Gaza in fog
The future of Gaza as a hostage to political and military power struggles in the region
Gaza in fog, the future of Gaza after the October War has become a great puzzle for international observers. It has the potential to become one of the longest conflicts between Israel and the resistance axis, considering its impact on the region and Iran. Therefore, we have decided to examine the future of Gaza in Iran Gate.
With the failure of negotiations for a ceasefire in the Gaza war, it seems that the Israeli government is more determined than ever to achieve the goals it initially set for this war: the destruction of Hamas, freeing the hostages through military operations, without engaging in further negotiations or exchanges with this group, and eliminating any threat that could be posed by Gaza to Israel.
Whether these goals are achieved or, on the contrary, negotiations and temporary deals between the parties resume, it is unlikely that Gaza will return to its pre-October 7th state and that Hamas will continue to have full control over the region as before. Israel, the United States, and European countries are unlikely to accept this.
For some countries in the region that have always had problems with this group, its ideology, its actions, and its relationship with the Islamic Republic, the situation is more or less the same. In line with the ongoing conflict, the future of Gaza is being discussed and debated in international diplomatic discussions.
There are Arab countries in the world that emphasize that the issue of governing Gaza, even in the short term without a long-term vision for the overall Palestinian issue, is not solvable. And even if it is solved, it will not be sustainable and will lead to the next conflict.
However, dealing with the Gaza issue after the current situation is more urgent than being conditional on a definitive and clear solution to the historical challenge of the Middle East. In this regard, different ideas are being proposed for the temporary governance of Gaza.
These options have different drawbacks and shortcomings.
One option in the discussions is to continue a situation that is roughly similar to the current situation in Gaza until October 7th, with a significantly weakened Hamas and a stronger blockade, including the complete cutoff of Gaza’s communication with Israel, which includes the inability of Gaza’s workforce to enter Israel for income and the increased need for international aid for the people of Gaza.
Some Israeli officials have spoken about the necessity of shrinking Gaza and expanding the buffer zone between Israel and Gaza in order to provide greater security for the residents of southern Israel. This statement may fit within the framework of this option or it may be a precursor to the implementation of a more radical option, which will be discussed later.
Whatever the case may be, considering Israel’s slogan and its allies’ stance on the complete destruction of Hamas or the definite neutralization of its access to power structures and management in Palestinian territories, it is unlikely that such options can be easily implemented or that Tel Aviv would readily agree to them.
However, it is not completely negated that the course of the war aligns with Israel’s slogans and objectives, and that Hamas, even if weakened, remains a significant factor among the people of Gaza and the coastal strip, as well as in the political structure of these regions. Nevertheless, it is currently not very likely in the equations and targeting strategies.
Another option under discussion is the reoccupation of Gaza by the Israeli army and the possibility of creating new Jewish settlements in the area. Some right-wing extremist ministers within the Israeli cabinet, such as Orit Struck, Minister of Settlement Affairs, have not ruled out this option and have referred to its historical and legitimate aspects. For example, Orit Struck believes that Gaza is an inseparable part of Israel and that there will come a day when we will return there again.
This option, especially if the Palestinians living in Gaza continue to stay there, contradicts the desires of most Israelis who have emphasized their inclination towards complete separation from Palestinian territories in recent polls. The presence of the army in Gaza, which is still the residence of Palestinians, is in conflict with this.
In terms of financial and security costs, it is more expensive than it is sustainable, as these costs were the reason behind the decision of Ariel Sharon, one of the most right-wing prime ministers of Israel, to withdraw forces from Gaza and evacuate over eight thousand Jewish settlers from the area in 2005.
The relocation of Palestinians from Gaza is a desirable but difficult option.
Complete separation from Palestinians is only possible for some Israeli authorities and political forums by expelling the Palestinians living in Gaza from this area and completely seizing this narrow strip by Israel. This solution, which is the darkest and most negative option for the current residents of Gaza, has been discussed intermittently throughout the 75 years since the establishment of the State of Israel.
Before the establishment of Israel in 1948, Gaza had an area of approximately 360 square kilometers and a population of 80,000. However, by the end of 1948, 160,000 Palestinian refugees were added to the population of Gaza.
One year later, following the signing of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Egypt, the administration of Gaza was handed over to Egypt. However, the increase in the population of this area was due to the return of Palestinian refugees who had gone to other countries, as well as the efforts of some of these Palestinians to infiltrate Israeli territory in order to reclaim their movable properties from their previous homes and belongings from which they had been displaced.
In addition, the belief in having a country from the river to the sea has created a critical security crisis for Israel, with conflicts and attacks from Gaza refugees on the southern border. Since then, the idea of relocating Palestinians to the Sinai Desert has been discussed among some political and security circles in Israel.
In 1950, King Farouk of Egypt rejected the US proposal to purchase the Sinai Peninsula for the settlement of Palestinians. However, two years later, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who came to power in Egypt after overthrowing the monarchy, expressed a desire to relocate 60,000 Gazans to the northern Sinai Desert.
Collaboration with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in this regard had been ongoing for two years, but the dissatisfaction of the people of Gaza with this plan led to widespread protests in 1955, known as the March Uprising, which put an end to this idea and resulted in the Egyptian government granting certain political and social freedoms to the people of Gaza.
My idea of relocation was rejected, but other benefits were left hanging and not acted upon. Even rebel leaders were arrested and remained imprisoned in Egyptian prisons for years. In 1967, when Israel occupied Gaza and the Sinai Desert, the discussion of relocating some of the people from Gaza to Sinai resurfaced. As a result, thousands of Gaza residents were transferred to the city of Rafah in the occupied Sinai by Israel.
In the 1979 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, which aimed at establishing peace and ending the occupation of Sinai, it was also agreed that the relocated Gazans in Rafah, Egypt, would return to their original place of residence in Gaza. However, the implementation of this decision took ten years.
Since then, the issue of relocating parts of the Gaza population to Sinai has occasionally been raised, both as an idea and as a subject for mostly confidential negotiations between official authorities of Israel, the United States, Egypt, Jordan, autonomous organizations, and even Hamas itself.
Since the beginning of the current war in Gaza, there has been a discussion about relocating or expelling the people of this region to the Sinai Desert in Egypt. Currently, in Israel, there are two publicly debated plans for moving the people of Gaza. One plan is proposed by the research institute Mesgaav, which is managed by Meir Ben-Shabbat, who was previously an advisor to Netanyahu and his representative on special issues. The second plan is being developed in the Israeli Ministry of Security.
The first plan advocates for the resettlement of Gazans in various cities in Egypt, while the second plan suggests relocating them to the Sinai Desert and possibly accepting some of them in Western countries. However, both plans acknowledge the initial phase of moving Gazans to the southern part of this region. The next phase would be when the living conditions for this population deteriorate in the south, and they have no choice but to flee to the northern part of the Sinai Desert. Egypt would also be unable to close its borders against such a wave of escape.
A respectful solution or expulsion in the Hail region.
The State of Israel does not officially support such plans, but it is still not considered a viable option. In other words, the idea of Gaza without Gazans and the annexation of this area to Israel is not unfamiliar among some political parties and circles in the country, especially since the statements of various officials with diverse political inclinations do not categorically reject such options. The lack of consideration for the well-being and safety of ordinary and non-combatant citizens of Gaza in the current war, and the disregard for their displacement, has practically fueled this suspicion that ultimately such a plan will be implemented.
Yisrael Katz, the Minister of Energy of Israel, declared at the beginning of the war that Gaza will be deprived of electricity, fuel, and water pump operations until all hostages return home. This statement has to a large extent taken on an operational dimension during the course of the war. Accusing all the people of Gaza of colluding with Hamas, which is repeated in the speeches of some senior Israeli officials, also supports the suspicion that the end of the war will result in settling accounts with the entire population and removing them from Israel.
Simha Rotman, a member of the religious Zionist party that is a partner in the governing coalition, recently stated in an interview that after the world war, attention should be paid to resolving the problems of the people of Gaza. He indirectly hinted that 75% of the population in Gaza are refugees, either themselves or their parents and ancestors, who came there as refugees. He said that there is no reason for the United Nations to keep them in Gaza.
Nakba refers to the events surrounding the establishment of Israel in 1948, in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were displaced from their lands, many of whom sought refuge in Gaza. Some of the current population in Gaza are descendants of those refugees.
Ram Ben Barak, a senior member of the opposition party Future Existence and former deputy director of Mossad, and Danny Danon, former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations and current representative of the ruling Likud party, have expressed their support for a voluntary relocation of Gaza residents. They have called on Western countries to open their doors to the people of Gaza through a call published in The Wall Street Journal.
As mentioned, these positions have not been officially confirmed. Both Benjamin Netanyahu and his senior advisor, Mike Rego, have discussed the creation of a buffer zone around Gaza after the end of the war. This buffer zone is intended to make any armed action against Israel from within Gaza impossible. The exact details of this zone are still unknown, but critics doubt that it will lead to improved conditions for the people of Gaza, as ultimately they may prefer to leave the area rather than remain there.
With all the progress made, both officially and unofficially, by the right-wing political factions in Israel, it is crucial for Gaza to receive support and cooperation not only from its forced companions but also from Israel’s main ally, the United States, and Arab countries such as Egypt, who have vehemently opposed any displacement of the people of Gaza.
Part of the concern about such a development, aside from disregarding the well-being of a population of over two million worldwide, stems from the fear that some extremist right-wing factions in Israel may later decide to implement such a plan regarding the West Bank, pushing Palestinians in this region to either move to Jordan or elsewhere, in an attempt to permanently solve the Palestinian issue. The hope of these right-wing extremist factions is that by implementing this plan, there would be no need for a fair and just solution that involves the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel or the acceptance of Palestinians as equal citizens with the rights of a two-nation country.
Realistic but more challenging options
The option of entrusting the affairs of Gaza to multinational forces, with or without the involvement of the United Nations, is a less aggressive and more realistic approach. This option, however, faces the challenge that Israel and the United Nations have long been involved in conflicts and tensions, particularly in the recent war. Tel Aviv sees this organization as biased and opposed to its actions in the way it has conducted the war.
The possibility of such options being realized with the support of trusted Arab countries like Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain is almost unlikely. These countries have conditioned the resolution of the Gaza issue after the war on the establishment of a clear vision for a complete solution to the chronic problem of the Palestinians.
Entrusting the affairs of Gaza to self-governing institutions located on the West Bank coast is also not a very promising option. Right-wing Israelis have always had issues with the level of authority that self-governing institutions on the same coastline possess. These institutions are currently facing personnel, financial, and structural challenges.
The loss of democratic legitimacy in these organizations, which have not witnessed elections for years, and their system, which is even tainted by corruption and social weakness in the Western world, is a major reason. Therefore, it will be difficult for Gaza to recover and take charge of its management.
Even securing democratic legitimacy for autonomous organizations through elections is unlikely to be accompanied by the extension of their power to Gaza. This is because most Palestinian groups emphasize that they are not willing to take any steps towards solving Gaza’s problems after the war without serious guarantees regarding the overall resolution of the Palestinian issue.
In general, the future of Gaza and the existence or non-existence of Hamas in that future largely depend on the course and actions of the ongoing war. However, if this war proceeds according to Israel’s defined objectives and Hamas is effectively removed or marginalized from the Palestinian political scene, it is unlikely that the psychological, stable, and non-controversial management of Gaza can be achieved through its occupation by the Israeli army or the creation of a buffer zone, or that the option of completely expelling Gazans from this area can be implemented.
This is while, considering the approaches and ideas that have emerged internationally and regionally, more realistic options for the temporary resolution of Gaza’s affairs may not have a chance of full and successful implementation without addressing the long-standing Palestinian issue. Everything may be contingent upon outlining a definitive vision for the most chronic problem in the Middle East and the fate of the Palestinians, a vision that is perceived as providing genuine and sustainable security for Israel. Otherwise, the cycle of violence, bloodshed, and instability in the region will continue to persist.
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