Not because Iran would reach nuclear weapons overnight in response to an American government withdrawing from the JCPOA, but for the simple reason that the control structure of a country’s nuclear program that has violated the non-proliferation treaty and has been documented to pursue nuclear weapons cannot be shaped in any way with fundamental exceptions and by providing an exit space from the control structure.
This two-and-a-half-year guarantee for non-sanctioning of foreign companies in case of an American government withdrawing from the JCPOA is a good achievement if it is accompanied by the agreement of Europeans, China, India, and other countries with the U.S.
The role of the agency’s inspection
The final closure of the safeguards file and arranging the inspection and control process of the International Atomic Energy Agency is an issue that, if resolved based on priorities and national security interests in a context based on understanding, will benefit Iran. The reality is that solving this issue is not possible without finalizing the review of discovered materials in Iran’s facilities and the IAEA’s final opinion on Iran’s safeguards violations.
After the discovery of uranium in some of Iran’s facilities, it can no longer be expected that Rafael Grossi will turn a blind eye and not pursue the matter. The main function of the JCPOA is this process, which is being implemented. The control tools embedded in the JCPOA 2015 process are powerful enough to monitor such instances in the future as well. The best way was to form a technical and expert team that would collaborate and communicate with the agency’s experts during the review of these cases.
The best and indeed only way has been and is Iran’s strong presence in the structure of its program’s control by the agency in the form of expert cooperation. Regarding the details and functioning of the JCPOA and the importance of understanding this reality that the JCPOA as a control structure for Iran’s nuclear program is operational, we have spoken before and will explain further in detail after this writing.
The current situation and political developments in the Middle East, and especially the new interactions that Russia has initiated in confrontation with the West, which have also involved Iran, have made the need to revive a complete JCPOA more urgent.
Otherwise, the people will struggle with the pressure of continued sanctions and the problems arising from them, even if the benefits of monopolies resulting from the sanctions highlight the benefit of not lifting the sanctions for certain groups.
The U.S. elections in November will be held alongside the Israeli elections, and the heated atmosphere of the election campaigns in tense conditions will never be suitable for showing flexibility towards Iran. The Iranian regime is well aware of this point and it should be hoped that understanding this reality will help materialize the good concessions taken from the U.S. and stamp its approval on the agreement before the American and Israeli elections become more serious. The Europeans, who are optimistic and even confident up to this moment, are also hopeful.